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Pervasive digitization of human environment has dramatically changed our everyday lives.
New technologies which have become an integral part of our daily routine have deeply affected
our perception of the surrounding world and have opened qualitatively new opportunities. In
an urban environment, the influence of such changes is especially tangible and acute. For
example, ubiquitous computing (also commonly referred to as UbiComp) is a pure vision no
more and has transformed the digital world dramatically. Pervasive use of smartphones, in-
tegration of processing power into various artefacts as well as the overall miniaturization of
computing devices can already be witnessed on a daily basis even by laypersons. In particular,
transport being an integral part of any urban ecosystem have been affected by these changes.
Consequently, public transport systems have undergone transformation as well and are cur-
rently dynamically evolving. In many cities around the world, the concept of the so-called
electronic ticketing (e-ticketing) is being extensively used for issuing travel permissions which
may eventually result in conventional paper-based tickets being completely phased out already
in the nearest future. Opal Card in Sydney [1], Oyster Card in London [2], Touch & Travel in
Germany [3] and many more are all the examples of how well the e-ticketing has been accepted
both by customers and public transport companies.
Despite numerous benefits provided by such e-ticketing systems for public transport, serious
privacy concern arise. The main reason lies in the fact that using these systems may imply the
dramatic multiplication of digital traces left by individuals, also beyond the transport scope.
Unfortunately, there has been little effort so far to explicitly tackle this issue. There is still
not enough motivation and public pressure imposed on industry to invest into privacy. In
academia, the majority of solutions targeted at this problem quite often limit the real-world
pertinence of the resultant privacy-preserving concepts due to the fact that inherent advantages
of e-ticketing systems for public transport cannot be fully leveraged.
This thesis is aimed at solving the aforementioned problem by providing a privacy-preserving
framework which can be used for developing e-ticketing systems for public transport with
privacy protection integrated from the outset. At the same time, the advantages of e-ticketing
such as fine-grained billing, flexible pricing schemes, and transparent use (which are often the
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1 Introduction
Since the last decade, computing has made a giant leap forward and continues to evolve rapidly
deeply penetrating into everyday life and accompanying individuals everywhere, anytime. The
technological advance has not only lead to the dramatic burst of computational power but,
what may be even more important, has made it possible to integrate intelligence into the
surrounding artefacts. The latter has become a significant driver for implementing the vision
of the so-called Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp) into life.
Despite the numerous benefits such systems provide, serious concerns over privacy of their
users arise, since the ubiquitous properties may pave the way to privacy invasion. This quite
often becomes a serious hurdle on the way to public acceptance of ubiquitous systems and
thus directly influences their commercial success. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on the
development of necessary concepts for making ubiquitous systems privacy-respecting while
preserving their core advantages (such as easiness of use, etc.) and by this making such
systems more attractive for customers. Since the notion of a ubiquitous system is still quite
broad, the more specific case of RFID/NFC-based systems was considered. Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) technology together with well standardized Near Field Communication
(NFC) can be indeed regarded to be among the main enablers of UbiComp. More specifically,
the focus was made on e-ticketing systems for public transport based on NFC/RFID.
1.1 Motivation
As ubiquitous computing has already transformed itself from a vision to reality, various parts
of our daily lives are being rapidly affected by it. The transport infrastructure of the future
comprising of the so-called intelligent transport systems (ITS) is one of the tangible examples of
this process. The area of public transport being an inherent part of any urban transport system
is, therefore, no exception either. More specifically, the trend of replacing the conventional
paper-based tickets with their electronics counterparts (e-tickets) is constantly growing. Public
transport systems incorporating the e-ticketing paradigm are referred to as e-ticketing systems
for public transport (ESPT) within this dissertation. The front-end of ESPT is typically based
on RFID/NFC technologies. Such systems have already been in operation for quite a while in
many large cities around the world, for example in London [2], Singapore [11] or Sa˜o Paulo [12].
In fact, the latest advances in mobile technology allowing to integrate NFC into widely spread
smartphones have opened new opportunities for ESPT at the same making such e-ticketing
systems even more ubiquitous.
Along with the numerous benefits of future public transport systems, serious privacy con-
cerns arise. The utilization of e-tickets integrated into a customer’s smartphone with NFC
support or stored on a smart card is going to dramatically multiply the digital traces left by
people using the system. This paves the way to various misuse scenarios if no mechanisms for
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privacy protection are explicitly considered. Till now, this issue has not been sufficiently ad-
dressed by the industry. The academic solutions developed so far are either based on additional
assumptions or are far too inefficient to be integrated into a real-life system. Moreover, the in-
herent trade-offs between privacy protection and security (especially for a transport authority)
as well as between privacy and efficiency pose a significant challenge for system developers.
Furthermore, the majority of academic privacy-preserving solutions have a negative side-effect
of disabling some important features of ESPT which are, however, an important advantage of
such systems. For example, the following features could be referred to: the support for flexible,
highly customizable tariff schemes and fine-grained billing, easiness of use, etc. Therefore, a
privacy-preserving solution leveraging the full potential1 of ESPT is highly required.
1.2 Research Area and Dissertation Focus
UbiComp is a hot topic in the scientific community. It is a complex and ambiguous notion in-
corporating different technologies and is often used in conjunction with other related buzzwords
such as pervasive computing, ambient intelligence (AmI) or the Internet of things (IoT). In or-
der to resolve possible ambiguities, the term ubiquitous systems is used within this dissertation
referring to the (distributed) systems the main parts of which consist of powerful internet-
worked processing centers (back-end) and the intelligence-enabled artefacts (front-end). The
latter is responsible for the ”ubiquity” of a system, whereas the former creates the necessary
backbone network which is required to interconnect the front-end devices and keep the system
functioning (background processes, implementing system logic, etc.). The third part – the
bridging element – interconnects front-end and back-end therefore acting as a bridge between
the two main components.
The classic and by far the most widespread technology for realization of such ubiquitous
systems is RFID. Another promising technology very closely related to RFID is the so-called
NFC currently being actively promoted by several leading IT companies. Therefore, in this
dissertation, the focus is made on RFID- and NFC-based ubiquitous systems. Since the area
of NFC and especially RFID is rather broad being used in different application domains and
incorporating several standards, the e-ticketing domain was chosen as the primary research
target. More specifically, the e-ticketing systems for public transport (ESPT) were considered.
The basic architecture of such systems essentially consists of e-tickets residing on a user device
(a smart card or an NFC-enabled smartphone), terminals validating e-tickets, and the back-end
(a more detailed description is presented in Section 2.3). Along with the numerous benefits
this kind of e-ticketing systems provide, serious privacy concerns arise (see the discussion in
Section 2.1). The main reason for that is the dramatic increase in the amount of digital traces
left by the customers. This thesis, therefore, is dedicated to the subject of privacy preservation
in ESPT. More specifically, the solution is devised which on the one hand aims at protecting
privacy of system’s customers, and on the other hand allows for the inherent benefits of e-
ticketing systems, such as transparent usage and benefits from flexible tariffs (and possibly
individual discounts) by leveraging the fine-grained billing approach.
1The advantages of ESPT are discussed in Section 2.1.1.
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1.3 Main Goals of the Work
The main goal of this dissertation is to develop a framework for building a loosely-coupled
privacy-preserving e-ticketing system which (1) allows for local validation of e-tickets and
(2) supports fine-grained billing for registered customers. Loosely-coupled architecture implies
that terminals can serve check-in/out requests in the front-end without requiring real-time
connection to the back-end. This is an important requirement since it to a large extent defines
the real-world pertinence of an e-ticketing system for public transport. Based on the main goal
described above, the specific research questions (RQ) have been derived for this work which
are summarized below.
Research Questions
RQ 1. How to provide for a privacy-preserving local validation at the terminal side such that:
a) valid e-tickets remain anonymous to the terminal;
b) invalid e-tickets are rejected.
RQ 2. How to allow for privacy-preserving travel records processing in the back-end such
that:
a) fine-grained billing for the registered tickets is possible;
b) customer identification is prevented.
Main Challenges
The aforementioned research questions introduce the following challenges for system develop-
ers:
Challenge 1. Terminals are widely distributed in the system and therefore can not be entrusted
to manage privacy-sensitive information pertaining to e-tickets and owners thereof. There-
fore, it should be possible for terminals (1) to authenticate e-tickets and (2) to check
their validity without being able to identify them or even to distinguish between them.
Challenge 2. In order to enable fine-grained billing for registered customers, different rides
pertaining to a single customer have to be correlated in some way. This, however, has
privacy implications, since e-tickets (and hence their owners) could be a subject to illegal
tracking.
1.4 Main Contributions
The contribution of this thesis is a privacy-preserving framework which explicitly addresses
the issues of privacy protection in e-ticketing systems for public transport (ESPT). On the
one hand, it allows for the implementation of flexible pricing schemes and fine-grained billing.
A transport authority, therefore, would be able to fully leverage the whole potential of such
systems. On the other hand, our solution addresses privacy protection from the outset through
the specific system design. Moreover, in contrast to several other solutions, the developed
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framework is based on a loosely-coupled architecture implying that terminals do not have to
maintain permanent real-time connection to the back-end in order to serve check-in/check-out
requests in the front-end. The main contributions of the thesis are summarized below.
1. Design and evaluation of a framework allowing to develop privacy-preserving e-ticketing
systems for public transport.
a) The developed approach enables for the implementation of fine-grained billing and
transparent tariff schemes in a natural way.
b) At the same time, privacy properties can be retained.
2. Important findings with respect to practical realization of interactive privacy-preserving
protocols on end user devices (RFID smart cards and NFC-enabled smartphones):
a) The issues concerning the implementation of interactive protocols via an NFC in-
terface on Android-based smartphones have been discussed.
b) The hurdles encountered while applying the protocols requiring the non-standard
cryptographic primitives to conventional smart cards were described.
3. Classification of the field with respect to privacy preservation in the context of public
transport systems based on e-ticketing was presented.
The core findings of the thesis were published at the following conferences:
 Ivan Gudymenko. A Privacy-Preserving E-Ticketing System for Public Transportation
Supporting Fine-Granular Billing and Local Validation. In Proceedings of the 7th Inter-
national Conference on Security of Information and Networks, Glasgow, UK, SIN ’14,
New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM. Best paper award in section ”Assuarance and Trust”
 Ivan Gudymenko, Felipe Sousa, and Stefan Ko¨psell. A Simple and Secure E-Ticketing
System for Intelligent Public Transportation based on NFC. In The First International
Conference on IoT in Urban Space, Rome, Italy, Urb-IoT, New York, NY, USA, 2014.
ACM
 Ivan Gudymenko. On Protection of the User’s Privacy in Ubiquitous E-ticketing Systems
Based on RFID and NFC Technologies. In PECCS 2013 - Proceedings of the 3rd Inter-
national Conference on Pervasive Embedded Computing and Communication Systems.
SciTePress, February 2013
 Florian Kerschbaum, Hoon Wei Lim, and Ivan Gudymenko. Privacy-Preserving Billing
for e-Ticketing Systems in Public Transportation. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM work-
shop on privacy in the electronic society, WPES’2013 , WPES ’13, pages 143–154, New




After the introduction, the necessary background on e-ticketing systems and underlying tech-
nologies is presented in Chapter 2. Then, the privacy issues in the e-ticketing domain are
introduced in Chapter 3 together with the discussion of generic threats and countermeasures
as well as with the analysis of the degree to which privacy is considered in the respective RFID
and NFC standards. Chapter 3 is concluded by the discussion of the core requirements for a
privacy-preserving e-ticketing system together with the adopted attacker model. A detailed
related work review is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is devoted to the discussion of our
solution. The respective evaluation is provided in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, the target area of research together with the respective motivation and problem
statement were presented. The main goals and research questions for the dissertation have been
discussed and the main challenges outlined. The core contributions of the thesis together with
the respective publications have been summarized
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In this chapter, the e-ticketing concept is discussed in detail. Firstly, its advantages and
disadvantages are highlighted in Section 2.1. Main functional types of an e-ticket together
with the most relevant application areas are presented in Section 2.2. The general applica-
tion scenario of public transport employing the e-ticketing concept which is the focus of this
dissertation is outlined in Section 2.3. Different fare collection approaches in e-ticketing are
discussed in Section 2.4 highlighting the ones based on check-in/check-out. The underlying
technologies (RFID and NFC) enabling check-in/check-out in e-ticketing systems for public
transport (ESPT) together with the respective standards are discussed in Section 2.5. The
chapter is concluded with raising the concerns over privacy-friendliness of ESPT which serves
as the logical transition to Chapter 3 where these issues are discussed in detail.
2.1 E-ticketing in Public Transport: Pros and Contras
E-ticketing is an attractive approach to fare management since it has a decent potential of
providing a set of unique long-term benefits both for the customers of an e-ticketing system
and for the service providers (public transport companies).
2.1.1 E-ticketing: Advantages
For customers, an e-ticketing system can potentially offer the following advantages:
 Faster and more convenient verification of a ticket [10];
 Saving on travel expenses due to the ”pay-as-you-go” feature (paying for the actual
distance travelled);
 The ability to profit from a flexible fare pricing scheme (possibly with individual discounts
and special offers);
 Revocation of lost tickets and their replacement [10];
 Increased usability:
– no need to have change for local ticket issuing machines1 (for instance, for customers
only sporadically using the transport service or while being in another city);
– no need to learn complex fare pricing schemes: the system can automatically choose
the best option and possibly suggest a discount (e.g., based on the customer’s travel
habits);
1This is possible if some form of electronic payment is supported. For convenience, the e-ticket could even
be linked to the bank account of a customer who can then transparently use the transport service in another
city, for example, without having to buy a single trip ticket from a local ticket issuing machine.
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For public transport companies, the adoption of the e-ticketing concept can be beneficial
due to the following reasons:
 Decrease in system maintenance costs [10, 17];
 Infrastructure optimization through the analysis of detailed statistics (a very important
source of feedback);
 Significant reduction of payment handling costs [18];
 Improvement of the fare dodgers rate through more efficient ticket verification [10];
 Mitigation of the ticket forgery problem by leveraging various digital tools (e.g., based
on digital signatures, authentication primitives, etc.) [10];
 The ability to create highly flexible fare pricing schemes and innovative ticketing solu-
tions [17];
 The opportunity to create innovative multi-application schemes combining the transit
with the non-transit1 functions [17];
 The possibility to create interoperable solutions between cooperating transport service
providers with subsequent revenue sharing2;
 Consequently, transport service providers can attract more customers and therefore gen-
erate more revenue.
2.1.2 E-ticketing: Disadvantages
Along with tangible benefits, the concept of e-ticketing raises several concerns. For a customer,
it can be the possible reluctance to using a conventional transport system in a new way (espe-
cially among the elderly). Moreover, the privacy-related issues arise, namely:
 Ubiquitous customer identification;
 The possibility of customer profiling (creation of location patterns, etc.);
 The resulting privacy violation through the increased surveillance potential (”The Big
Brother” problem).
If the privacy concerns outweigh the possible benefits for the user, the latter is likely to
prefer using the public transport system in a conventional way, which my eventually hinder
the successful roll-out of the respective e-ticketing system. For example, in the Netherlands
a similar situation occurred in the area of smart metering. Namely, the increased concerns
over privacy and the resulting public outcry introduced a serious hurdle for the successful
deployment of the local smart metering system [19].
1An example of this would be using an e-ticket for a discount in food vending machines deployed at sta-
tions, etc.
2The e-ticketing concept enables to create an interoperable architecture of public transport services from
different transport companies (e.g., in different cities or even countries). This allows a customer to use a single
e-ticket with different providers in a transparent way. At the same time, the providers of transport service can
share the profits from collaborative business relations.
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For transport companies, moving to an e-ticketing system may raise the following con-
cerns:
 Relatively high system development costs;
 Lack of mature interoperable solutions and standardization in the area as a whole (many
of the developed e-ticketing systems are proprietary);
 The necessity to invest in the creation of a new infrastructure and its deployment (which
might involve high risks for a relatively low-profit public transport business [17]);
 Possible reluctance to using the system from the customer side due to privacy reasons.
Moreover, due to constantly growing privacy awareness, public transport companies may
be pushed to additionally invest in privacy to retain current customer base and attract
new customers.
 To ensure interoperability between different service providers, the respective architecture
must be developed to provide for efficient, secure, and privacy-respecting sharing of
the respective billing information, which introduces yet another challenge to transport
companies.
2.2 Main Functional Types of an E-ticket and Application Areas
There exist several fundamentally different management schemes for e-ticketing systems which
by analogy with the classification presented in [20] can be roughly divided into account-based
and card-based. The notion of an electronic ticket (or an e-ticket), therefore, can be respec-
tively understood in several ways, namely as (1) a widely used online ticket or as (2) a ”smart
ticket” – an electronic medium (e.g., an RFID or NFC chip) holding the digitalized version of
rights to claim a certain service (e.g., a travel permission). The former has already become
a conventional way of issuing tickets for public transport, events, etc., through creation and
registration of the respective digital record at the service provider side. A user then simply
prints out a copy of the ticket itinerary which usually contains the reservation number essen-
tially serving as a reference to the respective digital record in the back-end. Upon check-in, the
itinerary is presented possibly together with the document certifying identity (e.g., a passport).
To the contrary, the second type of an e-ticket (a ”smart ticket”) is stored on a user device
in the form factor of a smart card or a smart phone, for example. Such e-ticket can by itself
prove the validity of a service request to an electronic validator by this rendering the need of
personal ID check unnecessary in many cases.
E-ticketing systems using the latter type of an e-ticket are in the focus of this dissertation
(see Figure 2.1). In order to avoid ambiguities, the term e-ticket is further used solely with
respect to the second type of an e-ticket.
It should be mentioned, that the e-ticketing concept can be utilized in several application
domains such as public transport, event ticketing, fitness studious, etc. Each of them im-
poses specific requirements on the e-ticketing system which determines the eventual design of
the latter. In this dissertation, however, the focus is made on public transport domain, see
Figure 2.1.
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public transport
event ticketing




Figure 2.1: E-ticket taxonomy depicting the main application areas. The dissertation focuses
on public transport which is respectively marked.
2.3 E-ticketing in Public Transport: A General Application Scenario
The e-ticketing concept can be implemented in a number of ways. The general application
scenario, however, can be described as follows (see Figure 2.2). A customer acquires an e-
ticket possibly registering himself to enable fine-grained billing and flexible pricing schemes with
individual discounts, for example (step 1 in Figure 2.2). The trip begins when the customer
enters the transport vehicle and checks in (step 2a). The check-in procedure is performed
through the reading device (reader) installed in the vehicle. On successful validation, the
reader forwards the e-ticket ID to the on-board processing unit which registers the check-in
time, the geographical coordinates1, etc. When the customer has reached the final destination,
he/she checks out (using the on-board reader) and leaves the transport vehicle (step 2b).
Similarly to the check-in case, the time, location, etc. are registered again and the co-called
travel record is eventually formed. The latter is then communicated to the back-end system
for processing purposes, statistics analysis and possibly for the application of individual fare
pricing schemes and fine-grained billing (step 3). All interchanges performed by the customer
during the trip are, therefore, registered, respectively processed, and subsequently included
into the bill. Note that depending on the system implementation, the reader functionality and
subsequent event processing may be encapsulated in a single device which is often referred to
as a terminal. Moreover, terminals may be deployed at the stops (i.e. stationary terminals)
and not on the vehicle. Furthermore, the adopted scheme for fare collection determines if and
how travel records are created (see the respective discussion in Section 2.4).
1The coordinates determination can be performed through the GPS technology or, for example, by regis-
tering the stop where a customer entered the transport vehicle. The combined approached is used in a so-called
Vehicle Location System (VLS) which was deployed in Singapore public transport system [21].
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Figure 2.2: E-ticketing: a general application scenario.
2.4 Fare Collection in E-ticketing: Main Approaches
One of the main advantages of e-ticketing is the ability to collect transport fares in an auto-
mated fashion which is often referred to as automated fare collection (AFC). There are several
approaches which enable AFC, see Figure 2.3. The chosen approach determines how price






Figure 2.3: Approaches to fare collection in e-ticketing.
The first class of approaches collectively referred to as electronic paper ticket (EPT) considers
the customer device (e.g., a smart card or a smartphone) essentially acting as an electronic
purse, i.e. being a cashless alternative to the conventional paper-based approach [22]. EPT is
considered to be rather inflexible compared to other approaches since in this case the price for
a trip is usually zone dependent and cannot be directly inferred from the actual travel distance
and other relevant parameters. Therefore, the check-out procedure (step 2b in Figure 2.2) is
usually not necessary1. An example of the public transport system using the EPT approach
1Some modified versions of this approach involve the check-out procedure to provide for rebates and to
29
2 Background: E-Ticketing Systems and Underlying Technology
is OstalbMobil [23] in Aalen, Germany.
In case of fare collection based on check-in/check-out (CICO), the events of a passenger
entering and leaving the transport vehicle are registered by terminals. It enables the creation
of flexible pricing schemes which operate on the respective travel information pertaining to
a customer. Moreover, different loyalty programs can be developed more easily supporting
fine-grained billing and other services.
In pure CICO (see approach 2a in Figure 2.3), explicit check-in/check-out on respectively
entering and leaving the transport vehicle is carried out. This is usually performed by a user
putting his/her device with an e-ticket in the vicinity of the dedicated area of a terminal (e.g.,
shortly touching the active surface). For example, the Octopus Card [24] in Hong-Kong and
the Dutch OV-Chipkaart [25] are the public transport systems utilizing pure CICO for fare
collection.
The approaches to fare collection termed seamless CICO within this dissertation in essence
differentiate themselves from pure CICO mainly by the technical means of registering check-
in/check-out events. As described in [26], walk in/walk out (WIWO) implies that the system
automatically recognizes when a user gets in (walks in) and leaves (walks out) the vehicle.
The procedure is performed in a wireless fashion and involves two electromagnetic fields. The
low-frequency (LF) field is used for e-ticket activation as well as for determining the check-
in/check-out events and for distinguishing between the two. The high-frequency (HF) field
enables the activated e-ticket to subsequently send its ID, stop name, time stamp, etc. to the
terminal. The duration of HF communication is determined by the time necessary to send
the aforementioned information to the terminal and receive the acknowledgement (usually in
the order of milliseconds). In case of be in/be out (BIBO), to the contrary, the on-board
HF reader maintains the connection to the customer device with an e-ticket throughout the
whole journey, i.e. since the e-ticket has been activated [26], hence the name ”be in/be out”.
Both WIWO and BIBO aim at making the travel even more seamless and comfortable for a
passenger. Therefore, they are referred to as seamless CICO in this dissertation.
Among the aforementioned approaches, seamless CICO (approach 2b) is the least standard-
ized and not widespread despite several completed pilot projects (see [26, 27]). EPT (ap-
proach 1) is relatively inflexible and is likely to be replaced by pure CICO. The latter is widely
used in ESPT around the world, for example, in the Netherlands (OV Chipkaart), Hong-Kong
(Octopus card), etc. Moreover, CICO is backwards-compatible to EPT. Therefore, the disser-
tation will primarily focus on pure CICO (approach 2a). It should be further mentioned that
for higher layers, it is essentially transparent whether pure CICO or seamless CICO is deployed
since each of them is based on the same idea (processing the check-in/check-out events).
Non-interactive vs. Interaction-based Systems. Additionally, the following two types of
ESPT can be distinguished with respect to the degree of user involvement into system infor-
mation flow: (1) non-interactive and (2) interaction-based. The first type can be also referred
to as an “honor-based” system implying that a user is not required to prove the possession
of a valid travel permission each time on entering and leaving the vehicle (or alternatively, a
transport system as in the case of a subway). Therefore, a customer is rather obliged to present
the corresponding proof of possession of a respective travel permission in case of a spot check
performed by a conductor. This model is fairly widespread in Germany, for example. Unlike
enhance loyalty schemes.
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the non-interactive systems, the ones based on interaction (type 2) require that a customer ex-
plicitly performs check-in/check-out each time on entering/leaving a transport vehicle by this
proving the validity of a travel permission. The latter type inherently allows for the implemen-
tation of flexible fare polices supporting on-demand payment (that is, a customer pays only for
the transport service actually used). Moreover, an interaction-based ESPT is compatible to
the non-interactive one but not the other way around. For this reason, the dissertation focuses
on interaction-based systems.
The next section briefly discusses the underlying technology and the respective standards
(mainly considering the front-end of an ESPT) which are most commonly used for implement-
ing the e-ticketing paradigm in public transport scenario.
2.5 Underlying Technology and Standards
As already mentioned in the introduction, two technologies can be distinguished as the main
enablers of e-ticketing systems for public transport (especially with respect to the front-end of
ESPT), namely RFID and NFC. Despite many similarities enabling interoperability between
these technologies, there also exist certain differences (especially concerning the protocol layer,
data exchange formats and the respective standards).
The architecture of e-ticketing systems for public transport based on RFID/NFC essentially
adheres to the three-tier model described in Section 1.2, namely it consists of the back-end,
front-end, and the bridging element. For the back-end system, it is transparent how the
respective information concerning each individual journey was acquired from the front-end
part, i.e. whether the data were received from an RFID device (e.g., a contactless smart
card) or from an NFC one (e.g., an NFC-capable smartphone). Therefore, the aforementioned
differences between these two technologies are further discussed with respect to the front-end
of an e-ticketing system.
2.5.1 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
The term RFID encompasses the whole family of contactless identification systems with the
applications ranging from simple theft prevention systems to relatively profound electronic
payment systems utilizing contactless smart cards (see, for example, [28] for more details).
With respect to the e-ticketing systems discussed in this dissertation, the class of the so-
called proximity-coupling smart cards is of particular relevance. Front-end of the majority of
modern e-ticketing systems is based on this class of RFID systems most of which1 comply with
ISO14443 (A, B) [30]. The latter considers the first two layers of the OSI model [31], operates
in the range of up to 10cm (hence proximity coupling) and consists of 4 parts:
Part 1: Physical characteristics;
Part 2: Radio frequency interface power and signal interface;
Part 3: Initialization and anticollision;
Part 4: Transmission protocol.
1There exists another important proprietary standard Felica from Sony Corporation [29]. It is used by
the systems based on Sony FeliCa Cards. Despite the standardization attempts, Felica’s recognition as an
international standard failed.
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The most widespread proximity smart card technologies used in e-ticketing systems comply
with ISO14443, namely:
 MIFARE family: Developed by NXP Semiconductors and used in the following e-
ticketing sytems: Dutch OV-chipkaart, London’s Oyster Card, Hong Kong’s Octopus
Card, the Puget Sound ORCA Card in the US, etc. According to [32], more than 80% of
all contactless smart cards in the world (as for 2011) are based on MIFARE technology.
 Calypso standard: Used in Calypso e-ticketing system (Belgium, Canada, China, France,
Israel, Italy, Portugal, etc.) [33].
It should be mentioned that there is another prominent smart card technology which was
initially applied to be included into the ISO14443 (as type C) but failed, namely FeliCa from
Sony Corporation [34]. It is mainly used in e-ticketing systems deployed in Singapore (EZ-
Link) and Hong-Kong (Octopus Card) and complies with Japanese Industrial Standard (JIS)
X 6319 Part 4 [29]. Every smart card technology mentioned above is supported by NFC for
compatibility and interoperability reasons1 (see the discussion in Section 2.5.2).
On top of the communication interface, a number of higher level standards further defining
data exchange and security-relevant functions is required (see Figure 2.4). Each of them is going
to be briefly discussed during the overview of privacy issues in e-ticketing systems in Chapter 3.
It should be mentioned that at the architecture layer (represented by ISO EN 24014-1), the
conceptual issues with respect to the organisation of Interoperable Fare Management System
(IFMS) are considered. The ISO EN 24014-1 standard, therefore, pertains to the back-end
part of an e-ticketing system. The actual system implementation is left, however, to the public
transport company and is not directly standardised. For the architecture layer, it is transparent







Figure 2.4: Standards supporting interoperable RFID-based e-ticketing systems.
In order to facilitate the development of interoperable systems for public transport and
incorporate all the necessary standards in a single technical specification [35], the so-called
Core Application (Kernapplikation) was created in Germany [36]. According to its developers,
Core Application is generic enough to enable interoperability between different e-ticketing
systems which comply with it (even interoperability on an international level is claimed to
be possible). Core Application is, therefore, a generic middleware developed on top of the
1Therefore, an NFC-capable device (e.g., a smartphone) can be used in (e-ticketing) systems based on any
of the three aforementioned influential smart card technologies.
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communication interface (ISO 14443) which should provide users with the ability to seamlessly
travel (e.g., using the same e-ticket in different cities) and enable transport companies to keep
such an interoperable system in operation (inlcuding revenue sharing). Moreover, it is claimed
to greatly improve the process of migrating from a set of proprietary solutions to a global one
(see Figure 2.4).
2.5.2 Near Field Communication (NFC)
NFC is a technology closely related to RFID, namely to RFID operating at 13.56 MHz (prox-
imity coupling systems due to ISO/IEC 14443, see Section 2.5.1, and vicinity coupling systems
due to ISO/IEC 15693 [37]). The communication takes place within the near field region with
respect to the operating electromagnetic field (13.56 MHz), hence the name Near Field Com-
munication. The operating distance of NFC is up to 10cm1. NFC is compatible with the RFID
technologies described in Section 2.5.1, namely MIFARE, Calypso and FeliCa [28].
NFC is being actively promoted by the NFC Forum [4] which is an important non-commercial
organisation in the area of NFC. It develops the necessary technical specifications to ensure
interoperability and worldwide acceptance of NFC and defines the so-called NFC Forum Archi-
tecture incorporating relevant standards and enabling the development of interoperable NFC
applications (see further).
2.5.2.1 The Cornerstones of NFC
The radio frequency (RF) layer of the NFC Forum Architecture together with initialization
schemes (involving data collision control) and transport protocol (including protocol activation
and data exchange methods) are defined in ISO/IEC 18092 standard as NFC Interface and
Protocol (NFCIP-1) [38]. This standard defines two communication modes: active and passive,
see Table 2.1. The passive mode of NFCIP-1 is compatible with MIFARE and FeliCa (see
Section 2.5.1) [39].
Table 2.1: The communication modes defined in NFCIP-1 (ISO/IEC 18092).
Modes Description
Active mode: Both the initiator (e.g., an NFC reader) and the target (e.g., an NFC
smartphone) use their own RF field for communication
Passive mode: The initiator generates the RF field, starts the communication and sup-
plies the target with energy needed for generating the response sequence
(using the load modulation scheme).
The NFCIP-2 standard (ISO/IEC 21481) [40] further combines the functionality of proximity-
coupling devices (ISO/IEC 14443), vicinity-coupling devices (ISO/IEC 15693) together with
the communication modes defined in NFCIP-1, and enables the compliant NFC device to
1NFC is in principle compatible with ISO/IEC 15693 (vicinity coupling) the communication range of which
is around 1 m. This feature, however, is not the part of the NFC Forum Architecture being actively promoted
by the NFC forum [4] (see further).
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switch between these communication modes. The distinct communication modes supported
by NFCIP-2 are listed in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: The communication modes supported by NFCIP-2 (ISO/IEC 21481).
Mode Initial standard
Proximity Coupling Device (PCD)
ISO/IEC 14443
Proximity Integrated Circuit Card (PICC)
Vicinity Coupling Device (VCD) ISO/IEC 15693
NFC NFCIP-1 (ISO/IEC 18092)
The PCD/VCD mode defined in NFCIP-2 (see Table 2.2) is analogous to the initiator (e.g.,
a reader), see Table 2.1. The PICC mode is analogous to the target (e.g., a smart card)
passively waiting for the initiator’s requests and energy supply. The NFC mode refers to the
communication modes (active and passive) defined by NFCIP-1.
NFCIP-2 specifies the mechanisms for detection and selection of one of the communication
modes described above as well as the subsequent behaviour ”... as specified in the standard
specifying the selected communication mode” [40]. Therefore, an NFCIP-2 compliant device
can act both as the initiator and the target depending on the device being communicated with
(and on the agreed communication protocol).
2.5.2.2 The NFC Forum Architecture
The aforementioned core standards (NFCIP-1,2) are the basis for the development of further
cross-layer specifications for NFC communication. In order to enable the interoperability
for the NFC-based systems and backward compatibility with the proximity-coupling RFID
systems (ISO/IEC 14443, FeliCa), the NFC Forum [4] developed the so-called NFC Forum
Architecture (see Figure 2.5). It should be mentioned, however, that currently the vicinity-
coupling technology (ISO/IEC 15693) is not included into the NFC Forum Architecture. The
possible reason may be to keep the operating range within around 10 cm (since the operating
range of vicinity-coupling systems is in the order of 1m) and by this to ensure the ”touch-to-
activate” principle for service discovery, decrease the collision probability between NFC devices
as well as to provide better security.
The NFC Forum Architecture supports 3 operation modes:
1. Peer-to-Peer mode. Defines the communication between two NFC devices.
Underlying basics: Defined by NFCIP-1.
Applications: data transfer between two NFC devices, exchange of configuration param-
eters (e.g., WiFi/Bluetooth pairing), etc.
2. Reader/Writer mode. Defines the communication between an NFC device and a
passive transponder. The latter may be compatible with the 4 types of NFC Forum Tags
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(see Table 2.3 further in the section) or with other contactless chip cards. This mode is
backwards-compatible with existing smart card infrastructures [39].
Underlying basics: Defined by NFCIP-1 and RFID standards: ISO/IEC 14443, JIS X 6319-4
(FeliCa).
Applications: content distribution, information access (smart posters), smart advertis-
ing [41] (reader mode), custom tag writing (writer mode).
3. Card Emulation mode. Enables an NFC device (appearing as a contactless smart
card) to communicate with RFID readers. It is, therefore, backwards-compatible with
existing smart card infrastructures.
Underlying basics: The same as for the Reader/Writer mode.
Applications [41]: mobile payment, ticketing, access control, top-ups, toll-gate, etc.
Figure 2.5: The NFC Forum Architecture. Taken from [4].
The selection of the required operation mode (and consequently the required mode at the
RF layer) is performed by the mode switch procedure at the respective Mode Switch layer of
the NFC Forum Architecture (see Figure 2.5).
In order to provide the necessary prerequisites for the interoperable behaviour of the mode
switch procedure, the so-called Digital Protocol Specification [42] was developed by the NFC
forum. This specification is applied between the RF layer and the Mode Switch layer of the
NFC Forum Architecture (being a part of both of them) and considers the digital part of
the physical layer (the digital interface) and the MAC layer (of the OSI architecture). It,
therefore, implements NFCIP-1 incorporating ISO/IEC 14443 and narrows down the options
in the underlying base specifications to ensure interoperability [43].
At the Mode Switch layer, the Activity Specification [44] of the NFC Forum describes how the
NFC Digital Protocol can be used to set up the communication protocol with the other device
through the definition of Activities. They combine elementary blocks of the Digital Protocol
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into the functional ones [44]. Activities are then combined in Profiles each of which in turn
has specific Configuration Parameters and covers a particular use case. Therefore, according
to [44], the combination of Activities and Profiles defines a predictable, deterministic behaviour
of the NFC Forum device. This however does not impose constraints on the implementation
of other building blocks (or the definition of other Profiles) for the use cases other than the
existing ones. The following Activities are considered in the Activity Specification [44]:
 Technology Detection Activity;
 Collision Resolution Activity;
 Device Activation Activity;
 Data Exchange Activity;
 Device Deactivation Activity;
The two lower layers of the NFC Forum Architecture (the RF layer and the Mode Switch
layer) define a common interface incorporating the underlying communication technologies
and making it transparent for the upper layers which particular technology (e.g., due to
ISO/IEC 14443-A or FeliCa) and in which mode is used for connection establishment (i.e.
for low-level communication). The further higher-level specifications are targeted at each par-
ticular operating mode.
For the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) mode, the Logical Link Control Protocol (LLCP) Specifica-
tion [45] was developed to establish and maintain the logical link between two NFC Forum
devices. The main features provided by LLCP are:
 Link Activation, Supervision, and Deactivation;
 Asynchronous Balanced Communication (for providing peer-to-peer capabilities in con-
trast to the default ”Initiator-Target” behaviour, hence ”balanced” communication);
 Protocol Multiplexing (the ability to accommodate several instances of higher level pro-
tocols at the same time);
 Connectionless/Connection-oriented Transport (unacknowledged/acknowledged data trans-
mission, respectively).
The LLCP resides between the Mode Switch and the Application layer of the NFC Forum
Architecture [43]. On top of LLCP, different protocols may be operating:
 Simple NDEF Exchange Protocol (SNDEF). This NFC Forum protocol [46] can be used to
exchange the so-called NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) messages in P2P mode. The
NDEF Specification [47] defines the NDEF data structure format, the rules to construct a
valid NDEF message as well as the mechanisms for specifying the types of application data
encapsulated in NDEF records (in an interoperable manner and completely transparent
with respect to the type of NFC device or tag in use). The detailed description of record
types being exchanged through NDEF is defined in separate specifications.
 Protocol bindings. Provide standard bindings to NFC Forum protocols and allow inter-
operable use of registered protocols [32], for example, OBEX, IP [32].
 Other protocols. Other protocols which may run over the link layer provided by LLCP
and for which no LLCP bindings from the NFC Forum are provided.
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Further up the P2P stack, at the application layer, the NFC Forum reference applications
may be run (over SNDEF) together with other P2P applications (e.g., printing an image taken
by the smartphone camera, third party NDEF applications) [48].
The Reader/Writer mode is used for communicating with (1) NFC Forum Tags (involving
NDEF Applications) or (2) for other vendor-specific applications which are not based on the
NDEF Specification (e.g., reading a balance of an electronic purse or getting information from
an e-ticket). In the first case, on top of the Digital Protocol, the NFC Forum specifies 4 tag
types (see Table 2.3) with the respective operations [49]. Information can be read/written
from/to these tags using the NDEF data format with records defined according to the Record
Type Definition (RTD) specification [50]. The latter defines how to construct records in NDEF
messages (e.g., records of type Text, URI, Smart Poster, etc.). Various NDEF applications
(both NDEF Reference and third-party ones) can run on top of the NFC Tag Specifications
(e.g., smart poster, reading product information from products/product flyers equipped with
NFC tags, etc.)







Read and re-write capable, can be config-
ured to be read-only; memory size 96 byte
(expandable to 2 kB)
106
Type 2 ISO14443-A
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ther read and re-writeable, or read-only;
memory is variable, theoretically limited
by 32 kB per service
≤ 424
In Card Emulation mode, the proprietary contactless card applications (e-ticketing, ac-
cess control, payment, etc.) are executed directly on top of the Digital Protocol (between the
RF layer and the Mode Switch Layer in Figure 2.5) enabling to emulate a contactless smart
card based on ISO/IEC 14443 of Type A,B and JIS X 6319-4 (FeliCa). These applications are
usually security-critical (payment information, etc.). Therefore, the sensitive part of the appli-
cation (e.g., secure storage of cryptographic keys, execution in the secure environment) usually
resides in the so-called Secure Element (SE). The latter can be of the following types [28]:
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 (1) Hardware embedded into the phone (i.e. soldered into the NFC mobile phone’s cir-
cuitry);
 (2) Secure Memory Card (e.g., Secure Digital (SD) card). It is removable and therefore
not bound to a single device;
 (3) (Universal) Subscriber Identity Module ((U)SIM). The SE based on (U)SIM is com-
pliant with smart card standards and can host multiple applications issued by different
application providers [32]. Moreover, the secure NFC applications stored in the (U)SIM-
based SE can be remotely managed via the so-called Over-the-Air (OTA) technology
(using the commands encapsulated in SMS messages) [32].
The most widespread technical means of implementing the interface between the SE and the
NFC controller are the following [28]:
 Single Wire Protocol (SWP). Interconnects an NFC Contactless Front-end (CLF) as
master and a SE as slave via a single-wire transmission. It is standardized in [51] and
mainly intended for (U)SIM (see above, SE type 3) since there is a single free contact
left on a (U)SIM card (out of the standard 8) which can be utilized for this function [28].
The transmission rates range from 212 kbit/s to 1.6 Mbit/s [32].
 NFC Wired Interface (NFC-WI) (also known as S2C interface). Interconnects the SE
with the NFC front-end utilizing two wires. It is standardized in [52] and supports the
transmission rates of 106, 212, and 424 kbit/s.
In case a (U)SIM is used as a SE, the power required for SWP to operate can be supplied
via the NFC interface (i.e. from the reader side). It, therefore, renders the need for an external
energy source (e.g., a smartphone battery) unnecessary, in order to be able to run the respective
applications (e.g., e-ticketing) residing in the (U)SIM memory in card emulation mode [28].
2.5.3 Underlying Technology and Standards: A Short Summary
The main enablers of the e-ticketing paradigm were reviewed in this section, namely RFID and
NFC. More specifically, the respective standards have been reviewed and analyzed above. A
holistic overview of the standardisation effort in the area of e-ticketing systems based on RFID















Figure 2.6: Standards stacks for e-ticketing based on RFID and NFC.
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2.6 Focus on Customer Privacy
Having briefly analysed the implications of e-ticketing systems, the following conclusion re-
garding security and privacy can be made. The interoperability goal implies the existence
of common security and privacy measures (e.g., an agreement on mutually recognized and ac-
cepted security and privacy policies). The need for security is widely acknowledged by transport
companies, since insecure solutions may result in substantial revenue losses (e.g., due to ticket
forgery or system blackouts) and even lead to the eventual phase-out of the system.
Privacy, namely the customer privacy, to the contrary, is not in direct interest of service
providers. The reason for this is that possible risks associated with privacy violation have far
less serious implications for company business compared to security. However, the constantly
rising privacy-awareness of customers and the ever growing likelihood of public outcry induced
by the cases of privacy violation may stimulate transport companies to invest in privacy in
order to remain competitive. The interoperability goal poses a further challenge to privacy
since sharing of privacy-critical data, which is needed for a proper delivery of transport services
by cooperating companies, should be performed in a privacy-preserving way.
As a consequence, the concerns over the customer privacy (see Section 2.1.2) have a negative
impact on public acceptance of interoperable e-ticketing systems which inevitably influences
the revenues of public transport companies. A privacy-preserving solution, therefore, would
be beneficial for both customers and transport service providers. Thus, this thesis aims at
providing such a solution which can be directly applied for the development of e-ticketing
systems with privacy-preserving mechanisms being integrated from the outset.
The next chapter focuses on privacy issues in e-ticketing systems discussing the privacy
threats together with the privacy-preserving mechanisms foreseen by the respective standards
and implemented in a number of currently deployed e-ticketing systems.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, the e-ticketing paradigm together with its advantages and disadvantages was
discussed. Moreover, main functional types of an e-ticket together with the most relevant
application areas were presented. The general application scenario of ESPT which is in focus
of this dissertation was discussed as well. Moreover, different fare collection approaches in
e-ticketing were presented focusing on the check-in/check-out concept. The main enablers of
the latter (RFID and NFC) in ESPT scenario together with the respective standards were also
discussed. The chapter is concluded with raising a question on privacy friendliness of such
systems which is going to be discussed in detail within the next chapter.
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3 Privacy Issues in E-ticketing Systems:
Overview and Requirements
Having discussed the foundations of e-ticketing systems for public transport (ESPT) in the
previous chapter, the thesis focuses on the issues of privacy protection in this area. In this
chapter, the notion of privacy is shortly formalized at first in Section 3.1. The generic privacy
threats endemic in ESPT systems are discussed in Section 3.2 together with the respective
countermeasures presented in Section 3.3. The availability of privacy-preserving mechanisms
within the respective standards comprising RFID and NFC stacks is discussed in Section 3.4.
Core requirements for ESPT as well as the adopted attacker model are discussed in Section 3.5
and Section 3.6 respectively.
3.1 Privacy Analysis: Prerequisites
The user’s privacy is a fairly ambiguous notion which is often understood in a number of
different ways depending on the culture, country’s political system, etc. Much effort from
different fields of science has been spent within the context of privacy per se and its perception
in society. In order to approach the problem from a technical point of view, a set of generic
privacy properties similar to the classic CIA triad in information security (confidentiality,
integrity, availability) is required. This would further enable to derive the privacy requirements
and to perform the privacy analysis of a system under concern. Therefore, the following notions
considering the user’s privacy from a technical perspective are defined below:
 Pseudonymity (to ensure accountability in contrast to Anonymity);
 Confidentiality ;
 Unlinkability.
Definition 1: Pseudonymity enables the communicating entities to perform the necessary
information exchange without disclosing their Personally Identifiable Information (PII) dur-
ing the communication session. In case the exchanged information is persistently stored, its
pseudonymised form should prevent malicious parties from illegal identification of the respec-
tive entities. It is, however, possible to perform subsequent identification by a special entity
with respective authorisation to ensure accountability (e.g., for billing purposes).
Definition 2: Confidentiality of information exchanged between communicating entities, which
can also be persistently stored, ensures that the content of such a conversation (especially with
respect to the identifying information) is disclosed only to the legitimate parties possessing
the respective authorisation (e.g., the ones being authorised to use the respective message
decryption key).
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Definition 3: Unlinkability prevents a malicious party from performing linkage of different
pieces of information1 which pertain to a certain entity and are distributed in time and/or
space and therefore from illegally obtaining the entity’s PII.
A set of the three notions defined above describes the basic technical aspects of the user’s
privacy and can be used, therefore, as the necessary basis for privacy analysis of an e-ticketing
system.
3.2 Generic Privacy Threats in E-ticketing Systems
Analysing the e-ticketing systems under concern (see Section 2.3) against pseudonymity, con-
fidentiality and unlinkability defined in the previous section, the following generic threats to
the user’s privacy can be identified in the e-ticketing environment:
1. Unintended customer identification:
a) Exposure of the customer ID:
i. Personal ID exposure (direct identification),
ii. Indirect identification through the relevant object’s ID2 [53].
b) Exposure of a static identifier (e.g., during the anti-collision session [35]);
c) Physical layer identification (RFID fingerprinting3).
2. Information linkage;
3. Illegal customer profiling.
The first subset of the aforementioned privacy threats (Unintended customer identification)
pertains to the front-end of an e-ticketing system. It mainly considers the process of e-ticket au-
thentication during check-in/check-out events (see Figure 2.2) when the respective trip tuples
are formed (containing user and terminal IDs, location, time, etc.). Moreover, the vulnerabili-
ties implied by these threats can be potentially exploited by any properly equipped passer-by
(e.g. with a portable reader).
The possible attack scenarios in this case are the following:
 Intervening with the RF interface between the e-ticket medium and the (honest) terminal:
– Communication eavesdropping;
– Relay attacks;
 Unintended interaction with the e-ticket medium (also outside the specifically designed lo-
cations for check-in/check-out) in order to compromise the privacy of its owner (Threats 1b,
1c).
1Such pieces of information can originate inter alia from the digital traces left by a person.
2The notion of object ID (OID) encompasses the following ID set: medium ID (e.g., unique card number),
application ID (the unique identifier of an application instance installed), etc. OID can, therefore, become an
indirect personal identifier [53].
3For example, using the deviations in the backscatter frequency of an RFID chip as a distinguishing factor,
see [54].
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 Spoofing the e-ticket medium into interacting with a malicious reader presenting itself as
a legitimate terminal.
 Compromising the legitimate terminal (e.g., to mount replay attacks).
The user’s privacy violation resulting from information linkage (Threat 2) can take place
when various pieces of information directly and indirectly pertaining to a user are combined
together in order to obtain an identifiable piece of information. The latter can be subsequently
used for committing privacy violating actions. The information traces ”left” by a user par-
tially originate as a result of the vulnerabilities collectively referred to as unintended customer
identification (Threat 1) in this section.
Illegal customer profiling (Threat 3) considers the creation of users’ profiles which is not
prescribed by the system specification and therefore is not required for maintaining system
functionality and proper service delivery. In contrast to the customer profiling needed for e.g.,
the implementation of different loyalty schemes (which should be well documented, certified
and implemented in a privacy-respecting way), the processes collectively referred to as illegal
customer profiling violate the privacy regulation and endanger the users’ privacy. One of the
examples of this would be selling of the sensitive user data to the third parties for marketing
purposes.
3.3 Generic Privacy Threats: Possible Countermeasures
The aforementioned privacy threats endemic to e-ticketing systems can be mitigated against
using specific countermeasures. In order to approach the problem and to consider specific
countermeasures against each privacy threat described in Section 3.2, a preliminary analysis
was conducted resulting in the countermeasures set, see Table 3.1. However, an efficient
application of such countermeasures during the system development as well as their optimal
distribution across system components is to a large extent an open research question. Currently,
privacy-preserving techniques being developed by the research community as well as the ones
implemented in real public transport systems are for the most part tailor-made and solve a
specific privacy-related problem. An approach which would target the privacy of users from
the outset in a holistic way treating all components1 of a public transport system in their
entirety is, however, still missing. Moreover, it is questionable whether a solution addressing
all possible privacy threats ranging from the physical layer (e.g., RFID fingerprinting) to the
application layer (e.g., user ID exposure) can stay efficient and what is even more important
compatible with the existing technologies currently embraced by the industry.
Therefore, it would be desirable to analyze to which extent privacy protection is addressed
within the widely adopted standards specifying the implementation of core enablers of e-
ticketing systems (namely, RFID and NFC, see Section 2.5). This is performed in the next
section and presented in a top-down manner beginning from the upper layers of the respective
standards stack.
1The focus is made on the functional components of a public transport system which can be generally
divided into back-end, front-end, and the so-called bridging element (e.g., readers/terminals).
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Table 3.1: Countermeasures against the generic privacy threats identified in the e-ticketing
systems under concern.
Threats Countermeasures
1. Unintended customer identification:
a) Exposure of the customer ID:
i. Personal ID exposure (direct) Privacy-respecting authentication; ID en-
cryption/randomization; access-control func-
tions [55]
ii. Indirect identification ID encryption
b) Unencrypted ID during anti-collision Randomized bit encoding [56]; bit collision
masking [57, 58] (protocol dependent)
c) PHY-layer identification Shielding; switchable antennas [59]
2. Information linkage Anonymization (in the front-end and in the
back-end): threat 1 countermeasures; privacy-
respecting data processing
3. Illegal customer profiling Privacy-respecting data storage (especially in
the back-end); the same as in threat 1
3.4 Privacy Issues Considered in the Respective Standards
The e-ticketing systems under concern are based on RFID and NFC technologies (see Sec-
tion 2.5). Despite obvious similarities between them, each technology possesses its own set of
distinctive features and, therefore, needs to be separately analysed for privacy issues. Thus,
Section 3.4.2 examines the RFID-based standards stack for e-ticketing systems (see Figure 2.4).
Section 3.4.3 contains the analysis of the generic privacy-enhancing mechanisms implemented
in the NFC Forum Architecture (see Figure 2.5). We start this analysis, however, with the
architecture layer common to both technologies, which is considered in the next section.
3.4.1 Architecture Layer
The Architecture layer of an interoperable e-ticketing system for public transport is specified
in ISO EN 24014-1 [18]. The standard introduces a conceptual framework for developing an
interoperable architecture for transport fare management systems, which are collectively called
Interoperable Fare Management System (IFMS). It describes the structure of an interoperable
platform, its main actors, and general flows of information exchange. Privacy is considered
at a conceptual level by requiring the definition of a security scheme that should provide for
privacy protection (along with ”integrity and confidentiality between the actors to ensure fair
and secure data flow within the IFMS” [18]). The security-related measures are defined in the
respective security policy. Security management is performed by the Security Manager entity
who is responsible for the implementation of the security policy by all actors concerned.
The standard prescribes that the privacy of a customer must be protected ”as required by
applicable laws” specifying the following rules [18]:
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 Only relevant personal data needed for the operation of the IFMS shall be requested
from the customer [the classic data minimization principle];
 The itemised disclosure of service consumption on an invoice shall be an option that can
be chosen by the customer;
 An IFM actor may not disclose customer-related information to third parties without
specific authorisation from the customer [user consent].
 Within the IFMS, the customer-specific data shall be handled only in connection with
the identification number of the contract (implicit or explicit) between the customer and
product owner. A link between the contract number and the name of the customer may
only be achieved by the contractual partner at the request of the customer.
As it can be seen, the ISO EN 24014-1 standard rather coarsely specifies the privacy-related
requirements which partially cover information linkage and illegal customer profiling (privacy
threats 2 and 3, see section 3.2). The standard, however, does not provide any detailed
recommendations concerning the further implementation of these requirements.
3.4.2 RFID-based Standards Stack
The assessment of privacy issues considered at each layer of the RFID-based standards stack
(see Figure 2.4) is performed in this section in a ”top-down” manner. Firstly, the uppermost
layer – the Data Interfaces layer – is considered.
3.4.2.1 Data Interfaces Layer
In this section, the Data Interfaces Layer which consists of three sub-layers represented by the
respective standards (see Figure 2.4) is considered.
EN 15320 The standard defines the logical structure of the data residing in the card, specifies
an abstract interface for interaction between the card and the terminal (which consists
of two logical interfaces: the Card Data Interface and the Data Group Interface) and
considers security through specification of the Security Subsystem (SSS). The latter is
divided into the Card Security Management System and the Data Group Security Man-
agement System in order to correspond to the two logical interfaces. Security-related
operations are defined in profiles (Card Profiles and Data Group Profiles respectively),
see Figure 3.1.
The privacy-related issues are considered only indirectly in EN 15320 through the de-
scription of data groups containing privacy-relevant information (e.g., the card holder
data group). If such data group is present, the necessary access control mechanisms to-
gether with encryption should be implemented in order to protect the customer’s privacy
(i.e. be included into the respective profiles of the SSS).
The division into two logical interfaces (Card Data Interface and Data Group Interface)
provides flexible implementation of access control schemes1. Specific security-related
1For example, in order to quickly and efficiently perform a ticket validation procedure, only the Card Data
Interface is used, which speeds up the processes and saves resources.
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Figure 3.1: Interaction between a terminal and a card. Based on the processes description
specified in EN 15320.
operations can be defined in the respective profiles and called whenever it is necessary
to ensure proper execution of application commands. This mechanism may be used for
processing of personal data in a privacy-respecting way, therefore, providing protection
against unintended customer identification (namely, personal ID exposure and object’s ID
exposure, see section 3.2, threats 1(a)i and 1(a)ii respectively). The standard, however,
does not explicitly address customer privacy and focuses solely on security issues.
EN 1545 Part 1 The structure of data elements residing in the card is considered, which
is expressed according to ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation 1). Privacy-relevant
information is contained in several data elements presented in Table 3.2. These
data can be protected by applying encryption and access control schemes defined at
a logical level in the respective profiles of the security subsystem (SSS, see EN 15320
above) therefore covering the issues of personal ID exposure and object’s ID exposure
(privacy threats 1(a)i and 1(a)ii respectively, see section 3.2).
Part 2 Data structures residing in the card are further specified according to the require-
ments of an interoperable fare management transport system (i.e. the requirements
specified at higher layers of the standards stack, see Figure 2.4). This part of the
standard focuses solely on the functional issues of a transport system and does not
consider privacy and security.
ISO/IEC 7816-4 The standard considers the issues of commands exchange as well as the
retrieval of data structures and data objects residing in the card. Security and privacy
are taken into account by specification of methods for secure messaging and a security
architecture which defines access rights to files and data in the card. Access methods to
the algorithms processed by the cards are considered as well [60].
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customer number customer reference number





customer profile ID e.g. student, military, resident, etc.
user data additional information about a customer
3.4.2.2 Communication Interface Layer
The Communication Interface layer is represented by ISO 14443, which consists of four parts [30].
Parts 1-3 are required for connection establishment between the card and the terminal. Part 4
is optional and usually used for the cards with relatively high processing power. The standard
does not consider any security- or privacy-related issues and focuses solely on functionality.
Therefore, the issues of unintended customer identification during the anti-collision session
as well as physical layer identification1, which could be covered within the communication
interface level, remain unconsidered.
Privacy Issues Considered in the RFID-based Stack: A Short Summary
Summarizing, the standards composing the generic e-ticketing system based on the RFID
technology primarily consider security for protection of transport companies’ assets and main-
taining the proper and reliable system functionality. The issues of customer privacy are seen
more as a by-product of security without the additional measures specifically targeted at en-
suring the privacy-respecting behaviour of the system. Table 3.3 summarizes the security and
privacy measures considered by each standard in the standards stack depicted in Figure 2.4.
3.4.3 The NFC Forum Architecture
There are two NFC modes defined by the NFC Forum Architecture (see Figure 2.5) which are
usually considered in the first place for e-ticketing applications: card emulation mode and peer-
to-peer mode. The former incorporates the existing RFID standards and therefore is succumb
to similar privacy threats as in the case of RFID stack described above. The P2P mode, to the
contrary, is NFC-specific having its own security (and hence privacy2) relevant mechanisms
considered in the respective standards, which are going to be addressed in this section.
1See privacy threats 1b and 1c in section 3.2.
2Security can be viewed as the underlying basis for implementing privacy-preserving mechanisms.
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Table 3.3: Security and privacy measures available in the e-ticketing standards stack based on
RFID.
Standard Security Privacy
ISO EN 24014-1 - definition of security policy;
- security management (by the
Security Manager entity).
coarsely specified privacy requirements,
targeted at compliance with the regula-
tion
EN 15320 - Security Subsystem (SSS);
- security-related operations are
defined in profiles.
- privacy-relevant data groups;
- protection through access control
(AC) and encryption.
EN 1545 - security-relevant fields privacy-relevant fields, see Table 3.2
ISO/IEC 7816-4 - secure messaging;
- security architecture with AC
security mechanisms can be applied to
privacy-critical data





In order to address security issues in NFC communication, a series of NFC security standards
(NFC-SEC) was developed on top of NFCIP-1. It defines an application independent security
protocol stack which enables link layer encryption and offers a key exchange mechanism for
upper layer (application-specific) encryption schemes [61]. NFC-SEC standards series consist
of a Common framework defined in ECMA-385 standard [62] and Cryptographic mechanisms
(used in the framework) defined in ECMA-386 standard [63]. The Common framework re-
ferred to as NFCIP-1 Security Services and Protocol considers the security services (Shared
Secret Service and Secure Channel Service), the Protocol Data Units (PDUs), and the security
protocol itself [61]. This framework is complemented by cryptographic mechanisms specified
in [63] as NFC-SEC-01: NFC-SEC Cryptography Standard using ECDH and AES1. Further
cryptographic mechanisms may be standardized for the NFC Common Security Framework,
which will then complement it with the respective number, e.g., NFC-SEC-xy. NFC Security
Stack is depicted in Figure 3.2.
NFC-SEC: The Services
NFC-SEC considers two services: the Shared Secret Service (SSE) and the Secure Channel
Service (SCH). The former provides a generic mechanism for key exchange which can be used
by application-specific encryption algorithms at higher levels. The SCH Service, however,
along with the key exchange establishes a secure session (on the link layer) between two NFC
peer devices.
1ECDH and AES stand respectively for the Elliptic Curves Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol for key agree-
ment and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm for data encryption and integrity.
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Figure 3.2: NFC Security Stack.
NFC-SEC: The Protocol
The protocol of NFC-SEC defines a sequence of steps for key agreement and confirmation
(common for SSE and SCH) as well as the ”PDU security” – the actual data encryption and
integrity checks (specific to SCH). PDUs of NFC-SEC are encapsulated in Data Exchange
Protocol (DEP) packets of a lower layer NFCIP-1 standard (see Figure 3.2).
NFC-SEC-01: Cryptographic Mechanisms
NFC-SEC-01 further specifies [61]:
 Message contents with concatenation rules for keys and other fields;
 Key primitives;
 Random number requirements;
 Conversion and transformation rules;
 Cryptographic algorithms and methods.
For key exchange, the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) mechanism is used (security
parameter 192 bit). Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is used for (1) key derivation and
confirmation, (2) data encryption, and (3) data integrity (security parameter 128 bit).
The mechanism, however, does not protect from the Man-in-the-Middle attack since no
entity authentication can be provided by NFC-SEC [61].
3.4.3.2 Open NFC Security Stack
Another interesting approach towards NFC security rather complementing the standardised
framework considered in the previous section is a Security Stack from Open NFCTM Open
Source Project [64]. The Open NFC Security Stack was designed to protect access to the
SE (such as (U)SIM, etc.) from unauthorized device applications. It essentially enforces a
specified access policy to the SE which is done using Access Control Lists derived from the
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so-called PKCS#15 applet, see the respective specification [65]. This applet contains an access
control file (ACF) where access rights are specified. The security issues pertaining to the RF
interface of NFC are beyond the scope of the Open NFC Security Stack [66].
Privacy Issues Considered in the NFC Forum Stack: A Short Summary
Summarizing, privacy issues are indirectly addressed within the NFC Forum Stack by intro-
ducing the NFC-SEC standard series. It enables to secure the communication channel between
two NFC devices as well as to exchange a secret for custom cryptographic algorithms at the
application layer. Therefore, unintended customer identification at the link layer and higher
can be prevented (threats 1(a)i, 1(a)ii, see Table 3.1). The problems of ID exposure during the
anti-collision session and PHY-layer fingerprinting are, however, not covered (threats 1b, 1c in
Table 3.1). Since NFC-SEC is vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks, entity authentication
should be additionally implemented on top of it in order to protect the privacy-critical data
from misuse during the communication session.
Privacy Issues Considered in the Respective Standards: A Summary
Privacy protection has been neither directly addressed within the RFID stack nor within the
NFC one. A common trend is that security issues are explicitely considered (ISO 7816-4 with
secure messaging in case of RFID and NFC-SEC specification in case of NFC) with privacy
protection being rather a by-product (if at addressed all).
The aforementioned analysis provides a motivation to explicitly address the issues of privacy
protection in the area of e-ticketing systems for public transport (ESPT). In order to devise an
appropriate solution, privacy requirements have to be determined at first taking into account
the specifics of ESPT as well as other important functional requirements (e.g., the support for
fine-grained billing) which comprise a set of core advantages of e-ticketing. The next section
focuses on this issue.
3.5 Core Requirements
Fully fledged requirements analysis is a complicated process which should be carefully consid-
ered in its own right. For the current thesis which specifically focuses on privacy protection in
ESPT, only the most essential (technical) requirements are considered enabling analysis of the
related work and development of the solution. Therefore in what follows, the discussion of the
most pertinent requirements is provided leaving the holistic process of fully fledged requirement
analysis out of scope. The requirements discussed below are summarized in Section 3.5.5.
3.5.1 Privacy
Privacy protection should be applied across system components taking into account the system
in its entirety as well as the external entities which are not a part of the system, see Figure 3.3.
Accordingly, three core privacy requirements can be distinguished:
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1. Privacy against external observers;
2. Privacy against terminals (front-end);












Figure 3.3: A high-level overview of the system architecture together with external entities.
3.5.1.1 Privacy Against External Observers
A substantial set of attacks targeted at privacy invasion are carried out by external entities not
directly involved into the system information flow. Such adversarial entities exogenous to the
system are collectively referred to as external observers in this dissertation, see the attacker
model in Section 3.6. The question of privacy protection against such kind of attackers is
especially acute in system front-end due to the wide distribution of terminals and contact-
less communication between e-tickets and terminals (which is inherently easy to intercept).
Therefore, no external entity should be able to derive any identifying or tracking information
pertaining to an e-ticket or its user by observing the communication session between termi-
nals and e-tickets. It is implicitly assumed that the communication between terminals and
the back-end (see Backbone Network in Figure 3.3) is reliably secured using well-established
techniques such as TLS, etc. Therefore, with this respect, the dissertation focuses mainly on
the front-end of the system.
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3.5.1.2 Privacy Against Terminals (Front-end)
Due to the wide distribution of terminals across the transport network, they are not always
under physical control of a transport authority (TA). Moreover, the wireless interface used
for ticket validation can be misused by third parties representing an additional attack vector
(e.g., a buffer overflow attack covertly mounted via NFC or RFID). This is further backed up
by the claim made in [67] that transport authorities are willing to store as minimum critical
data at the terminal side as it is possible. The aforementioned stimulates to greatly reduce
the amount of private information disclosed from the e-ticket side to a terminal during check-
in/out sessions. More specifically, terminals must be prevented from tracking valid e-tickets,
distinguishing between them as well as from identifying the customers associated with e-tickets.
For the invalid ones (e.g. blacklisted) this requirement may be relaxed (see the discussion on
revocation/black list checks later).
3.5.1.3 Privacy Against the Back-end
Ideally, the back-end should also be prohibited from both identifying and tracking individual
transactions between terminals and e-tickets, similarly to the previous case (privacy require-
ment 2). It is highly desirable, however, that fine-grained billing is enabled at the back-end
side1 (see fine-grained billing support in Section 3.5.2). Therefore, a reasonable trade-off is al-
lowed in this case, namely the back-end is prohibited from identifying the customers associated
with e-tickets but it can correlate different front-end sessions (registered as travel records) to
a single e-ticket pseudonym for billing purposes.
3.5.2 Fine-grained Billing Support
3.5.2.1 The demand for fine-grained billing
One of the core advantages of ESPT is the ability to offer highly flexible fare policies to
customers. This makes the transport service more attractive and enhances the competitiveness
of the public transport company on the market (see Section 2.1.1). In contrast to upfront and
flat rate payments, the approaches involving fine-grained billing can offer a personalized fare
scheme which takes into account the customer’s travel pattern. The customer does not have
to go through the tedious process of carefully studying complex pricing schemes any more and
automatically gets a regular bill (e.g. once a month), which is optimally computed according
to the service actually consumed during the billing period.
Fine-grained billing directly supports additional services and loyalty programs which are
attractive for customers. For example in [68], it was stated that a considerable number of
customers choose personalized cards since they provide more services. Several ESPT systems
have already reacted to this trend offering a fine-grained billing approach [69, 70].
Thus, the support for fine-grained billing plays an important part in the process of fully
leveraging the potential of e-ticketing systems and making the optimal use of their peculiar
advantages over the conventional systems for public transport. In this dissertation, therefore,
1For completeness, it should be mentioned that client-side billing is also possible. This, however, has several




supporting this feature is considered an important requirement for ESPT. A negative side-effect
of it is, however, that it can pave the way to privacy invasion from the transport companies’
side. The respective discussion together with the methods for privacy protection (alongside
fine-grained billing) are discussed later in this work.
3.5.2.2 Thin vs. Rich Client for Fare Calculation
Another important issue with respect to fine-grained billing is the actual method for fare cal-
culation. With this respect, two main approaches1 can be distinguished: (1) centralized fare
calculation (in the back-end) and (2) the decentralized one (at the client side). The former im-
plies that the price is calculated in the back-end of a system therefore allowing a ”thin” client
approach for users, enabling the utilization of relatively simple user devices for e-tickets, etc.
The decentralized model, to the contrary, considers delegation of (a certain part of) fare cal-
culation to the user side, which requires additional computational overhead for customers (i.e.
beyond simply using an e-ticket for the transport service itself) and introduces more stringent
requirements to the trustworthiness and complexity of the user-side equipment2. The second
approach is considered beneficial for user privacy since the most sensitive pieces of information
(visited locations together with time, user ID, etc.) are processed at the user side and are only
partially disclosed (if at all) to the TA for correctness enforcement (e.g., for the so-called spot
checks, see [71].) The substantial shortcoming of the decentralized approach, however, are the
more stringent requirements for the user device and more importantly additional overhead for
a user who is responsible for maintaining the processes pertaining to local fare calculation and
result submission to the back-end. In the e-ticketing scenario considering the decentralized
model, further efforts are likely to be required for a customer to compute travel fees locally
and submit the result to the back-end by, for example, regularly interacting with a card reader
connected to the home computer (with the latter running a specialized piece of software).
Moreover, such model is more error prone than the centralized one, since it is much harder to
trace the source of possible failures and determine their nature (e.g., system malfunction, ma-
licious user device behavior, etc.). Lastly, the decentralized approach implies additional costs
for users due to the necessity to obtain extra pieces of hardware (such as NFC/RFID reader,
etc.). Therefore, while focusing on privacy protection in ESPT, we resort to the centralized
model for fare calculation as it is much more likely to have higher acceptance both among
customers (less overhead, simpler to use) and public transport companies (billing correctness).
3.5.3 Loose-coupling
E-ticketing systems for public transport are widely distributed and have to process thousands
of check-in/out events in parallel. Having the back-end serve all such events originating from
terminals in real time would render the overall system highly impractical and excessively costly.
Therefore, in the real-world scenario, terminals do not maintain a constant real-time connection
to the back-end but rather receive regular updates which do not have to be performed in real
1This classification was initially introduced in the context of road pricing in [71].
2Since a user device where an e-ticket resides is usually fairly constrained in terms of computational power,
additional equipment at the user side may be required for fare calculation and subsequent result submission to
the back-end (for example, a card reader connected to a personal computer running a piece of software certified
by TA).
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time. Our discussions with the representatives of public transport companies of Metroˆ Sa˜o
Paulo in Brazil and Dresdner Verkehrsbetriebe in Germany have shown that tightly-coupled
systems are highly impracticable and are not likely to gain acceptance in practice. Therefore,
privacy-preserving solutions being developed for ESPT must be compatible with a loosely-
coupled architecture which is considered among the core requirements in this dissertation.
3.5.4 Efficiency
To successfully deploy a privacy-preserving system in a real world scenario, it must comply
with efficiency requirements. In ESPT, it is especially critical in the system front-end where
check-in/check-out events must be handled in a timely fashion to avoid long passenger queues.
In practice, the maximum tolerated time frame within which a terminal must meet the decision
of whether to accept or reject an e-ticket, ranges from 0.2 sec (London Oyster Card) to 2.0 sec
(early versions of Singapore EZ-Link) [72]. Quite often, a side-effect of many privacy-preserving
protocols is their suboptimal efficiency and demand for additional resources (see the related
work discussion in Chapter 4). An architecture of a target privacy-preserving ESPT, therefore,
should not by design entail prohibitive performance and enable its deployment in the real world.
3.5.5 Multilateral Security
The security goals of a TA as well as the ones of each user must be carefully addressed in
each ESPT system. For the TA that would imply, for example, that customers cannot cheat
and use the transport service without delivering the appropriate payment. Moreover, the
effort of forging e-tickets must be high enough to render it practically infeasible to perform.
For customers, it should be guaranteed that protection measures against framing or incorrect
billing are implemented. The aforementioned issues are collectively referred to as multilateral
security in this dissertation following the terminology discussed in [73].
Core Requirements: Summary and Discussion
The above discussed core requirements for a privacy-preserving ESPT are summarized in Ta-
ble 3.4. Note that Requirements 1 and 2 are particularly conflicting. On the one hand,
fine-grained billing requires capture and analysis of user travel patterns1. On the other hand,
this immediately poses a serious privacy threat if implemented without taking the issues of
privacy protection into account. A straightforward approach to solve this requirements conflict
would be to completely abandon Requirement 2 and therefore to develop a fully anonymous
system where travel patterns cannot be collected and analyzed by default. However, as already
mentioned in Section 3.5.2, the support for fine-grained billing is essential in the current state
of the market in public transport area. Therefore, for the target ESPT system a reasonable
trade-off should be found to enable fine-grained billing at the same time ensuring that customer
privacy is protected.
1It should be mentioned that there are some methods from the area of private information retrieval (PIR)
which by design allow a privacy-preserving pattern analysis for billing purposes, see for example [16]. They are,
however, relatively inefficient and inflexible
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Table 3.4: A summary of core requirements
1. Privacy
a) Privacy against external observers. An external attacker (see the adopted
attacker model in Section 3.6) must be prevented from deriving any PII
from interaction between e-tickets and terminals in the front-end.
b) Privacy against terminals. Terminals must be prohibited from tracking
and distinguishing between valid e-tickets as well as from identifying the
users associated with them.
c) Privacy against the back-end. The back-end is allowed to correlate travel
records related to a single e-ticket while being prohibited from identifying
the users associated with e-tickets.
2. Fine-grained billing support
3. Loose-coupling
4. Efficiency. Check-in/out events handling must comply with the timing require-
ments.
5. Multilateral security
3.6 The Attacker Model
Along with the discussion of core requirements, further assumptions about the relevant adver-
sary types (collectively referred to as an attacker model) have to be made in order to develop
a privacy-preserving solution. For the case of ESPT, the attacker model defined in Table 3.5
is considered within this dissertation.
The division into outsider/insider is made with respect to the attacker’s involvement into
system information flow. That is, the attacker of type 1 is an entity exogenous to the system. It
is assumed that an observing attacker is polynomial-time bounded and is not able to physically
tamper with the device carrying an e-ticket.
Terminals are widely distributed within the transport network and are, therefore, situated
for the most part in an unsecured area and in certain cases may be even subject to compromisa-
tion. Moreover, the wireless interface used for ticket validation can be misused by third parties
representing an additional attack vector (e.g., a buffer overflow attack covertly mounted via
the RFID/NFC interface). Should an adversary manage to obtain information from terminals
in such a way (represented by type 2 attacker), privacy of users as well as the overall secu-
rity of the system is likely to be endangered. Furthermore, in practice, transport authorities
have proved to be reluctant to have terminals process security and privacy relevant pieces of
information [67]. Therefore, in this attacker model, terminals are prohibited from tracking
e-tickets, distinguishing between them as well as from identifying customers associated with
e-tickets.
Privacy protection against the back-end is represented by the attacker of type 3. Even though
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Table 3.5: The adopted attacker model
1. (Outsider) External observers can tap the wireless communication between
terminals and e-tickets in the front-end.
→ No derivation of PII should be possible in this case.
2. (Insider) Terminals can perform additional analysis of communication data
and logs maintained, may leak information (e.g., due to a buffer overflow attack
mounted via the wireless interface).
→ No tracking of valid e-tickets, distinguishing between them or identification
of user identities associated with e-tickets should be allowed.
3. (Insider) Back-end can process all information pieces under its control, relate
them together and analyze.
→ No identification of users associated with e-tickets should be possible.
the back-end is in the possession of large amounts of information pertaining to check-in/out
events and has a global view on the system (which enables fine-grained billing for specially
registered e-tickets in particular, see Section 3.5.2), it must be prohibited from learning the
user identity associated with e-tickets.
3.6.1 Additional Assumptions
In order to clearly define and refine the scope of threats considered in this dissertation, the
following assumptions with respect to the adopted attacker model need to be explicitly men-
tioned.
First, it is assumed that external observers (attacker of type 1 ) are not able to act at the
physical layer by mounting, for example, a radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting attack to track
user devices managing e-tickets.
Second, a relay attack during which a terminal is spoofed into communicating with the rogue
device relaying messages to and from a legitimate user medium is out of scope. Relay attacks
are extremely difficult to mitigate against and this is still an open research question in the area
of e-ticketing and micropayment. Some known techniques such as distance bounding protocols
are likely to have only a limited effect due to high volatility and fluctuations of the NFC/RFID
communication interface.
Third, it is assumed that it is not possible for an attacker to gain access to auxiliary sources
of information beyond the context of the described public transport system. An example
of such information sources could be video surveillance data which would allow for inference
of additional pieces of information pertaining to users and would imply a qualitatively new
attack vector with respect to privacy invasion. Moreover, an omnipotent attacker (e.g., major
governments), which is fairly likely to actually have additional access to such auxiliary sources
of information, is beyond the scope of this work as well.
Furthermore, it is assumed that due to the quantized nature of stops in the context of a
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public transport network in a large city, multiple users are going to get on and off each station
simultaneously (as opposed to walking travel patterns). Therefore, it is assumed that user
travel patterns with respect to public transport do not leak enough information to be able
to identify an individual ”in the crowd” with sufficiently high probability. Observe, however,
that unlike gathering check-in/out information from public transport (i.e., stops/station data),
personal travel patterns originating from GPS or cellular data are far more privacy invasive
(see [74] for instance).
Lastly, the attacks leveraging physical tampering with user device, malicious code injection,
etc., are out of scope of this work. Moreover, the omnipotent attacker being able to break
established encryption mechanisms or, for example, having power to combine different pieces
of information from distinct non-colluding entities, is not considered either.
Chapter summary
In this chapter, an overview of privacy issues in e-ticketing systems for public transport (ESPT)
was performed. Firstly, the generic privacy threats endemic to ESPT together with the re-
spective countermeasures were discussed. Then the core technological stacks (RFID and NFC)
were analyzed for the availability of built-in privacy-preserving mechanisms accessible in the
off-the-shelf fashion. Summarizing, it can be stated that unlike the security mechanisms, the
ones explicitly addressing privacy are either completely absent in the respective standards or
only rudimentary considered. The chapter is finished by the discussion of core privacy re-
quirements for ESPT as well as of the adopted attacker model. This influences the choice of





The issues of customer privacy protection in ESPT are rapidly gaining importance. There
have been only a few papers, however, which explicitly consider this problem for the target
domain. Therefore, along with the work specifically targeted at systems for public transport,
the other research results pertinent1 to ESPT are considered within this chapter. The material
is reviewed and evaluated according to the set of criteria presented in Section 4.1. The solutions
falling into the category of tightly-coupled systems are discussed in Section 4.2. The approaches
based on the decoupled architecture are analyzed in Section 4.3. The summary of the most
important solutions reviewed is presented in Section 4.4.
4.1 Evaluation Criteria
The core evaluation criteria have been essentially derived from the core system requirements
(see Section 3.5) and the attacker model (see Section 3.6). They are further extended with
other relevant criteria. The result is summarized in Section 4.1.1. The respective discussion
follows in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Evaluation Criteria Summarized
The complete criteria set used for evaluation of the related work is listed below. The most





2. E-ticket anonymity against terminals;
3. E-ticket untraceability against terminals;
4. Mutual authentication between terminals and e-ticket;




7. Explicit consideration of public transport area;
1For example, lightweight protocols for mutual authentication in RFID environment.
59
4 Related Work
8. Possibility of e-ticket revocation;
9. Dynamic extensibility allowing to accommodate new e-tickets without re-initializing the
system-wide parameters.
10. Tamper resistance requirement for the e-ticket carrier medium;
11. Involvement of an external personal device to provide privacy properties;
12. Cryptographic primitives used;
13. Type of fare calculation:
a) Centralized (in the back-end);
b) Client-side;
4.1.2 Evaluation Criteria: Discussion
Criteria subset 1 (Back-end coupling). Among all the criteria listed in previous section,
the one indicating the type of connection maintained between the back-end and terminals
(Criteria subset 1) is decisive for the current evaluation. Three main system types can be
distinguished in this context, namely (a) tightly-coupled, (b) semi-coupled, and (c) loosely-
coupled. The last two ones, namely types b and c, are collectively referred to as decoupled
systems in this dissertation. Below each of them is discussed in more detail.
(a) Tightly-coupled Systems. The first case (Criterion 1a) represents the ”always on-
line” scenario where the back-end maintains constant connection to the terminals and actively
participates in real-time e-ticket validation protocols taking place in system front-end. Such
systems would be beneficial for a number of reasons. Firstly, this would substantially limit the
set of possible attack vectors both in terms of e-ticket privacy and security (for TA and for the
customer, i.e. in a multilateral sense) since in such a case terminals could simply be used as a
plain relay component without further involvement of any more intelligent tasks. Terminals,
therefore, would be solely responsible for relaying messages between the e-ticket attempting
to be validated and the back-end. Secondly, this greatly simplifies infrastructure management
and overall system architecture. The decisive drawback of such an approach, however, lies
in the stringent requirement to network connectivity (small delays, etc., leading to dramatic
increase in infrastructure costs) and the back-end component being a single point of failure
(system reliability and scalability). Taking into account the number of e-tickets circulating in
the system1 and terminals in operation (simultaneous validation requests) our suggestion would
be to decouple the back-end functionality from e-ticket validation processes and to resort to
one of the two other architecture types discussed below. Further discussion on tightly-coupled
systems and their properties is provided in Section 4.2.1.
(b) Semi-coupled Systems. Semi-coupled systems (Criterion 1b) rely on the semi-online
connection to the back-end for regular updates of black lists, certificate information, and other
parameters required to keep the system operating. These updates are usually carried out on a
nightly basis. Terminals, however, do not have to consult the back-end during the time-critical
e-ticket validation and are able to serve check-in/check-out requests locally.
1In the currently largest ESPT in the world – Octopus Card Limited in Hong Kong – there are around
11 million cards in circulation which are used in over 8.3 million daily transactions [75].
60
4.1 Evaluation Criteria
(c) Loosely-coupled. Loosely-coupled systems (Criterion 1c) are based on the infrastruc-
ture where terminals are able to validate e-tickets without the need to get regular updates
from the back-end (such as black lists updates, etc.). In this case, however, a certain portion
of private information would have to be stored on the terminal side in order to provide for
proactive validation of e-tickets and enforcement of a travel policy of a TA. Moreover, such
systems are inherently inflexible and do not provide support for efficient accommodation of
new e-tickets (expressed as Criterion 9).
Further discussion on advantages and drawbacks of decoupled systems (i.e., incorporating
both semi-coupled and loosely-coupled ones) is provided in Section 4.3.1.
Criteria 2, 3 (Anonymity/Untraceability against terminals). It is of high importance
to ensure that e-tickets are anonymous and untraceable against terminals following the attacker
model discussed in Section 3.6. Criteria 2, 3 indicate if these properties are met.
Criterion 4 (Mutual authentication). The communication partners should be properly
authenticated to each other prior to the session begin. This provides protection against man-
in-the-middle attacks and protects e-tickets against unauthorized interaction. Mutual authen-
tication (Criterion 4) is especially critical in the constrained front-end environment due to
contactless communication and much weaker capabilities to secure terminals and especially
carrier mediums for e-tickets. The back-end communication is, in contrast, considered rela-
tively secure due to the plethora of well established fully fledged security mechanisms which
are available.
Criterion 5 (Fine-grained billing support). Another important criterion for evaluation is
the support for fine-grained billing (Criterion 5). Whereas this might be viewed as an optional
feature for ESPT, there is a strong argument presented in Section 3.5.2 which underlines the
importance of the privacy-preserving fine-grained billing support in such systems and outlines
its decent potential for the future.
Criteria subset 6 (Trust assumptions). Following the attacker model presented in Sec-
tion 3.6, the reviewed literature has been analyzed according to the trust assumptions with
respect to the terminals and to the back-end. Namely, in several solutions it is assumed,
for example, that terminals are trusted to store identifying information about the circulating
e-tickets and consequently to fully identify them on each interaction (check-in/out). Further-
more, a substantial body of literature is based on the assumption that the back-end is fully
trusted meaning it can identify and trace individual e-tickets, create travel patterns and link
them to each user. There are approaches, however, that do not require terminals and/or back-
end to be trusted with respect to processing of customer private information. These trust
assumptions are of high importance for the evaluation of related work in this thesis. They are
reflected in Criteria subset 6.
Criterion 7 (Explicit consideration of ESPT). Only a few pieces of the related work
reviewed explicitly consider the area of public transport and therefore take into account the




Criterion 8 (Revocation). For TA, it is important to be able to (efficiently) revoke the
issued e-tickets. In a non-privacy-preserving setting, it can be done in a fairly straightforward
way. For several privacy-preserving solutions, however, it may impose additional challenges,
since their primary goal is to protect customer privacy and often the revocation issue is treated
as an optional feature if at all. Criterion 8 captures the fact if revocation is addressed in the
reviewed solution.
Criterion 9 (Dynamic extensibility). Several privacy-preserving solutions for ESPT re-
quire complete re-initialization of the system parameters in order to accommodate new e-
tickets. This may render them highly impractical in the real life scenario. This issue reflected
in Criterion 9.
Criterion 10 (Tamper resistance). E-tickets issued to customers can be viewed as a part
of the TA’s security domain similarly to the smart cards issued for banking purposes. The
latter possess a tamper resistant module to securely store critical information such as authen-
tication and signing keys, etc. Until recently, the costs associated with such smart cards were
considered to be nearly prohibitive to be used in public transport. However, along with the
rapid evolution of smart card technology and the resultant price fall, a growing number of
transport operators are adopting the cards with a tamper resistant module for annual and
monthly passes. Therefore, there are some privacy-preserving solutions that require a certain
level of tamper resistance for e-tickets which is reflected in Criterion 10. It should be men-
tioned that a substantial part of the early work on privacy-respecting authentication protocols
in RFID area consider the issue of tag compromisation. RFID devices were initially thought
to be inherently susceptible to compromisation attacks, i.e. when an attacker can obtain all
the tag’s secrets by physically intervening with it. Therefore, quite a few approaches based
on symmetric cryptography and hash functions additionally consider the notion of backward
traceability which suggests that if a tag gets compromised at a certain point in time, an ad-
versary must be prevented from tracking it in the past (e.g., based on the previously recorded
sessions between other tags (including the victim) and terminals). Moreover, as it is further
discussed in Section 4.2.1, some solutions aiming at optimization of tag identification proce-
dure have a specific privacy weakness called the ”tag compromise vulnerability”. It is caused
by the fact that the compromisation of a certain tag may endanger the privacy of the other
uncompromised ones (especially their tracking may become possible). In this dissertation, we
assume that relatively profound RFID tags (let alone NFC-enabled smartphones) can provide
for a decent protection of their secrets (i.e. they possess a tamper-resistant memory area).
Therefore, in our further analysis the issue of tag compromisation is not going to be explicitly
considered as one of the main criteria.
Criterion 11 (Involvement of an external device). RFID devices have been historically
considered to be inherently resource constrained with very limited computational capabilities
let alone the ones providing security. Since one of the types of carrier medium for ESPT are
RFID-based devices, the area of privacy-respecting protocols in RFID environment is reviewed
along with other solutions. Due to severe computational constraints, several analyzed solutions
for this area utilize an external (personal) device (e.g., a smartphone) to which computationally




Criteria subset 12 (Cryptographic primitive used). Various privacy-preserving pro-
tocols have different assumptions with respect to the capabilities of front-end devices and
therefore utilize different cryptographic primitives to achieve certain privacy properties. In
the e-ticketing domain, each type of carrier medium (smart card, NFC smartphone) has its
own cryptographic capabilities and therefore imposes respective constraints on the underlying
cryptographic primitives that can be used. Therefore, Criteria subset 12 reflects the type of
cryptographic primitives on which each of the reviewed approaches is based. Evolution in the
area of RFID and smart card manufacturing, not to mention NFC-enabled smartphones, has
made it possible to efficiently support relatively advanced cryptographic operations like public-
key cryptography on constrained devices. Therefore, this criteria subset is not considered to
be critical for the current evaluation.
Criteria subset 13 (Fare calculation). As it was already mentioned in Section 3.5.2, in
the e-ticketing scenario two main approaches can be distinguished with respect to the user in-
volvement into the process of fare calculation: (1) centralized (performed in the back-end) and
(2) decentralized (client-side fare calculation). Due to the reasons discussed in Section 3.5.2,
this dissertation focuses on the first approach. However, the decentralized billing is concisely
discussed in Section 4.3.4 for completeness.
4.1.3 Evaluation Criteria: Summary
The evaluation criteria which are subsequently used during the review of privacy-preserving
solutions for ESPT (as well as for the other neighbouring domains) have been presented and
discussed in this section. The following analysis can be divided into two main categories
according to the core Criteria subset 1 (back-end coupling), namely (1) the solutions based
on tightly-coupled systems and (2) the ones considering the decoupled architecture (semi- and




(Section 4.2) (Section 4.3)
Figure 4.1: Taxonomy of the reviewed solutions: an outline
In the next section, the related work is analyzed according to the evaluation criteria discussed
above. The reviewed material is structured according to the two main categories presented
in Figure 4.1. It should be mentioned that in the following analysis, the RFID devices are
often referred to as tags due to the initial terminology considered in the papers reviewed.
In this dissertation, RFID tags (or simply tags) are viewed as potential carrier media for
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e-tickets (together with NFC-enabled smartphones). If the reviewed approaches explicitly
consider public transport, we refer to e-tickets. Otherwise, the term ”tag” is used as in the
corresponding paper being reviewed.
4.2 Related Work Analysis: Tightly-coupled Systems
4.2.1 An Introductory Discussion
A common property of the solutions pertaining to this category is the existence of a centralized
database of tag IDs which is maintained by the back-end. In order to identify/authenticate
a tag, the respective request is forwarded to the back-end by a terminal. In order to provide
for privacy properties, a pointer to the tag’s ID (or other authentication parameter of a tag)
delivered to the terminal is concealed in some way usually involving cryptographic operations.
Therefore, in order to authenticate a tag, the central database quite often has to perform an
exhaustive search to find a match. The reason for this is that authentication usually requires
applying corresponding cryptographic operations by the back-end sequentially to every element
in the back-end database. After authentication is performed in the back-end, the answer
(accept/reject) is communicated back to the terminal. This approach has several advantages:
1. Terminal simplicity. All intensive computations are performed in the back-end.
2. Less trust in terminals. The terminals do not need to maintain any secret/private in-
formation pertaining to tags and are essentially relaying messages between tags and the
back-end.
3. Simple infrastructure. The overall system infrastructure is simple and centralized. There
is no need to consider revocation in the front-end (e.g., using terminal-side black lists)
since everything is done in the back-end.
4. Easiness of e-ticket revocation. Since on each check-in/out the back-end is consulted, e-
ticket revocation can be straightforwardly implemented in the centralized way without the
necessity to distribute the respective information (e.g., revocation lists) to the terminals.
However, the crucial disadvantage of this centralized fully online approach is that it does not
scale well. If n is the number of all tickets circulating in the system, the authentication com-
plexity in the front-end is often linear in n, i.e. O(n). In a real world scenario, n can be in the
order of millions (e.g. roughly 8 million in Hong-Kong Octopus system [75]). Additionally, the
search procedure involves some sort of cryptographic operations (e.g., applying a cryptographic
hash function for each database entry, possibly several times to recover a hash chain). What
may be even more critical, the back-end must always (24/7) maintain a reliable connection to
all terminals in the system which can be quite expensive from the system architecture point of
view, especially in case of mobile on-site terminals (e.g., on buses). A further issue is that in
order to provide untraceability against terminals, many approaches falling into this category
(e.g., [76, 77]) consider updating a tag pseudonym on each successful authentication which
requires the back-end database and a tag to be in the synchronized state. Otherwise, a valid
ticket can be rejected due to inconsistency (for example, as a consequence of an attacker having
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queried a tag between two successful authentication sessions). Moreover, in such scenario, the
back-end can become a bottleneck and represent a single point of failure (SPoF) impairing the
system reliability. The aforementioned disadvantages are listed below for clarity.
1. Scaling issues. The back-end often must perform exhaustive search (rendering O(n)
complexity) under stringent timing requirements.
2. The back-end is online 24/7. The back-end must maintain a constant connection to
all terminals in a system (can be rather expensive, especially in case of mobile on-site
terminals).
3. Synchronization (Statefullness, DoS). Many privacy-preserving approaches require tag
pseudonyms to be updated on each successful authentication which requires that syn-
chronization is reliably maintained between the back-end and tags. In case of desynchro-
nization (e.g. due to an attack), a valid tag can be rejected.
4. The back-end is a bottleneck and a SPoF. In a simple case of fully centralized infrastruc-
ture, the back-end can become a single point of failure and a bottleneck.
Regarding point 1 (scaling issues), additional mechanisms can be considered to enhance
search performance. One of the most prominent approaches to optimize the average tag iden-
tification time are:
1. Precomputation-based. Utilizing some sort of precomputation which requires a consider-
able expansion of the size of the back-end database (i.e. trading off storage for real-time
identification efficiency).
2. Secrets ordering. Organizing the secrets pertaining to tags in some ordered way1, for
example, in a tree structure (where leaves correspond to tags’ IDs) and having a reader
engage in multiple request-response rounds with a tag to traverse the tree to perform au-
thentication. An important (negative) property of the protocols falling into this category
is that parts of tags’ secrets are shared in some way (tree traversal or matrix search) to
optimize the average search time.
As an example of the first class of optimization approaches, a special time-memory trade-off
presented in [79] can be considered. It is targeted at enhancing the performance of the hash
chain-based OSK protocol [80] (see further). The main idea is to use precomputed tables
(units of memory, hence the name) to boost the search operation. The performance gain
increases with the square of available memory (used for precomputed tables) and depends on
system parameters and some further assumptions peculiar to each particular case (see [79]
for details). The optimized identification complexity achieved is O(n
2
3 ) as opposed to O(n)
of the exhaustive search (n is the number of tags in a system). Another concept to enhance
the tag identification time was developed by Nohara et al. [81] who suggested to use the
precomputation scheme based on bloom filters [82] to store the hash chains for each tag (one
bloom filter for each tag in a system). Alomair et al. [83] provided their own efficient solution for
1The prominent example is a tree structure. However, organizing the tag secrets in some other form, e.g.
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Figure 4.2: Tightly-coupled systems. Solutions taxonomy.
privacy-preserving tag identification which is not based on OSK (see the taxonomy presented
in Figure 4.2). Similarly to the optimization approaches discussed above, a time-memory
trade-off is used for precomputations. The precomputed back-end database consists of 3 tiers
with the tag ID information residing in the third one (reminding a linked list structure). On
each successful authentication session with a tag, its pseudonym gets updated from a pool of
random pseudonyms maintained by the back-end and securely transferred to a tag (for details,
see [83]). The protocol provides mutual authentication between terminals and tags with the
constant time identification complexity. However, the addition of new tags to the system
requires recomputing the whole database which is a costly operation. Moreover, an attacker
model assumed in this paper is rather specific.
Among the approaches falling into the second category (ordering tag secrets in a structure),
Molner and Wagner’s optimization based on tree-based identification can be considered [84] (see
Figure 4.2). It reduces the identification complexity from O(n) to O(log n). Their method,
however, is potentially susceptible to probabilistic tracing attacks in case several tags get
compromised1 as demonstrated in [85]. Another method to enhance the search performance
was developed by Cheon et al. [78] and considers organizing tag secrets in a matrix form (the
so-called ”meet-in-the-middle” strategy). The search complexity in this case is reduced to
O (
√
n log n). This approach suffers from a similar problem as the Molner and Wanger’s one
in case of tag compromisation (see ”indirectly compromised tags” in [86]).
1This privacy threat is called ”tag compromise vulnerability” in [83]. The reason for this is that a compro-
mised tag reveals its keys from the root to the corresponding leaf of the tree. The keys in each path are shared
with other tags which poses a privacy threat, since the more tags get compromised, the higher is the likelihood
that other non-compromised tags can be traced and even identified. See [85] for details.
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Therefore, the solutions aiming at enhancing the search performance require careful con-
sideration of the arising trade-offs. Moreover, further disadvantages of having the back-end
manage the whole tag authentication process (see points 2–4 above) render this type of systems
hardly practicable for privacy preservation in real-life ESPT.
If it is required that terminals can not trace and identify tags, the only viable solution which
remains is to have the back-end handle the authentication procedure while terminals simply
relay messages between the tag being authenticated and the back-end. Therefore, resorting
to a tightly-coupled system seems to be unavoidable if no asymmetric cryptography is used.
However, in large systems the scaling issues are very likely to impede the overall performance
and render such ESPT highly impractical. For this reason, a certain kind of decentralization
is required leading to the fact that the pieces of information pertaining to tags’s secrets are
stored either at local centers, which are able to cope with the required load, or even at the
terminal side. In the former case, the system costs are likely to grow up dramatically. In the
latter one, terminals must ensure the proper protection of sensitive information or otherwise
the privacy concerns arise.
The solutions shortly mentioned above are based on symmetric cryptography and do not
leverage the potential of asymmetric cryptography to enhance its privacy properties. The main
reason for this is the severely constrained environment of low-cost RFID tags which does not
allow computationally expensive asymmetric encryption to be efficiently implemented on a
simple tag. However, the newer generations of middle class RFID devices are already capable
of efficiently performing asymmetric cryptographic operations [87, 88]. For example, in one
of the solutions based on e-cash [8], it is already assumed that an e-ticket is able to perform
public key encryption.
In what follows, the most relevant approaches from the ones mentioned above are going to
be reviewed in more detail. They are presented in a structured way in Figure 4.2 for clarity.
4.2.2 Tightly-coupled Systems: A Detailed Review
4.2.2.1 Solutions Based on Symmetric Cryptography
Ohkubo et al. (OSK) [80]
Protocol Description. The protocol due to Ohkubo, Suzuki and Kinoshita (OSK) [80] was
developed for privacy-respecting RFID identification and therefore it is particularly suited for
lightweight RFID tags. OSK only requires two hash operations on the tag side for a single
protocol run and possesses the following privacy properties. Firstly, tag’s answers to each
query from a terminal are indistinguishable1 from random values thus providing untraceability
against an observing attacker (see the attacker model in Section 3.6). Secondly, the transactions
are unlinkable for the observing attacker. Lastly, should the adversary be able to acquire the
tag’s secret, it would be still impossible to trace the previous transactions of this compromised
tag (in [80] the latter property was referred to as forward security).
The protocol is relatively simple and essentially requires a tag to be capable of performing
two hash operations using two distinct hash functions:
1Provided that the underlying hash function has the respective properties.
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 H(·) is used to internally update the tag’s secret on each query from the terminal side;
 G(·) is used to further randomize the tag’s answers and make them untraceable for
observing attackers.
After the initialization phase, each tag j shares its initial secret1 sjinit with the back-end.
The latter stores tags’ IDs with their corresponding initial secrets in the database. On each
query, the tag hashes the value of its current secret state sji using G and sends the result G(s
j
i )
as a response to the terminal. Afterwards, the tag uses the other hash function H to internally
update its secret by hashing the current secret value: sji+1 = H(s
j
i ). The terminal in turn
forwards the tag’s answer G(sji ) to the back-end where an exhaustive search is performed for
all entries in the database (i.e. for all registered tags) in order to reconstruct the hash chain
and find a match. More specifically, for each DB entry l, the back-end compares the current
tag’s answer aji = G(s
j
i ) to the value computed at the back-end side according to the function
F (l, k) :







where slinit denotes the initial secret of the l-th tag, n is the maximum length of the hash chain,
T represents the set of all tags circulating in the system.
Each tag in the system, therefore, can be identified and authenticated at most n times, which
is determined by the maximum length of the hash chain. The main steps of OSK protocol are





Figure 4.3: OSK Protocol. Tag j is queried by a terminal and validated in BE. j in superscript
denotes the relation to tag j. The expression H(k−1) denotes hash operation applied
(k − 1) times.
1j in superscript denotes the tag to which the current secret sinit pertains.
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Protocol Assessment. The protocol is fairly simple and has the generic properties of tightly-
coupled protocols presented in Section 4.2.1. Among the positive features are tags’ anonymity
and untraceability against terminals, easiness of revocation procedure. The protocol does not
require that terminals are entrusted to maintain any secret information pertaining to tags.
Even though fine-grained billing was not directly considered in [80] (the protocol was not
initially targeted at ESPT), it would be fairly straightforward to implement this feature, since
the back-end keeps track of every transaction with each tag. In its initial version, OSK is
stateless with respect to updates of tags’ initial secrets sinit (therefore, a hash chain must be
restored each time to find a match). Whereas it is a positive feature as long as DoS attacks
aimed at desynchronizing the respective states of tag secrets between the back-end and each
tag are considered, it imposes a hard limit on the maximum number of times a tag can be
validated. Moreover, the complexity of a single protocol run is linear in the number of tags n
circulating in the system and the parameter k determining the maximum size of a hash chain,
i.e. O(nk). No mutual authentication is performed, therefore any tag can be queried by any
external or internal entity in the system. Moreover, according to the protocol, the back-end
must be fully trusted. Therefore, OSK provides protection only against the first two attacker
types of the attacker model discussed in Section 3.6 (outsider, terminals). Another drawback
of the OSK protocol is its susceptibility to replay attacks. Indeed, any adversary intercepting
the communication between a reader and a tag can impersonate the latter by simply re-sending
the tapped tag’s response aji on request of a reader, see Figure 4.3.
The most important properties of OSK protocol are summarized in Table 4.1 below. A
holistic summary along with the other reviewed approaches is presented in Table 4.19 at the
end of this section.
Table 4.1: Main properties of OSK [80]. The features advantageous to ESPT are marked with
a Xsign. k represents the maximum size of the hash chain. n denotes the general
number of tags circulating in a system.
Criterion Assessment
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end yes
anonymity and untraceability against terminals yes X
mutual authentication in the front-end no
fine-grained billing is feasible yes (as add-on) X
terminals are trusted no X
the back-end is trusted yes
limited number of validations (at most k times) yes
serious scalability issues: O(nk) yes
susceptibility to replay attacks yes
OSK-A: The OSK Protocol Improved by Avoine et al. [5]
Gildas Avoine in his PhD thesis [5] suggested three improvements for the conventional version
of the OSK protocol, namely (1) resistance to replay attacks, (2) mutual authentication, and
(3) optimization of search efficiency.
69
4 Related Work
The first improvement (against replay attacks) can be achieved by additionally generating
a nonce1 r at the back-end side on each request to the tag. The tag’s answer aji then must
include the generated nonce value: aji = G(s
j
i ⊕ rji ), see Figure 4.4.
In order to provide mutual authentication, the reader can authenticate itself to the tag at
the end of the session by additionally sending the hashed value of the next secret state of the
tag XORed with some publicly known non-zero binary string2 w : G(sji+1 ⊕w). If the answer
received from the terminal is correct, the back-end has successfully authenticated itself to the
tag and by this mutual authentication has been achieved (tag authentication takes place earlier
in the protocol). In Figure 4.4, an improved OSK protocol is depicted.
Back-end Tag j









∀l ∈ T, k = [1, n] :








= F (l, k)














Figure 4.4: OSK-A: an improved version of the OSK protocol by Avoine [5]. The i-th session
with tag j is depicted.
In order to optimize the search efficiency (the third improvement for OSK), Avoine sug-
gested that a time-memory (T-M) trade-off initially proposed by Hellman in [89] and further
optimized by Oechslin in [90] is used. In order to apply this technique to the improved protocol
OSK-A depicted in Figure 4.4, a tag has to additionally answer with G(sji ) (according to the
conventional version of OSK) along with G(sji ⊕ rji ). The complexity of the commensurately
optimized protocol depends on the memory size available for trade-off purposes. The former,
1”Nonce” stays for a number used once.
2Similarly to the common reference string model.
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therefore, can theoretically be varied from O(1) to O(n) depending on the available memory
size used for the time-memory trade-off (n represents the number of tags circulating in a sys-
tem). For example, according to [79], the amount of work required to identify a tag can be
reduced from N to N 2/3 using N 2/3 units of memory, respectively. This implies the search
complexity of O(n2/3) with the respective memory size complexity of O(n2/3).
Protocol Assessment The version of OSK improved by Avoine in [5] and referred to as
OSK-A in this dissertation has similar properties as OSK (see Table 4.1) with the exception
of three enhancements: resistance to replay attacks, mutual authentication support, and op-
timization of search efficiency. Concerning the latter property, the efficiency gain is achieved
using precomputed tables according to the time-memory trade-off. The downside of this is
that additional memory is required for this at the back-end side and more importantly the
respective recomputation must be made whenever a new tag is registered in the system.
The properties of OSK-A are summarized in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Main properties of OSK-A [5]. The features advantageous to ESPT are marked with
a Xsign. k represents the maxim size of a hash chain. n denotes the general number
of e-tickets circulating in a system.
Criterion Assessment
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end yes
anonymity and untraceability against terminals yes X
mutual authentication in the front-end yes X
fine-grained billing is feasible yes (as add-on) X
terminals are trusted no X
the back-end is trusted yes
limited number of validations (at most k times) yes
complexity: tuneable from O(1) to O(n), T-M trade-off yes X
susceptibility to replay attacks no X
OSK-N: A Version of OSK Improved by Nohara et al. [81]
Similarly to OSK-A, Nohara et al. [81] proposed another form of time-memory trade-off based
on bloom filters [82] in order to improve search efficiency of the initial OSK protocol. Similarly
to OSK-A, OSK-N is not susceptible to replay attacks due to the fact that the corresponding
tag’s secret at the back-end side gets updated on each successful authentication,. However,
in contrast to OSK-A, OSK-N does not consider mutual authentication and resistance to
impersonation attacks.
The authors of [81] suggest that the issue of search complexity can be solved using bloom
filters for storing the hash chains for each tag. On receiving the j-th tag’s answer aji (see
Figure 4.3 of the initial protocol), the back-end performs the following operations. Firstly, it
queries all bloom filters to find a match with the received answer aji . For each match
1, the
1The classic bloom filter has false positives (but no false negatives).
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back-end checks its accuracy by ”sequentially” computing the hash chain. After this, it can be
decided if each occurrence has been a correctly identified tag or it has been a false positive and
the search has to be continued in the set of bloom filters that signalize a match. After correct
identification, the respective bloom filter is updated so that the state of the corresponding
tag’s secret is correctly maintained. The properties of OSK-N are summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Main properties of OSK-N [81]. The features advantageous to ESPT are marked
with a Xsign. k represents the maxim size of the hash chain. n denotes the general
number of e-tickets circulating in a system.
Criterion Assessment
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end yes
anonymity and untraceability against terminals yes X
mutual authentication in the front-end no
fine-grained billing is feasible yes (as add-on) X
terminals are trusted no X
the back-end is trusted yes
limited number of validations (at most k times) yes
complexity: sublinear, depends on the setting yes X
susceptibility to replay attacks no X
Revised Song and Mitchell’s Protocol (RSM) [91]
Along with OSK and its improvements, another important protocol developed by Song and
Mitchell is reviewed in this dissertation. In their initial paper [92], the authors proposed a
protocol for privacy-preserving mutual authentication between the back-end and an RFID
tag. In [91], Song and Mitchell further improved and extend their solution responding to the
security attacks revealed in [93]. Therefore, in this dissertation the revised version of the initial
protocol is reviewed.
In contrast to classic OSK, the revised Song and Mitchell’s protocol (RSM) is stateful with
respect to the maintenance of secrets shared between tags and back-end and synchronization
of their state. During the initialization phase, the back-end assigns each tag T a secret s
and computes a tag-side pseudonym t = h(s) where h is a hash function (all notations are
summarized in Table 4.4). t is then uploaded to the corresponding tag T while s stays at the
back-end side. The back-end in turn maintains a quadruple (s, t, sˆ, tˆ) for each tag, where sˆ and
tˆ are the most recent previous values of the current s and t pertaining to the respective tag
T . RSM protocol requires that RFID tags are capable of performing the following operations:
XOR ⊕, right and left circular shift operations,. The main protocol steps are depicted in
Figure 4.5 where ← denotes substitution, ‖ concatenation, and ft(·) is a keyed hash function.
As it can be seen from Figure 4.5, mutual authentication between the back-end and a tag is
achieved using the shared secret t and the corresponding value of s (the latter is persistently
stored in the the back-end), see Tag authentication and Back-end authentication in Figure 4.5.
On each successful authentication, the state of the commensurate secret is updated at both
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Table 4.4: Notations used during the discussion of RSM and RSMP.
Notation Meaning
T tag identifier;
s tag secret shared with the back-end;
h(·) cryptographic hash function;
t tag-side pseudonym: t = h(s);
sˆ, tˆ the most recent previous values of s and t respectively;




ft(·) keyed hash function;
{xi} one-time tag-specific pseudonyms;
et(·) keyed hash function (to create a pseudonyms chain);
k the maximum length of a pseudonym hash chain.
sides, which is denoted as Update state in Figure 4.5. The complexity of identifying and
authenticating a tag is linear in the overall number of tags in the system: O(n).
In order to improve scalability and reduce complexity to the constant time O(1), the authors
suggest that one-time tag-specific pseudonyms {xi} are additionally used for tag identification.
These pseudonyms form a tag-specific hash chain which is created using another keyed hash
function et(·) with a tag-specific shared secret t as a key. At the tag side, the initial pseudonym
x1 is stored which is updated on each authentication request from the reader: xi+1 = et(xi).
Therefore, each authentication session consists of two parts: (1) Tag identification on the
basis of the current one-time identifier xi (used for table look up, ensures the O(1) search
complexity) and (2) Namely authentication for which a check is performed if the shared secret
t corresponding to xi satisfies the equality ft(r||xi) ?= MT , where MT = ft(s) was previously
computed by tag, and r is a request nonce previously sent to the tag by a reader. This version
of RSM protocol is referred to as RSM with one-time pseudonyms (RSMP) within this
dissertation. The pseudonym pool is formed by the hash chain. The length k of this chain
determines the number of pseudonyms assigned to each tag for identification. Therefore, the
maximum number of tag identification attempts (and subsequent authentication sessions) is
limited by k. When the pool of one-time tag-specific pseudonyms is exhausted, the update
procedure must be performed to update the tag-side initial pseudonym x1 and to recompute the
look-up table in the back-end. RSMP additionally requires each tag to maintain a decreasing
counter c the initial value of each is set to k corresponding to the length of a hash chain (and
consequently to the size of the pseudonym pool). The counter is decreased on each request from
a reader and serves as an indicator when the respective pseudonyms must be updated. If for
some reason the update of the shared secret fails (which should not normally happen), RSMP
behaves as RSM. Moreover, the counter is used for delegation of tag authentication rights to
external parties (see [91] for details). Interestingly, unlike the initial RSM protocol, RSMP




∀T : (s, t, sˆ, tˆ) t : h(s) = t
Generate random r1, |r1| = l r1−−−−−→
Generate random r2, |r2| = l (session secret)
M1 = t⊕ r2 mask the tag pseudonym t with r2
Prepare challenge for BE: M2 = ft(r1 ‖ r2)
r1,M1,M2←−−−−−−
Tag authentication:
In the back-end DB, find
t : M2 = ft (r1 ‖ (M1 ⊕ t))
Recover r2 = M1 ⊕ t
Prepare response to the tag’s challenge:
M3 = s⊕ ft(r2 ‖ r1)
r1,M3,M2−−−−−−→
Update state: Back-end authentication:
sˆ← s Recover s = M3 ⊕ ft(r2 ‖ r1)
tˆ← t if h(s) = t, Update state:
s← (s l/4)⊕ (t l/4)⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 t← h ((s l/4)⊕ (t l/4)⊕ r1 ⊕ r2)
t← h(s)
Figure 4.5: The revised Song and Mitchell’s protocol (RSM).
in Figure 4.5). Therefore, RSMP does not provide mutual authentication.
The authors claim that both RSM and RSMP can withstand several attacks, such as tag
impersonation, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack as well as the DoS attack (in the
sense of selective blocking of messages between the the back-end and the tag). Moreover, the
protocols are backward untraceable in case of tag compromisation. Forward untraceability is
provided by RSMP after the update procedure is performed.
Protocol Assessment. Similarly to the OSK protocol, RSM and RSMP provide tag’s
anonymity and untraceability against terminals. The latter are not required to maintain any
private information pertaining to tags. Revocation can be easily performed as well. Fine-
grained billing can be straightforwardly implemented, since each interaction in the front-end is
controlled and registered by the back-end. As in the case of OSK, the back-end fully identifies
every tag on each authentication session. Therefore, RSM and RSMP only address the first
two attacker types from the attacker model in Section 3.6. Unlike OSK, RSM and RSMP are
stateful by design with respect to the state of the secret t shared between tags and the back-end.
Moreover, a very important property of RSM is that it enables mutual authentication. Simi-
larly to OSK, RSM suffers from scalability issues, since the complexity of tag authentication is
linear with the number of tags in the system: O(n). However, unlike OSK, RSM in its initial
version does not impose a hard limit on the number of sessions for tag authentication. The
extended version of RSM – RSMP – is far more efficient in terms of tag authentication (con-
stant time complexity) but it requires a system update when the pseudonym pool is exhausted.
Moreover, in contrast to RSM, RSMP does not provide mutual authentication.
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The main properties of RSM and its extension RSMP are summarized in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: A summary of the main properties of RSM and RSMP [91]. Advantages are marked
with a Xsign. The general number of e-tickets circulating in a system is denoted n.
RSM RSMP
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end yes yes
anonymity and untraceability against terminals yes X yes X
mutual authentication in the front-end yes X no
fine-grained billing is feasible (as add-on) yes X yes X
terminals are trusted no X no X
the back-end is trusted yes yes
scalability issues: O(n) yes no X
4.2.2.2 Solutions Based on Symmetric Cryptography: A Short Summary
In this section, the protocols based on symmetric cryptography where back-end is assumed to
be always online (tightly-coupled systems) were discussed. The most important representa-
tives of this class of protocols were presented and analyzed in detail, namely the ones due to
Okubo et al. (OSK) [80] and to Song and Mitchell (RSM) [91]. The enhanced versions of
the aforementioned basic protocols were discussed as well: OSK-A due to Avoine et al. [5],
OSK-N due to Nohara et al. [81] as well as RSMP due to Song and Mitchell [91]. The
other approaches based on symmetric cryptography presented in the taxonomy in Figure 4.2
(Alomair et al. [83], Molnar and Wagner [84], and Cheon et al. [78]) were shortly discussed in
the introduction (see Section 4.2.1).
RSM(P) and OSK-A deserve special attention as the protocols satisfying most of the
core requirements for ESPT discussed in Section 3.5. Unlike OSK-A, RSM(P) is stateful
with respect to synchronization of a tag secret between an e-ticket and the back-end. Both
approaches do not require terminals to be trusted. Back-end, however, is a fully trusted
entity in the system. Therefore, the third attacker type (see attacker model in Section 3.6)
is addressed in neither protocol. In order to enhance the front-end performance, a certain
type of precomputation is used in each approach. In case of RSMP, it is a pool of one-time
pseudonyms. In OSK-A, the search time is optimized using a special time-memory trade-off.
4.2.2.3 Solutions Based on Asymmetric Cryptography
Most of the privacy-preserving solutions in the area of RFID authentication are based on
symmetric cryptography and hash functions since these cryptographic primitives are more
efficient and feasible to implement on a constrained device. However, the latest advances in
technology have made it possible to leverage certain public key operations on RFID tags by this
vastly expanding the design choice for new privacy-preserving solutions. In what follows, two
approaches, which were specifically designed for ESPT, are going to be reviewed and analyzed.
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Peng and Bao (PB) [94]
In [94], Peng and Bao addressed the issue of privacy protection (in the first place, tracking
resistance) by proposing two token-based protocols (PB-1, PB-2). Similarly to RSMP discussed
in the previous section, both PB-1 and PB-2 are stateful and based on one-time tokens which
are presented to the terminal on each check-in/out for validation. There is an important
caveat, however, concerning PB protocols: they are specifically tailored to provide support
exclusively for one way trips. Moreover, each one way trip must be equally billed (one token
for check-in and one for check-out) regardless of the distance traveled, trip duration or time
of day. There are four main actors that are considered in [94]: e-ticket, vending machine,
terminal (validator), and finally the back-end.
Both protocols developed by Peng and Bao mainly consist of three stages: (1) e-ticket
acquisition (or alternatively e-ticket top-up) at a vending machine, (2) e-ticket registration
in the back-end database (or propagation of the top-up event to the back-end), and finally
(3) direct usage of transport services (check-in/out events handling). The first protocol (PB-1)
is solely based on a one-way hash function which is used to mask the secret tokens (pertaining
to a certain e-ticket) stored in a hashed form in the back-end database. In this case, the
vending machine must be fully trusted since the secret travel tokens are generated by it. The
back-end, however, is not able to profile individual users, since the tokens from different users
are delivered to it in bulk and in a mixed form. It learns, therefore, only the mere fact that a
certain one-time token is valid and does not know to which particular e-ticket is pertains to. The
second protocol (PB-2) is claimed to be more privacy friendly, since it does not require vending
machines to be trusted. At the same time, the back-end is able to link check-in/out events (but
still is not aware of the e-ticket ID to which these events pertain to). PB-2 is based on hash
chains (using a cryptographic hash function) and asymmetric probabilistic encryption with
homomorphic properties (the latter is performed with the assistance of a vending machine).
In what follows, PB-2 is reviewed and analyzed in more detail.
The privacy-preserving solution presented in [94] is mainly based on one-time tokens gen-
erated as the members of a hash chain and their further asymmetric probabilistic encryption
with a public key of a transport authority. The latter is performed according to Paillier cryp-
tosystem [95] with assistance from the vending machine, since it is assumed that an RFID chip
is not able to perform all operations required for this type of encryption. As it already has
been mentioned above, PB-2 can be divided into three stages according to which the protocol
is reviewed below.
1. E-ticket acquisition (or top-up). Actors involved: (a) user (e-ticket), (b) vending
machine.
In order to obtain an e-ticket with travel permission for t trips (or top-up an existing one
for t trips), a user pays the respective price at a vending machine. The following steps are
performed afterwards. Firstly, the vending machine generates 2t encryptions of 0 under the
public key of a TA according to Paillier’s probabilistic1 scheme: E = {ei : ei = Ei (0)}2t . The
notation Ei(0) means the i-th encryption of 0 under the public key of a TA (the latter is
assumed to be implied and therefore not explicitly shown in the formula). The e-ticket in turn
randomly chooses a seed s to generate 2t secret tokens ai using a cryptographic hash function h:
1Therefore, the obtained ciphertexts are indistinguishable (IND-CPA security) under the so-called decisional
composite residuosity assumption.
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a0 = h(s), ai = h(ai−1), i = (0, 2t]. The set of secret tokens A = {ai : ai = h (ai−1) , a0 = s}2t
never leaves the e-ticket space. Then the tokens from A are encrypted using the cryptographic
material in E what is referred to as vending machine assistant encryption due to Paillier
in this section. According to Peng and Bao [94], it can be performed by simple element-
wise multiplication of tag-side generated tokens A by precomputed cryptographic material E
received from the vending machine:
B =
{
bi : bi = ai · epi(i)
}
2t
, i = [0, t − 1], where pi(i) denotes some permutation used to
randomize the order of the resultant encrypted tokens (against the vending machine). The
authors of [94] claim that the elements of B thus constitute a valid encryption according
to Paillier’s scheme (under the public key of a TA). The e-ticket, therefore, does not have to
perform all the necessary operations required by this partially homomorphic scheme (including
exponentiation) but rather a single modular multiplication for each token. However, it is not
clear how exactly the authors make use of the additive homomorphic property of the Paillier’s
scheme, since in order for the encryption1 B = A · E to be valid (and therefore to correspond
to the sum of respective plaintexts, i.e. A + 0) the elements of the set A (tag-side generated
tokens) should be either already transformed into a valid Paillier encryption or exponentiated
accordingly (for details see homomorphic properties of Paillier’s Cryptosystem [95]).
Afterwards, an e-ticket stores the encrypted tokens B in its secret memory in a stack with
b0 being at the bottom and b2t−1 at the top. The last element of the initial token hash chain
a2t is then submitted to the vending machine.
2. E-ticket registration in the back-end database (alternatively, propagation of
the top-up event to the back-end). Actors involved: (a) vending machine, (b) the back-end
database.
Having received a2t from the e-ticket, the vending machine forwards it together with the number
of acquired trips (2t) to the back-end. In the back-end, the respective record is registered:
Rj = (a2t, 2t), j = [1, n] (n is the number of all tickets registered in the system) and the user
can start the journey. Note that no PII are required (and hence stored) by the system to be
able to operate. The notations used during protocol description are summarized in Table 4.6
for clarity.
3. Usage of transport service. Actors involved: (a) user (e-ticket), (b) terminal (val-
idator), and (c) the back-end database.
On entering the transport system, a user checks in by presenting his/her e-ticket to a terminal2
(validator). Check-in technically implies the following operations. (1) A terminal reads out
the encrypted token bj currently stored at the top of the e-ticket token stack
3 and forwards it
to the back-end database. (2) The latter decrypts the received token and hashes the decrypted
value rj to find a match in the database. If the respective record with h(rj) is found, the user
is allowed to enter the vehicle. Therefore, in order to validate itself, an e-ticket delivers a
pre-image of the corresponding hashed value stored in the back-end database to the terminal
1Multiplication in the cipthertext space is performed modulo n2 with the corresponding addition in plaintext
modulo n, n = pq (see [95] for details). In the notations used during the protocol analysis, this is omitted for
brevity.
2Note that a terminal (or validator) is not a vending machine. The former validates travel permissions
stored on an e-ticket. The latter serves to issue these to a user.
3Only one element (the outer one) in the stack can be read from the ticket’s memory. The other ones are
read and write protected.
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Table 4.6: The second protocol suggested by Peng and Bao (PB-2): main constituents.
Notation Role in the protocol
E = {ei : ei = Ei (0)}2t the set of probabilistically encrypted zeros (due to
Paillier) generated by a vending machine (used for
vending machine assisted encryption);
A = {ai : ai = h (ai−1) , a0 = s}2t ticket-side secret tokens; they never leave the e-
ticket space unencrypted except of a2t which is used
for bootstrapping at the back-end side;
B =
{
bi : bi = ai · epi(i)
}
2t
, i = [0, t− 1] Encrypted tokens (calculated and stored at the e-
ticket side in a stack) after vending machine as-
sisted encryption;
Rj = (a2t, 2t), j = [1, n] a record sent to the back-end by the vending ma-
chine upon registration of an e-ticket j (n is the
total number of the e-tickets registered in the sys-
tem);
each time a user performs check-in/out. On successful validation, the corresponding ”old”
record in Rj maintained by the back-end is substituted with its preimage and the trip counter
(initially 2t) decreased by one. (3) After being read out, the transmitted token is deleted from
the e-ticket memory (to prevent tracking) and is substituted by the next one from the stack:
bj−1. Thus, on each validation, the e-ticket moves the tokens up the stack which corresponds
to traversing the respective hash chain1 backwards (to its first element).
Protocol Assessment. Both protocols (PB-1 and PB-2) can withstand replay attacks (due
to one-time tokens). In case of a more complex protocol (PB-2), neither vending machines nor
terminals (validators) can track e-tickets. Vending machines solely possess the knowledge of
the first token a2t (which is the end of a hash chain). Therefore, provided that the underlying
hash function is secure, no tracking is possible even in case the vending machine, which assisted
in issuing the tokens, and terminals collude. The back-end, however, is able to link different
check-in/out events pertaining to a single e-ticket. However, provided that no exogenous
knowledge about the user and the respective e-ticket2 is available to the back-end, no PII can
be inferred from check-in/out events.
In case of the simpler protocol (PB-1), which considers random tokens issued to for each trip
(2t tokens for t trips) and does not require asymmetric encryption, the back-end cannot link
different check-in/out events. The vending machine which issued the respective tokens must
be trusted, however (since the tokens are not further encrypted or randomized at the e-ticket
side). The terminals which do not collude with the respective vending machines, are not able
1Initial set of unencrypted tokens {aj} form a hash chain, see the process of tokens creation described earlier
as well as Table 4.6.
2For example, observing a user performing check-in/out and recording the respective token used for this.
The token will point to the respective record Rj in the database pertaining to e-ticket j.
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to link transactions and track e-tickets.
The complexity in terms of required cryptographic operations is similar for both protocols
and is constant time. In case of PB-1, the back-end performs a simple look-up (involving
no additional cryptoghraphic operations) to find the token forwarded by the terminal in the
database. PB-2, however, requires one decryption (Paillier) and one hash operation for each
token received from a terminal following the look-up in the database. Therefore, the number
of cryptographic operations required for PB-2 does not depend on the number of e-tickets in
the system.
The downside of the two solutions presented in [94] is a very coarse-grained billing supported
by the system (any ride costs 2 tokens) which prevents the effective implementation of flexible
travel tariffs and loyalty programs. Moreover, it must be ensured that token generation is
collision free during each issuance of a travel permit for each e-ticket in a system. Provided
that this procedure is performed frequently (one-time tokens for each ride), it may impose
additional requirements on the token size and collision checks. The main properties of both
PB-1 and PB-2 are summarized in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: A summary of the main properties of PB-1 and PB-2 [94]. Advantages are marked
with a Xsign.
PB-1 PB-2
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end yes yes
anonymity and untraceability against terminals yes X yes X
mutual authentication in the front-end no no
fine-grained billing is feasible no no
terminals are trusted no X no X
vending machines are trusted yes no X
the back-end is trusted no X no X
tokens must be collision free (affects scalability) yes yes
constant time complexity (in terms of crypto operations) yes X yes X
ESPT Based On E-cash by Heydt-Benjamin et al. (HCDF) [8]
In [8], a privacy-preserving framework for ESPT based on e-cash, anonymous credentials,
and proxy re-encryption was presented. The authors considered two types of tickets:
(1) temporally-bounded (TB) and (2) stored-value (SV). Similarly to Peng and Bao [94],
Heydt-Benjamin et al. holistically consider the generic processes happening in an e-ticketing
system. HCDF framework, therefore, essentially includes the following core aspects:
1. E-ticket acquisition. It implies a transaction between a vending machine and a user
(alternatively between a vending machine and an e-ticket, which has to be topped up).




3. Leaving the ESPT (exit). On exit, a terminal proves the validity of the travel permission
stored in the e-ticket and calculates the price for a ride (in case of SV ticket).
Before each transaction between an e-ticket and a terminal, a secure channel is established
through negotiation of a secret key. It is achieved through a special kind of authentication
which is called re-encryption based authentication in [8]. This method is based on delegation
keys d which are valid only one day and are issued by a TA to each reader (terminal) on a
daily basis. Possession of a such non-expired delegation key allows a reader to re-encrypt the
message C previously encrypted with the TA’s public key K+TA, so that the result C
′ can be
further decrypted with the reader’s private key k−R (see [8] for details). Revocation of a reader
in this scenario is achieved by not issuing a new delegation key d to it. The aforementioned
re-encryption based authentication can be used to negotiate a session secret S between an
authorized reader (having a valid d) and an e-ticket parameterized with a public key of a TA
K+TA, see Figure 4.6. An e-ticket, therefore, has to be capable of performing one encryption
under the public key of a TA.
Authorized Reader (Terminal) E-ticket T
k−R , d K
+
TA
Get current timestamp t
t−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Generate random r ∈R {0, 1}ln
Set session secret: S ← t||r
Encrypt S with K+TA : C ← EK+TA(S)
C←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Re-encryption: C ′ ← REd(C)




Figure 4.6: HCDF framework: an authentication session between an authorized reader and an
e-ticket [8]. k−R and d are respectively reader private key and non-expired delegation
key. K+TA denotes public key of a TA.
As it can be seen from Figure [8], each transaction in which an e-ticket is involved (see the
aforementioned generic processes ) is secured against an observing attacker. In what follows,
the main constituents of HCDF framework are going to be concisely presented and analyzed.
1. E-ticket acquisition. Actors involved: (a) E-ticket, (b) Vending machine, (c) TA.
For a temporally-bounded ticket (TB), the following transactions are performed. (1) Firstly, an
e-ticket pseudonym has to be negotiated between a TA and an e-ticket (it is performed through
a vending machine). Each party stores its portion of the respective information pertaining to
the pseudonym. At the e-ticket side, the corresponding secret key only known to the current
e-ticket is stored. The TA maintains the other portion of information which corresponds to the
negotiated pseudonym together with some additional information which later allows it to verify
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the validity of the credential issued for this pseudonym (in this case a TB travel permission).
The idea strongly resembles e-cash in that a blinded e-ticket-specific pseudonym is used to
prevent double spending. If a user does not abuse the protocol, the transactions bound to the
pseudonym are unlinkable. (2) After the pseudonym has been agreed upon, an attribute-based
credential (bound to this pseudonym) is granted to a user proving the validity of the travel
permission (the attribute in this case is the time period for which this e-ticket is valid). Note
that different validation sessions using the granted credential (when a user checks in/out) are
unlinkable provided that a user adheres to the protocol (see [8] for details).
In case of a stored-value ticket (SV), a TA issues several e-cash based tokens to an e-ticket
(via a vending machine). The amount of tokens corresponds to the acquired balance thus
forming an analog of a virtual purse at the e-ticket side. Needless to say that the tokens are
unlinkable during the spend phase (see further) unless double spending has taken place.
2. Entering the ESPT. Actors involved: (a) E-ticket, (b) Terminal (validator), (c) TA.
In case of a temporally-bounded ticket (TB), an e-ticket has to prove to a terminal (in zero-
knowledge) that (1) it possesses a valid credential to enter the system and (2) that this
credential is still valid for the current time period. This is performed without the direct
involvement of the TA. The terminal does not learn any additional information concerning the
e-ticket (and its former transactions) beyond the validity status of the presented (unlinkable)
credential.
For a stored value ticket (SV), the so-called entrance cookie CE parameterized by the sta-
tion ID is sent to the e-ticket. According to [8], CE is essentially a one-show credential formed
similarly to the token creation for TB tickets (see e-ticket acquisition above). The TA, there-
fore, has to be online in this case for pseudonym negotiation and issuance of CE . It is not
clear, though, why the authors did not consider the option of performing pseudonym negoti-
ation during e-ticket acquisition as in the case of TB tickets. An entrance cookie could then
be directly issued by the terminal during check-in and bound to the e-ticket pseudonym in
a blind way (to prevent tracking). In this way, the terminal would not have to additionally
relay communication for pseudonym negotiation between the TA and an e-ticket. Moreover,
the terminal would learn no auxiliary information transmitted during pseudonym negotiation,
since any authorized terminal can decrypt messages encrypted under the public key of a TA
using the valid delegation key.
3. Leaving the ESPT (exit). Actors involved: (a) E-ticket, (b) Terminal (validator),
and (c) TA.
For a TB ticket, the check-out procedure is carried out in the same way as for check-in (see
entering the ESPT above). In case of a SV ticket, the entrance cookie CE has to be revealed
to the terminal in order to enable price calculation. The latter is performed by the TA on
receiving CE from the terminal side. The calculated cost (essentially the amount of tokens to
be withdrawn) is then sent to the terminal which relays it the e-ticket. The latter spends the
specified amount of tokens (which are relayed back to the TA), deletes them from its memory
(to prevent double spending) and deletes the current entry cookie (against tracking).
Three main processes described above (e-ticket acquisition, entering/exiting ESPT) form the
core of HCDF framework. In [8], the authors additionally define user transfer to a different
segment of a system (performed similarly to enter/exit), add value (similar to e-ticket acqui-
sition), and finally cancel e-ticket (technically performed similarly to tokens spend operation
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and double spending detection). The aforementioned additional processes were omitted in the
concise description above for brevity due to their (technical) similarity to the main ones.
HCDF Assessment. Similarly to Peng and Bao protocols (PB-1, PB-2) discussed above,
HCDF framework presented by Heydt-Benjamin et al. in [8] explicitly considers the public
transport scenario. The major difference between the two approaches lies in how the travel
permission (tokens) is created. In case of PB protocols, the tokens are either random values
(PB-1) or are the elements of a hash chain (PB-2). In HCDF, in contrast, the tokens are e-cash
based. As a result, the framework essentially inherits its privacy-preserving properties from the
e-cash concept. Namely, the transactions between an e-ticket and a terminal are unlinkable.
E-tickets, therefore, cannot be tracked unless double spending has taken place. Each session is
protected against an observing attacker through the establishment of a secure channel between
an e-ticket and a legitimate terminal. Moreover, unlike the majority of reviewed approaches
(including PB protocols), e-tickets remain anonymous and untraceable even towards the TA
due to the inherent properties of e-cash (unless double spending occurs). Therefore, the frame-
work provides protection against all three types of attacker discussed in Section 3.6 (outsider,
terminals, TA). This is an essential advantage provided by HCDF. At the same time, one the
most significant disadvantages of this framework is the inability to support fine-grained billing
and hence different loyalty programs attractive to customers. Moreover, the efficiency of the
proposed approach is questionable. Firstly, in order to prove the validity of possessed creden-
tials, the e-ticket has to able to perform an interactive zero-knowledge proof which may be
computationally prohibitive for many constrained devices. Unfortunately, the authors did not
back-up their concept with a proof-of-concept implementation demonstrating the applicability
of their solution to the e-ticketing scenario (this was rather left for the future work). Secondly,
in case of a stored-value ticket, the price for a ride is calculated on the fly in the back-end
which is likely to introduce additional delays during check-out. Thirdly, a full-fledged mutual
authentication in its classic sense is not performed in the front-end, since an e-ticket is not
authenticated to the authorized reader1. However, it should be noted that by proving the
possession of a valid travel credential later in the protocol, an e-ticket indirectly authenticates
itself. Lastly, it was not clearly stated how the delegation key d is actually get expired after
24 hours, since the corresponding public key of a TA (stored at the e-ticket side) remains the
same. HCDF framework is summarized in Table 4.8.
4.2.2.4 Solutions Based on Asymmetric Cryptography: A Short Summary
Leveraging the properties of public key cryptography provides qualitatively new ways of en-
hancing privacy in ESPT as well as greatly expands the choice of available security measures.
In this section, two privacy-preserving approaches based on asymmetric cryptography which
are specifically targeted at ESPT were shortly presented and analyzed. Namely, Peng and Bao
(PB) protocols [94] and HCDF framework due to Heydt-Benjamin et al. [8] were considered.
In both cases, it was assumed that back-end is always online (tightly-coupled systems) and
can process in real-time the front-end requests originated from interaction between terminals
and e-tickets (check-in/out, e-ticket acquisition/top-up). Unlike PB-2 where tokens form the
1Indeed, the mere knowledge of the public key of a TA is not sufficient for e-ticket authentication
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Table 4.8: Main properties of HCDF [8] summarized. Advantages are marked with a Xsign.
Criterion Assessment
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end yes
anonymity and untraceability against terminals yes X
mutual authentication in the front-end yes (implicit) X
fine-grained billing is feasible no
terminals are trusted no X
the back-end is trusted no X
efficiency considerations due to ZKP during check-in/out yes
elements of a hash chain (and are further encrypted element-wise in a non-deterministic way),
a travel permission in HCDF framework is mainly based on the e-cash concept. As a conse-
quence, even the TA is not able to track e-tickets and therefore to profile users (unless double
spending of a travel token occurs). This comes at a cost, however. Proving the validity of
an e-cash based travel permission in zero-knowledge (each time on check-in/out) is likely to
impose a severe burden on the minimal computational capabilities of end user devices carrying
an e-ticket. PB-2, in contrast, is more lightweight and does not involve any cryptographic
operations from a tag during check-in/out. Security properties of this protocol, however, are
notably weaker than those of HCDF (no mutual authentication, any terminal can query e-
tickets). Moreover, the back-end must be completely trusted in PB-2, whereas HCDF enables
to relax trust assumptions for the back-end due to the inherent properties of e-cash (unlinka-
bility of transactions, etc). This, however, completely prevents the implementation of flexible
travel policies and hence the adoption of fine-grained billing in HCDF, since it is by design not
possible to correlate check-in/out events by any entity in the system.
4.2.3 Tightly-coupled Systems: Review Summary
In this section, the privacy-preserving solutions were discussed where it is assumed that the
back-end is always online and can process the front-end requests originating from check-in/out
events in real time (see tightly-coupled systems in the taxonomy depicted in Figure 4.1).
The reviewed approaches can be further divided into the ones leveraging the properties of
asymmetric cryptography1 and the solutions based on symmetric cryptography (see the re-
spective taxonomy in Figure 4.2). Each of the solutions has its own benefits and disadvan-
tages. Taking into account the requirements discussed in Section 3.5 as well as the derived
evaluation criteria (see Section 4.1), the following approaches stand out: OSK protocol en-
hanced by Avoine et al. (OSK-A) [5], revised Song and Mitchell’s protocol (RSMP) [91]
(symmetric-key based) and a privacy-preserving framework for ESPT based on e-cash due to
Heydt-Benjamin et al. (HCDF) [8]. The first two solutions satisfy the majority of the core
criteria but fail to provide privacy-protection against the back-end (therefore, only considering
the first two types of attacker discussed in Section 3.6). HCDF framework, to the contrary,
covers all three attacker types but fails to provide the support for fine-grained billing which
1The distinction is made with respect to cryptographic operations performed on the e-ticket side.
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is essential in modern ESPT (see the respective discussion in Section 3.5.2). Moreover, all
approaches reviewed so fare are inherently based on the assumption that the back-end can
process requests originating from check-in/out events in real time. Taking into account the
size of a widely-distributed e-ticketing system and the tight timing requirements posed to the
processing of check-in/out events, such system architecture is very likely to result in the back-
end becoming a bottleneck (see also the introductory discussion in Section 4.2.1). Moreover,
scaling issues together with the additional requirements posed to the connectivity of widely
distributed (mobile) terminals arise.
Summarizing the analytic review performed in this section, it can be concluded that none
of the reviewed solutions fully satisfies the set of core requirements (see Section 3.5) posed
to the target ESPT. Therefore, in the next section, the solutions which consider the back-
end decoupled from real-time interaction in the front-end (see Figure 4.1) are reviewed and
analyzed.
4.3 Related Work Analysis: Decoupled Systems
4.3.1 An Introductory Discussion
This section considers the most generic privacy-preserving solutions which are based on the
system architecture with the back-end decoupled from the front-end processes. Depending on
the degree (and frequency) of back-end involvement into the front-end performance, decoupled
systems can be further divided into (1) loosely-coupled and (2) semi-coupled systems (see
also the general taxonomy of the reviewed solutions in Figure 4.1). In case of the loosely-
coupled systems, relatively infrequent updates from the back-end side are necessary to enable
proper functionality in the system front-end. That is, check-in/out events can be served and
processed locally at the terminal side. The updates are received from the back-end on a
monthly or quarterly basis (for example, certificate updates, system patches, etc.). A semi-
coupled system, however, requires frequent updates regularly performed on a daily or even
hourly basis (blacklist updates, for example).
Decoupled systems (both loosely-coupled and semi-coupled) have the following advantages
over the close-coupled ones:
1. Better scaling (due to loose-coupling). Since back-end and front-end are loosely coupled,
the former does not have to process the requests originating from check-in/out events in
real time. This results in much better scaling compared to a tightly-coupled system.
2. Terminal-side e-ticket validation (efficiency). In a decoupled system, terminals can lo-
cally validate an e-ticket without depending on the back-end’s answer. As a result, the
front-end processing of check-in/out events is more efficient (both in terms of communi-
cation costs and processing time).
3. Relaxed requirements to terminals interconnection. In contrast to tightly-coupled sys-
tems, back-end does not have to maintain constant (24/7) reliable connection with the
terminals. Therefore, link costs are considerably lower in case of decoupled systems
(especially if mobile on-site terminals are considered).
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The aforementioned advantages come at a cost, however. Compared to tight-coupling, the
decoupled architecture implies the following disadvantages:
1. Higher requirements to the terminal processing power. Since the whole validation cycle
is performed in the system front-end, terminals have to possess enough resources to
carry out all operations required to validate an e-ticket (including the ones involving
cryptography which may be rather computationally expensive).
2. Substantially increased effort for managing the decentralized infrastructure. Due to loose-
coupling, additional effort is required to (a) keep the system up-to-date, (b) collect travel
records from terminals, and (c) resolve possible conflicts.
3. Requirements conflict: privacy versus local validation. In order to validate an e-ticket
locally (possibly including blacklist check), terminals are likely to operate on (partially)
identifiable data. This, however, is in direct conflict with the privacy requirement (see
Requirement 1b in Table 3.4), since terminals must be prevented from deriving any PII
during validation.
The generic representatives of both loosely-coupled and semi-coupled systems are going to
be briefly presented and analyzed within the following review. Similarly to the taxonomy of
tightly-coupled systems (see Figure 4.2), the one for the decoupled systems is presented in
Figure 4.7. The trivial case of each terminal locally managing the entire tag database (under
the category of symmetric cryptography in Figure 4.7) is mentioned solely for completeness
reasons and is not going to be discussed due to its straightforwardness.
4.3.2 Decoupled Systems: A Detailed Review
4.3.2.1 Solutions Based on Symmetric Cryptography
TanSL Protocols by Tan et al. [96]
Tan et al. addressed the problem of local, terminal-side e-ticket validation by presenting two
protocols in their paper [96] collectively referred to as TanSL in this dissertation. The pri-
mary goal was to achieve what the authors called ”serverless search and authentication” in
the area of RFID. More specifically, the solution provides for privacy-respecting terminal-side
tag identification together with mutual authentication. The solution falls into the category of
loosely-coupled systems (see Figure 4.7), since after the initialization phase no further inter-
action between terminals and back-end is required to validate tags. Three main parties are
considered in TanSL: an RFID tag (e-ticket), a terminal (reader) as well as a trusted certificate
authority (CA). In order to remove the need for real-time persistent database in the back-end,
the authors of [96] suggest that the terminal-specific tag access lists (AL) are computed and
uploaded to each terminal by a trusted CA (via a secure connection on successful terminal-to-
CA authentication). ALs are bound to each terminal. Namely, for each terminal (reader) ri CA
creates a terminal-specific access list ALi with the elements Lij corresponding to each tag tj
registered in the system. Namely, ALi = {Lij : Lij = h(ri||sj)}n where j = [1, n] with n being
the number of all tags registered in the system, h denotes a cryptographic hash function, ri is
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Figure 4.7: Solutions taxonomy: decoupled systems. LC stays for loosely-coupled architecture,
SC for the semi-coupled one.
particular tag itself. Every terminal Ri, therefore, maintains its specific ALi where each record
Lij points to the ID of a particular tag tj (tag’s ID is not secret, in contrast to its secret sj).
Notations used within the current discussion are summarized in Table 4.9 for clarity. During
check-in/out, each authorized terminal fully identifies a tag if the respective record was found
in AL. At the same time each terminal stays unaware of the underlying tag’s secret sj , which
was used by CA to create the respective AL, and operates only on the corresponding hash
value (see Lij). This is essential for the security of the system in case a terminal becomes com-
promised. An ”authorized terminal” in this case means it possesses the respective access list
ALj . Moreover, once authenticated to CA (e.g. by means of well-established signature-based
authentication), all terminals are considered to be trusted.
The aforementioned terminal-specific access lists are the basis for the two privacy-preserving
protocols with mutual authentication developed by Tan et al. [96], namely TanSL-1 and
TanSL-2. The first protocol is based on challenge-response for mutual authentication and
subsequent tag identification. In TanSL-2, authentication is implicit, since only an autho-
rized terminal is able to (1) correctly interpret the tag’s message and (2) extract the tag’s ID
contained therein. TanSL-2, therefore, does not provide mutual authentication in its classic
sense.
TanSL-1. Prior to engagement into the challenge-response phase, a terminal and a tag ex-
change nonces, nr and nt respectively. The terminal additionally sends its ID ri to the tag.
Thus, both parties possess the necessary basis to create and reproduce a challenge. Firstly, a
tag calculates the so-called challenge material (a basis for challenge) C = h(h(ri||sj)||nr||nt) of
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Table 4.9: Notations used during the discussion of TanSL protocols.
Notation Meaning
h() a cryptographic hash function;
CA a trusted certificate authority;
ALi access list for the i
th terminal (reader) ri;
ri, tj ID of the i
th reader (terminal) and the jth tag respectively;
sj the secret of the j
th tag (known only to the tag itself and to CA);
Lij an element in ALi, equals to h(ri||sj);
n the number of all registered e-tickets in a system;
nr, nt nonces generated by reader and tag respectively;
C challenge material, equals to h(h(ri||sj)||nr||nt);
U the first q elements of C, namely C0, C1, . . . , Cq−1;
C ′ challenge material recovered at the terminal side;
l length of the hash function output (and consequently of C);
k the number of randomly chosen positions among the last (l − b) elements in C;
quesr, quest strings of k random positions pointing to the elements of C (a question).
length l. Note that h(ri||sj) in C corresponds to the respective entry Lij which an authorized
reader has in its access list ALi. Then the tag randomly chooses k positions (k ≤ (l − b)/2)
among the last (l − b) elements of C by this obtaining a random string also called a tag’s
question: quest = { p : p ∈R [l − b, l] }k. This string together with the first q elements of C is
sent to the reader as a challenge. The challenge semantics, therefore, is in a way similar to the
cut-and-choose method known from other application areas.
On receiving the challenge, the terminal (1) tries to reproduce it locally using its access list
(element-wise) and (2) each time compares the first q bits of the result with U received from the
tag. More specifically, for each registered tag tj (including the one trying to authenticate), CA
has already precomputed h(ri||sj) for each terminal ri and uploaded these values in form of an
AL . Therefore, for each entry in AL, the terminal can recover the challenge by performing the
same computations as the tag did to compute C. For each recovered challenge C ′, the terminal
compares its first q elements with U received from the tag. The procedure is sequentially
repeated until a match is found. Having found the match, the terminal computes an answer
ansr to the tag’s challenge by sending the actual elements with the position’s numbers defined
in quest. If the answer is correct, the terminal has successfully authenticated itself to the
tag. A tag is authenticated to a reader in a similar way. If several entries corresponding to U
are found, the previous steps are repeated till the tag is singulated. TanSL-1 is presented in
Figure 4.8.
Should a certain terminal become compromised, the possible damage to the system (including
negative consequences for privacy) is substantially reduced. Terminal compromisation implies
that all information stored at the terminal side is exposed to the attacker. However, even
being in the possession of a terminal-specific access list and therefore having the knowledge
of the respective mapping to tag IDs, such an attacker would have access only to the check-
in/out events served by this particular terminal which has been compromised. Tag sessions
with other terminals (at other locations in the system) will remain intact, since each terminal
uses its specific access list which is bound to its ID ri. Therefore, according to the authors,
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Compute a challenge for the reader:
C = h(h(ri||sj)||nr||nt), |C| = l;
put U = C0, C1, . . . , Cq−1 (first q bits of C)
prepare quest = { p : p ∈R [l − b, l] }k;
Ct→r = (quest, U)
Ct→r, nt←−−−−−−−
Recover the challenge:
∀Lim ∈ ALi,m = (0, n) compute:
C ′ = h(Lim||nr||nt);
put U ′ = C ′0, C
′
1, . . . , C
′
q−1;
compare U ′ ?= U ;
if a single match is found (e.g. for Lij)
compute the answer:
ansr = {C ′m : m ∈ quest }k
else if several entries are found
start the protocol again;
else fill the answer with random values:
ansr = { p : p ∈R }k
Compute a challenge for the tag:
generate question: quesr (similarly to quest);
ansr, quesr−−−−−−−−−→
Reader authentication:
check if ansr is correct;
check that quesr 6= quest;
compute anst similarly to ansr;
anst←−−−−−−
Tag authentication and identification:
if anst is correct
tag tj is successfully authenticated and identified
else reject the tag.
Figure 4.8: TanSL-1. Cx denotes the x-th bit of a bit string C .
the information leaked from a single terminal does not help an attacker to defeat privacy in
the whole system (or in the other parts of a system).
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TanSL-2. The second version of the protocol is more efficient, simpler but at the same time
less privacy-preserving (due to tracking implications). Moreover, no explicit reader-to-tag
authentication is considered in this case. In contrast to TanSL-1, no challenge-response mech-
anism is used. After the nonces have been exchanged, the tag tj : (1) computes V = h(h(ri||tj))
corresponding to h(Lij) at the terminal side; (2) computes C as in TanSL-1 and performs XOR
operation of the result with its ID: W = C ⊕ tj ; (3) sends the first n bits of V together with
W to the terminal. At the terminal side, the entries Lij matching the first d bits of V are
determined at first. Since V is static for each (terminal, tag) pair, terminals can additionally
apply pre-computation by hashing the elements of ALi in advance. Then for each entry found,
C ′ is recovered as in TanSL-1 and subsequently XORed with W received from the tag. If
the correct1 tag’s ID tj is obtained as a result of this operation, the tag is considered to be
authenticated and identified. Else the aforementioned steps are performed for the next entries
found until the right ID is obtained. TanSL-2 is presented in Figure 4.9.
Terminal (Reader) ri Tag tj




compute V = h(h(ri||sj))
put F = V0, V1, . . . , Vd−1 (first d bits);
compute W = h(h(ri||sj)||nr||nt)⊕ tj
nt, F,W←−−−−−−
∀Lij ∈ ALi check if the first n elements of h(Lij)
are equal to F .
For each match:
1. Recover the challenge C ′;
2. Compute ID′ = C ′ ⊕W ;
3. Compare ID′ with corresponding tj .
Figure 4.9: TanSL-2.
Protocol Assessment. Two protocols developed by Tan et al. allow for terminal-side e-ticket
validation without the need to consult the central database in the back-end. Following the
classification introduced in Section 4.3.1, the solution presented in [96] can be further classified
as the one falling into the category of loosely-coupled systems. The authorized terminals
are initialized with terminal-specific access lists AL which enable local validation. After the
initialization, terminals essentially function independently from the back-end and are therefore
completely decoupled from the rest of the system. Authorized terminals can fully identify tags
for which there is the corresponding record in the terminal access list. For this reason, only the
1The ”correct” tag’s ID obtained by XOR operation means that it corresponds to the tag’s ID being pointed
to by the respective entry Lij at the terminal side.
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first attacker type (the outsider, see Section 3.6) is addressed in TanSL protocols. In the first
protocol, TanSL-1, the complexity of tag authentication (and identification) is linear in the
number of tags which the terminal is allowed to validate. That introduces a serious bottleneck
and imposes strict requirements on terminal’s processing power. Moreover, if several entries are
found which correspond to the tag’s message, the challenge-response phase must be repeated
until a single match is found. In order to improve efficiency, the second protocol was introduced
in [96]. TanSL-2 is not based on classic challenge-response. The search complexity can be
kept constant by partitioning the terminal-side access lists according to the first d bits of the
corresponding hash of each Lij value. Then on receiving the answer from the tag, a terminal
can efficiently determine the group which the current tag belongs to and subsequently perform
linear search within this group. This is possible, since the tag additionally sends the first d bits
of h(h(ri||sj)) to the terminal along with the challenge. The side-effect is, however, that tag
tracking could be possible if the size of the group is small. Moreover, in TanSL-2, no explicit
terminal-to-tag authentication is considered.
Regular billing is not directly considered by the authors but it can be implemented on top
of the protocol, since authorized terminals fully identify each tag being validated. TanSL
protocols are summarized in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: A summary of the main properties of TanSL-1 and TanSL-2 [96]. Advantages are
marked with a Xsign.
TanSL-1 TanSL-2
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end no X no X
anonymity and untraceability against terminals no no
mutual authentication in the front-end yes X no
fine-grained billing is feasible (as add-on) yes X yes X
terminals are trusted yes yes
the back-end is trusted yes yes
scalability issues: linear complexity yes no X
ALM Protocol by Avoine et al. [97]
The solution presented by Avoine et al. in [97] referred to as ALM in this dissertation is based
on TanSL protocols discussed above. In contrast to TanSL, the issue of terminal compromisa-
tion is explicitly considered in ALM by introducing the so-called reader counter cri to determine
”stale” terminals which have failed to synchronize themselves with the back-end. The latter
fact points to terminals compromisation, since in [97] it is assumed that the compromised
terminals are out of sync with the back-end. The reason for this is that after a compromised
terminal has been detected in the system, all other legitimate terminals receive an update
including the new reader counter.
Similarly to TanSL, three main parties can be distinguished in ALM: (1) tags, (2) terminals,
and (3) back-end. During the system set up, a tag j is initialized with a unique ID tj (known
to terminals and the back-end), secret (long-term) key sj , and tag counter c
t
j . The secret key
is known only to the respective tag itself and to the back-end. Terminals are unaware of sj .
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Each terminal (reader) i is assigned with a reader ID ri, reader counter c
r
i , and maintains its
access list ALi. The latter is a set of shared keys between this reader and each tag which is
precomputed by the trusted back-end:
{
kij : kij = Esj (ri, c
r
i ), j = [1, n]
}
n
. Here, Esj () denotes
symmetric encryption under the tag’s secret key sj . Therefore, the elements of AL are bound
to each particular terminal as in the case of TanSL. Moreover, as it was mentioned above,
it is possible to prevent the corrupted terminals from validating the tags by updating the
counters of other terminals. Having interacted with the legitimate terminal, each tag updates
its counter to the new value and hence will no longer accept the corrupted terminal with an
”old” counter value (see Figure 4.10 for details). The notations used during the discussion of
ALM are summarized in Table 4.11.
Table 4.11: Notations used during the discussion of ALM.
Notation Meaning
ri, tj the IDs of the i-th terminal (reader) and the j-th tag respectively;
sj long-term secret key of the j-th tag (known only to the tag and to the back-end);
cri , c
t
j counters of the i-th terminal (reader) and of the j-th tag respectively;
ALi access list of the i-th terminal (similarly to TanSL);
kij a key shared between the i-th reader and the j-th tag;
nr, nt nonces generated by a reader and a tag respectively;
n the number of all tags registered in the system.
Summarizing, the following steps can be distinguished in ALM:
1. On-the-fly computation of the shared key kij on the tag side after receiving rj , c
r
i , nr from
the terminal.
2. Mutual authentication using challenge-response and the computed shared key.
3. Tag’s counter update, if necessary.
The protocol is depicted in Figure 4.10.
If terminal compromisation is determined in the system, the back-end updates the counters of
the other legitimate terminals and recomputes the corresponding access lists accordingly. The
compromised reader, therefore, would be able to validate only those tags which have not yet
interacted with the updated terminals. In the public transit setting, this is a rather rare case1
(consider check-in/check-out events) provided that (1) the number of compromised terminals
is much less than the number of the legitimate ones and (2) the compromised terminals are
distributed in the system (as opposed to the case when, for example, all terminals along a
certain transit line in a system have been compromised).
Protocol Assessment. Similarly to TanSL, ALM provides for terminal-based tag validation
without the need for a real-time connection to the back-end. In ALM, however, the issue
1A tag will eventually interact with a legitimate terminal and update its counter.
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ri, c
r
i , ALi =
{
kij : kij = Esj (ri, c
r










if cri ≥ ctj








∀kij ∈ ALi decrypt V until nr is extracted;
if nr has been successfully extracted;
extract nt;
else reject the tag.
nt−−−−−−→
Reader authentication:
check if the received nt is correct.
Update tag’s counter if needed:





Figure 4.10: ALM protocol.
of terminal compromisation is more profoundly addressed by introducing counters which are
updated each time when the compromisation event is detected. The other properties are similar
to TanSL with protocol complexity being linear in the number of all tags in the system, as in
TanSL-1. Therefore, compared to certain tightly-coupled protocols (e.g., OSK, RSM), both in
TanSL-1 and ALM the complexity issue is shifted from the back-end to the terminal side. The
main properties of ALM are summarized in Table 4.12.
GR Protocols due to Garcia and Rossum [6]
Garcia and Rossum further elaborated on the issues of tag privacy preservation in case of
terminal compromisation. Namely, in [6] the issues of the so-called ”forward privacy” (FP)
and ”backward privacy” (BP) together with the ability of the system to re-synchronise itself
after malicious actions of the compromised terminal were considered. FP implies that if a
certain terminal gets compromised, it cannot infringe on ”privacy” of the past transactions.
BP, to the contrary, considers ”privacy” of future transactions after the event of terminal
compromisation has occurred. ”Privacy” in this case refers to the inability of a malicious
terminal to trace tags. Moreover, the protocols introduced by the authors (collectively referred
to as GR in this dissertation) are stateful by design. Therefore, additional issues of state
re-synchronisation after the attack mounted by a compromised terminal were addressed as
well. The main application area of GR are e-ticketing systems for public transport where it
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Table 4.12: ALM: main properties summarized. Advantages are marked with a Xsign.
Criterion Assessment
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end no X
anonymity and untraceability against terminals no
mutual authentication in the front-end yes X
fine-grained billing is feasible yes (as add-on) X
terminals are trusted yes
the back-end is trusted yes
scalability issues: linear complexity yes
is assumed that during a single shift mobile terminals stay oﬄine (with respect to the back-
end) and validate tickets locally. Terminal updates are performed when vehicles are in depot
(during the out-of-shift time, e.g. at night). In contrast to TanSL and ALM, the access lists
(called reader tables T in [6]) are not terminal-bound. However, as in TanSL and ALM, the
synchronised terminals can fully identify tags. There are also three main parties in the system:
tags, terminals, and the (trusted) back-end. On system initialization, each tag initially shares
a key k with terminals. At the tag side, an additional parameter k′ is stored which state
is used to (indirectly) maintain synchronisation with the back-end (through terminals). At
the terminal side, the following parameters are maintained: k˜, h(k′, C0), and u. The first
parameter is referred to as ”the first key of the day” and is updated by the back-end in the
following way: k˜ ← h(k′+1) (it is explained in more detail below). C0 is a known system-wide
constant and u is a bit flag indicating if the tag has been validated during the current epoch
(that is, between two synchronisation periods, within the current shift). Note that terminals
are unaware of k′ the initial value of which is shared between tags and the back-end. The
notations used during the discussion of GR are summarized in Table 4.13. The major protocol
due to Garcia and Rossum is depicted in Figure 4.11 and functions as follows. Having received
the nonce nr from the terminal, the tag computes an answer c and updates its key k. On
receiving c, the terminal checks the following three cases.
Case 1 (accept the tag). For each entry k in its table (access list), the terminal tries to
recover the corresponding hash chain and to find a match with c in a similar way as it is done
in OSK (see Section 4.2.2.1). The difference to OSK is that a nonce nr is taken into account
(see Table 4.11). If a match is found (rendering case 1 true), the conclusion can be drawn
that the tag with the respective ID has been validated for the first time within the current
epoch. The terminal then computes an answer m as shown in Figure 4.11. The tag checks if
m is correct and if so, further updates k and k′. Then it computes an answer c′ and updates
k again. At the terminal side, the condition h(k˜, nr) = c
′ is checked. If it is true, u is set to
true which signalizes that k′ has to be updated in the back-end (namely, k′ ← h(k′)) which
happens when the tables are gathered and analyzed during the off-the-shift time. Note that k˜
at the terminal side is pre-computed be the back-end and equals to h(k′+1). This corresponds
to the new value of k updated by the tag after checking the correctness of m (see Figure 4.11).
Case 2 (accept the tag). If the tag has been already validated during the current epoch, the
second case evaluates to true. In order to check the respective condition, operations similar
to the ones in case 1 are performed but using k˜ instead of k. The reason is that the value of
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terminal-side k˜ pre-computed by the back-end corresponds to the one of k ← h(k′+1) updated
by the tag after receiving m (see case 1 above and Figure 4.11). If case 2 evaluates to true,
m is set to a random value and k˜ is updated as follows to maintain consistency: k˜ ← hi+1(k˜).
On receiving m, the tag computes an answer c′ and updates its k. Having received c′, the
terminal performs no further actions (that is, the value of u remains intact) since case 1 has
been evaluated to false.
Case 3 (reject the tag). If no match has been found, neither using k nor k˜, the tag is
rejected.
At the end of each epoch, the tables from all terminals are gathered by the back-end and
analyzed. Namely, for each tag the latest value of key k is determined. If a table is found for
which u is true, then the corresponding k˜ is updated as follows: k˜ ← h(k′ + 1) and u is set to
false. Moreover, k′ is updated in the back-end database: k′ ← h(k′). After the aforementioned
operations, the updated tables are distributed to terminals.
Table 4.13: Notations used during the discussion of GR.
Notation Meaning
k the key initially shared between a tag and terminals
k′ the secret key of a tag, shared only with the trusted back-end
C0 a well known system wide constant
k˜ the ”first key of the day”, initially k˜ ← h(k′ + 1)
Protocol Assessment In [6], the terminal-side tag validation was addressed together with
the issues of privacy preservation in case of terminal compromisation. The former is ensured
through the so-called terminal tables which correspond to access lists in TanSL and ALM.
The important difference is, however, that the tables are not terminal-bound as in the two
previous protocols. The advantage of it is that the back-end does not have to compute tables
individually for each terminal as it is done in TanSL and ALM. Should a certain terminal
become compromised, however, additional measures have to be undertaken to protect privacy
(see forward privacy and backward privacy discussed above). For this, each tag maintains its
secret key k′ shared with the trusted back-end which is used to maintain consistency between
legitimate terminals and tags and to prevent compromised terminals from tracing tags (across
epochs). This is done through regular updates of k′ for each new epoch. Moreover, in [6],
the issues of self-stabilization after a de-synchronisation attack mounted by a compromised
terminal were addressed as well.
Depending on the fact if a tag has already been validated during the current epoch, two
cases are foreseen for terminal-side tag validation. Both of them are essentially based on OSK
in terms of a match search (see Section 4.2.2.1) additionally taking nonce nr into account.
Therefore, the worst case complexity for tag validation equals to the one of OSK protocol,
namely O(V n) where V is the maximum length of the hash chain and n is the number of all
tags registered in the system. Moreover, within a single epoch a tag can be validated a limited
number of times (corresponding to V ).
Therefore, GR is similar to TanSL and ALM in terms of the following properties: no
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Terminal (Reader) Tag
T : [id, k, k˜, h(k′, C0), u] k, k′
generate nonce nr
nr−−−−−−→
compute: c← h(k, nr)
update: k ← h(k)
c←−−−−−−
case 1: ∀k ∈ T, i ≤ V
search for a match h(hi(k), nr) = c
if found, compute: m← h(hi+1(k), h(k′, C0))
case 2: ∀k ∈ T, i ≤ V
search for a match h(hi(k˜), nr) = c
if found, set: m← random
k˜ ← hi+1(k˜)
case 3: if no matches have been found,
reject the tag, set m← random
m−−−−−−→
if h(k, h(k′, C0)) = m
update k ← h(k′ + 1)
k′ ← h(k′)
compute: c′ ← h(k, nr)
update: k ← h(k)
c′←−−−−−−
if case 1 is true and h(k˜, nr) = c
′
set u← 1 (signal to update k′ in the back-end)
Figure 4.11: GR protocol [6]. V represents the maximum length of a hash chain hi().
anonymity and untraceability against terminals, trust assumptions, billing as well as coupling
nature between the back-end and terminals. However, no terminal authentication towards the
tag is considered. Moreover, the worst-case complexity of tag validation is similar to OSK,
namely O(V n). The properties of GR are summarized in Table 4.14.
4.3.2.2 Solutions Based on Symmetric Cryptography: A Short Summary
In this section, the most relevant solutions which can be applied to develop a privacy-preserving
decoupled ESPT system based on symmetric cryptography were reviewed and analyzed. Since
the decoupled systems can be further divided into loosely-coupled and semi-coupled (see Fig-
ure 4.7), the representatives of both sub-categories were reviewed. Thus, the two protocols due
to Tan et al. [96] referred to as TanSL-1 and TanSL-2 fall into the category of loosely-coupled
systems. Whereas TanSL-1 provides for mutual authentication (unlike TanSL-2), it is fairly
inefficient in terms of performance (tag validation complexity is linear in the number of all tags
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Table 4.14: GR: main properties summarized. Advantages are marked with a Xsign.
Criterion Assessment
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end no X
anonymity and untraceability against terminals no
terminals are trusted yes
fine-grained billing is feasible yes (as add-on) X
mutual authentication in the front-end no
the back-end is trusted yes
the number of tag validations is limited within an epoch yes
scalability issues: linear complexity, O(V n) yes
in the system). Similar issues has ALM due to Avoine et al. [97] which is based on TanSL. In
ALM, however, terminal updates are foreseen (unlike in TanSL) that are targeted at tackling
the problem of terminal compromisation. Moreover, ALM is a semi-coupled protocol. Garcia
and Rossum (GR) further addressed the issue of terminal compromisation in their solution [6]
(also a semi-coupled approach). Unlike TanSL and ALM, GR is a stateful protocol. Therefore,
mechanisms for state re-synchronization after a possible attack from a compromised reader is
presented in GR as well. One of the important constituents of GR is tag search in a terminal-
side table. It is based on OSK protocol (see Section 4.2.2.1) with minor modifications (that
is, inclusion of the reader nonce). The negative consequence of it is the impact on system
scalability and terminal efficiency, since the worst case complexity for tag validation is O(V n)
where n is the overall number of tags registered in the system and V is the maximum length
of the hash chain (used for OSK tag search). All protocols reviewed in the current section
are based on the fact that (authenticated and legitimate) terminals as well as the back-end
are fully trusted. Moreover, each terminal fully identifies the tag on validation. Therefore, in
each solution, only the attacker of type 1 is addressed (see Section 3.6). Mutual authentication
between a tag and a terminal is explicitly considered only in TanSL 1 and ALM.
4.3.2.3 Solutions Based on Asymmetric Cryptography
As it was previously mentioned in Section 4.2.2.3, among the solutions applying the mechanisms
based on symmetric cryptography which is well-established in the area of RFID authentication,
there are approaches leveraging the potential of asymmetric cryptography. The latter require
RFID devices with relatively profound performance capabilities. Their price, however, is no
longer prohibitive for deployment in large-scale systems like ESPT which motivates to include
the approaches making use of asymmetric cryptography into our review.
Pay as You Go (PAYG) by Baldimtsi et al. [9]
Similarly to HCDF [8] discussed in Section 4.2.2.3, Baldimtsi et al. [9] developed a solution
essentially based on e-cash which is referred to ”Pay as You Go” (PAYG) in this dissertation.
As HCDF, PAYG is specifically targeted at ESPT. PAYG, however, does not require terminals
to maintain a constant connection to the back-end for e-ticket validation.
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There are four main parties in PAYG: (1) e-ticket, (2) terminals, (3) vending machines, and
finally (4) back-end. In PAYG, only single trip tickets are considered. The ESPT adheres to
check-in/out model (CICO, see Figure 2.3) and the actual fare for the trip is calculated by
the check-out terminal based on the location where an e-ticket was checked in. Similarly to
HCDF, PAYG can be regarded as a privacy-preserving framework for ESPT that covers the
following core processes:
1. E-ticket acquisition (namely, acquisition of e-cash based tokens);
2. Entering the ESPT (check-in).
3. Leaving the ESPT (check-out).
4. Obtaining a refund (reimbursement).
The first three processes are generic for a CICO-based ESPT. The last one (obtaining a
refund) is specific to PAYG since it is a refund-based system. That is, on each check-in, a
fixed amount of e-cash based tokens is spent (independently of the route) which corresponds
to the most expensive (e.g., the longest) trip. On spending the tokens, the so-called refund
calculation token1 (RCT) is obtained from the check-in terminal which is used by the check-out
terminal to issue a refund. The aforementioned core processes including the refund mechanism
are explained in more detail below. The underlying cryptographic mechanisms can be found
in [98].
1. E-ticket acquisition. Parties involved: (a) e-ticket, (b) vending machine, (c) back-end.
E-ticket acquisition essentially implies a user acquiring e-cash based tokens from a vending
machine. The prerequisite is that a user has the respective account opened either in some
external bank or directly in TA (following the concept of e-cash). More specifically, the vending
machine issues a travel credential referred to as Trip Authorization Token (TAT) to a user.
TAT is based on e-cash and therefore an identifying piece of information pertaining to the
user (e.g., the number of a credit card used for a transaction) is encoded into TAT (to prevent
double-spending). TAT is therefore bound to a particular ID (that is, the ID is encoded into
TAT) but in such a way that the ID cannot be directly obtained from a token. The cost
of a single TAT corresponds to the most expensive single trip in the system. The actual
price together with the corresponding refund will be determined later during check-out (see
further). Therefore, PAYG is an e-ticketing system with upfront payment. Following the e-
cash principle, the events of TAT withdrawal and its future use cannot be linked. The acquired
TATs are stored at the e-ticketing medium of a user which is referred to as an e-ticket (in this
case, acting like an electronic purse).
2. Entering the ESPT (check-in). Parties involved: (1) e-ticket, (2) terminal.
To check in, the user spends one TAT maintained by the e-ticket at the corresponding terminal.
On spending, an e-ticket has to prove (in zero-knowledge) that it knows the ID encoded into the
TAT. If that is the case, the e-ticket is issued the so-called Refund Calculation Token (RCT)
which corresponds to the entrance cookie in HCDF. RCT is bound to the TAT having been
spent by the e-ticket and additionally contains a time stamp together with the terminal ID.
1The concept of RCT is similar to entrance cookie in HCDF.
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RCT is signed by the corresponding terminal. After RCT has been issued, the user is allowed
to enter the system. The aforementioned operations are performed locally by the terminal
without the need to consult the back-end (that is, in an oﬄine fashion).
3. Leaving the ESPT (check-out). Parties involved: (1) e-ticket, (2) terminal.
On check-out, the RCT together with the corresponding zero-knowledge proof of the encoded
ID is presented to the terminal which calculates the actual fare (based on RCT) and the
respective refund. The latter is aggregated into the so-called Refund Token (RT) maintained
at the e-ticket side (refund top-up). These operations are also performed in an off-line fashion
without the involvement of the back-end.
4. Obtaining a refund (reimbursement). Parties involved: (a) e-ticket, (b) vending
machine, (c) back-end.
Refund is obtained from a vending machine by presenting the corresponding RT to it. The
vending machine consults the central database in the back-end in order to check if the same
RT has been already reimbursed and then issues a refund. The latter can be either cashed
directly or used to obtain new TATs.
In Table 4.15, the main notations used during the discussion of PAYG are summarized for
clarity.
Table 4.15: Notations used during the discussion of PAYG.
Notation Meaning
TAT Ticket Authorization Token (obtained from a vending machine);
ID a piece of information uniquely identifying the user (e.g., a credit card number);
RCT Refund Calculation Token (acts as a stamped ticket);
RT Refund Token, aggregates multiple RCTs.
PAYG Assessment. PAYG is a framework targeted specifically at privacy-preserving ESPT.
As in HCDF, its privacy-preserving properties are essentially inherited from e-cash. Namely,
the unlinkability of tokens withdrawal and spending is guaranteed provided that no double
spending occurs. E-tickets, therefore, are untraceable and unidentifiable not only towards
terminals but also towards the back-end (as long as no double spending occurs). PAYG thus
considers all three attacker types (see Section 3.6) which is an essential advantage over TanSL,
ALM, and GR. Moreover, in contrast to HCDF, variable pricing schemes are supported through
the encoding of the respective attributes (for example, a student, elderly, or disabled) into
TAT. However, the system supports only single trip tickets. In order to obtain such a ticket,
a (personalized) account must be opened beforehand to enable TAT issuance. Alternatively,
the tokens could be bought without preliminary registration if for that a credit card is used,
for example (which ID is then encoded into TAT for double spending prevention). This means
that there is no possibility to obtain a single trip ticket in a fully anonymous way without the
need for preliminary identification of a user. Whereas for a monthly or a year ticket it would
be a viable option (which is not possible with PAYG), the sporadic travelers willing to use the
system only once may be reluctant to perform an identifying transaction to obtain a single
trip ticket. Similarly to HCDF, regular billing is by design not feasible in PAYG. Another
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issue is that mutual authentication between terminals and e-tickets is not directly considered
in PAYG. This fact does not pose a serious privacy threat due to unlinkability properties
(inherited from the e-cash concept). However, without mutual authentication an e-ticket can
be covertly queried by an attacker (e.g. using a pocket reader) in order to illegitimately obtain
the tokens. The adversary would not be able to use the received TAT further since it does
not possess the knowledge of the ID encoded into the token (required for the corresponding
zero-knowledge proof). However, as a DoS attack such a process of getting tokens from e-
ticket is possible, since an e-ticket does not check the correctness of the terminal’s answer
(that is, the correctness of RCT). Moreover, all reimbursed refund tokens (RT) must be stored
in the back-end to prevent double spending (merely for an infinite amount of time). Taking
into account that refunds can be claimed after each ride (without accumulating individual
refunds into RT), the amount of the redeemed tokens which must be stored and processed in
the back-end on each reimbursement request may introduce a bottleneck. Furthermore, the
refund-based approach itself may be seen as additional nuisance for users as it is necessary
to spend extra time on reimbursement procedure. An important issue is the price calculation
which happens at the terminal side during check-out. Terminals must be able to calculate
the price on-the-fly based on the presented RCT. This renders flexible pricing schemes which
require more complex processing time-prohibitive and imposes extra requirements on terminal
performance. The authors did not include the time required for price calculation during PAYG
evaluation in [9]. The main properties of PAYG are summarized in Table 4.16.
Table 4.16: Main properties of PAYG [9] summarized. Advantages are marked with a Xsign.
Criterion Assessment
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end no X
anonymity and untraceability against terminals yes X
mutual authentication in the front-end no
fine-grained billing is feasible no
terminals are trusted no X
the back-end is trusted no X
efficiency considerations due to ZKP during check-in/out yes
Sadeghi, Visconti, and Wachsmann (SVW) [10]
A privacy-preserving framework for ESPT developed by Sadeghi, Visconti, and Wachs-
mann [10] referred to as SVW within this dissertation, is essentially based on secure key
storage with physically unclonable functions (PUFs), symmetric key authentication, and re-
randomizable encryption. In order to capture the core processes of an e-ticketing system
for public transport, the following parties are considered in the framework: (1) token issuer,
(2) verifiers, and (3) user devices managing tokens. Verifiers are further divided into (a) en-
trance verifiers, (b) inspectors, and (c) exit verifiers essentially depicting the process of a user
beginning a ride by entering ESPT, presenting a ticket to a conductor if requested, and finally
exiting the system. E-tickets in this case are represented by digital tokens the authenticity
and validity of which must be proven to verifiers in order to use the system. Even though such
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system architecture per se would allow to implement CICO-based fare calculation on top of
it (see Figure 2.3), in SVW framework, the support for flexible fare schemes and fine-grained
billing was not explicitly considered.
SVW framework relies in large on token-based authentication between user devices (in this
case, RFID tags) and verifiers. A token T is constructed by using an authentication secret KT .
In order to securely store the latter, the utilization of physically unclonable functions1 (PUFs)
was suggested in [10]. In order to bootstrap symmetric-key authentication between verifiers
(terminals) and an e-ticket, the so-called re-randomizable public key encryption is employed
(see [101, 102] for details). In essence, the idea is to additionally encrypt the authentication key
of a token KT under some public key pkV , namely cT ← EncpkV (KT ) . The corresponding pri-
vate key must be known to all verifiers (terminals) in the system. The respective ciphertext cT
is stored in the memory of an e-ticket and presented to a verifier on each authentication. Thus,
the symmetric authentication key of a token KT can be securely transferred to legitimate ver-
ifiers for authentication. The external entities without the knowledge of the respective private
key to decrypt cT (e.g., an observing attacker) are not able to extract KT and subsequently
misuse is. However, if the value of cT is static and persists across multiple sessions, it can
serve as a tracking parameter for external entities which perform sniffing. In order to mitigate
that, the re-randomizable encryption comes into play. Namely, cT can be re-randomized by an
additional process called anonymizer. In SVW framework, the latter can be further classified
into four categories:
1. Integrated anonymizers. The re-randomization process is performed directly by e-tickets
if the respective computational capabilities are present.
2. User-controlled anonymizers. This kind of anonymizers is represented by an external per-
sonal user device capable of performing re-randomizable encryption and communication
with an e-ticket carrier medium to transfer the computation result.
3. Transport authority anonymizers. The devices for re-randomization are deployed by a
transport authority and are installed at stations or possibly been included into trusted
verifiers.
4. Public anonymizers. Re-randomization can be performed by any device. That implies
that every (possibly malicious) third party may host such an anonymizer which renders
this type of anonymizers impractical due to security concerns.
The following core processes can be distinguished in SVW framework: (1) token acquisition,
(2) token verification, and (3) token anonymization.
1. Token acquisition. Parties involved: (a) issuer, (b) user device.
On user request, the token issuer creates a token incorporating e-ticket parameters ρT (ticket
type, validity period, etc.), token symmetric authentication keyKT as well as the corresponding
issuer’s signature σT on (ρT ,KT ). Then the issuer creates the ciphertext cT which is going
1PUFs are functions which are closely bound to physical properties of each concrete device and essen-
tially originate from the unique random physical irregularities introduced during the manufacturing process.
Therefore, PUFs are believed to be unclonable. For further information, see [99], [100].
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to be sent to verifiers (terminals) for authentication: cT ← EncpkV (KT , ρT , σT ). In general, a
public key of the anonymizer pkA chosen by a user is delivered to the issuer as well. The latter
in turn creates the anonymizer authentication key KA and encrypts it under pkA obtaining
cA ← EncpkA (KA). Finally, (KT ,KA, cT , cA) is written to the user device by the issuer. The
notations used are summarized in Table 4.17 for clarity.
Table 4.17: Notations used during the discussion of SVW.
Notation Meaning
ρT e-ticket parameters (ticket type, validity period, etc.);
KT token symmetric authentication key;
σT issuer’s signature on (ρT ,KT );
pkA public key of an anonymizer;
pkV public key of verifiers (terminals);
cT ciphertext for authentication between an e-ticket an a terminal;
cA ciphertext for authentication between an e-ticket and its anonymizer;
2. Token verification. Parties involved: (a) user device, (b) verifiers.
In order to verify the token, a terminal sends a verification request to a user device. The
latter answers with cT . The terminal in turn decrypts it using its secret key and verifies the
extracted token signature σT and the validity of the corresponding travel attributes ρT . If
both checks pass, the terminal engages into symmetric key authentication with the user device
using the extracted KT . If the authentication is successfully passed, the e-ticket is accepted.
3. Token anonymization. Parties involved: (a) user device, (b) anonymizer.
The anonymization protocol is performed between a user device maintaining the token (e-
ticket) and the corresponding anonymizer (see different anonymizer types discussed above).
First, the anonymizer authenticates itself to be allowed to perform re-randomization of cre-
dentials. For this, a user device generates a challenge NT and sends it together with cT and cA
to the anonymizer. The latter decryptes cA using its secret key and obtains the anonymizer
authentication key KA created during the issuance phase (see token acquisition). Then the




A) respectively. Finally, with the extracted
symmetric key KA, the anonymizer authenticates newly re-randomized credentials together
with the challenge NT and sends everything to the user device. The latter checks the authen-
ticity of received data and in case the check has passed, updates its credentials with newly
received values (c′T , c
′
A). Depending on the type of anonymizer, re-randomization may be per-
formed before each verification or as often as it is currently possible/convenient for the user
(for example, in case of transport authority anonymizers).
SVW Assessment. Similarly to PAYG [9], SVW is explicitly targeted at privacy preservation
in ESPT, likewise suggesting a framework capturing the core processes taking place. The main
goal of SVW is to provide privacy protection (in the first place concerning user whereabouts)
against the entities which are exogenous (i.e. external) to the e-ticketing system. That is, the
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verifiers (terminals) are considered to be trusted as long as they can successfully authenticate
themselves to a user device. The authors of SVW mention that in order to reduce trust in
terminals, the latter could maintain a real-time connection to the trusted issuer (the issuer is
always trusted within the scope of SVW) or verifiers should be additionally equipped with a
security module of the issuer (e.g., a TPM). Both of these options are, however, assessed as
rather impractical by Sadeghi et al. Moreover, the necessity of maintaining a costly real-time
time connection to the issuer would imply a considerable load increase at the issuer side which
usually only issues credentials and is not supposed to constantly verify them in the running
system. Furthermore, the system architecture would not be adhering to the decoupled principle
any longer and consequently would lose all the respective advantages (see the introductory
discussion in Section 4.3.1).
In SVW framework, the focus is made on ticket-to-terminal authentication. Terminals, how-
ever, are not explicitly authenticated to the e-tickets (whereas the anonymizers are). Therefore,
mutual authentication is not explicitly considered. Moreover, should no anonymizer service
be available for a certain time period, the e-ticket is traceable by all entities sniffing commu-
nication including the external ones. The reason for this is that cT released from an e-ticket
on each verification query remains static between re-randomization sessions and therefore can
be used as a tracking parameter. Therefore, only the first type of attacker (the outsider, see
Section 3.6) is considered by SVW and only in case re-randomizations take place regularly
enough (that is, for each verification request cT is freshly re-randomized). Moreover, no sup-
port for fine-grained billing is explicitly considered within SVW framework. Implementing
this functionality on top is, however, in principle possible. The main properties of SVW are
summarized in Table 4.18.
Table 4.18: A summary of SVW framwork [10]. Advantages are marked with a Xsign.
Criterion Assessment
tight coupling between terminals and the back-end no X
anonymity and untraceability against terminals no
mutual authentication in the front-end no
fine-grained billing is feasible yes (as add-on) X
terminals are trusted yes
the back-end is trusted yes
4.3.2.4 Solutions Based on Asymmetric Cryptography: A Short Summary
Within this section, two approaches were reviewed which leverage asymmetric cryptogra-
phy and are based on the decoupled system architecture. Both frameworks, PAYG due to
Baldimtsi et al. [9] and SVW by Sadeghi et al. [10] are explicitly targeted at public transport
scenario. PAYG achieve relatively profound privacy properties inherited from the e-cash con-
cept. More specifically, event the token issuer can not link token transactions in the front-end
(provided that no double spending occurs). Neither can terminals and system back-end trace
e-tickets. Unlike PAYG, in SVW framework, the authorized terminals as well as the back-end
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are considered to be fully trusted. Moreover, the e-tickets are traceable between two consec-
utive re-randomizations involving the anonymizer process. At the same time, the processing
power requirements with respect to user devices maintaining e-tickets are much lower in SVW
than in PAYG (in case the anonymizer service is running on an extra device). Moreover, SVW
framework does not prohibit the implementation of fine-grained billing policies whereas PAYG
allows only relatively limited options for that (in PAYG, the price is determined on the fly
during check-out).
4.3.3 Decoupled Systems: Summary
The approaches based on the decoupled architecture have an important practical advantage
following from the fact that terminals can locally validate e-tickets without consulting the
back-end in real-time. In case of TanSL [96] and ALM [97] this is achieved by uploading
terminal-specific access lists pre-calculated in the back-end to the terminals. In GR [6], an
alternative solution was presented which is based on regular updates of terminal secrets and
does not require the calculation of terminal-specific access lists in the back-end. Similarly
to TanSL and ALM, GR does not provide anonymity and untraceability of e-tickets against
authorized terminals. Moreover, it is based on similar trust assumptions and does not prohibit
fine-grained billing. However, unlike TanSL and ALM, no mutual authentication is provided in
GR. The SVW framework presented in [10] specifically address the public transport domain. As
in case of the aforementioned approaches, SWV is based on the assumption that authenticated
terminals as well as the back-end are trusted. Therefore, all of the approaches above only
consider the first type of attacker discussed in Section 3.6 (namely, external observers). The
PAYG framework [9], however, covers this issue and holistically addresses all attacker types
due to its decent privacy-properties essentially inherited from the e-cash concept. However,
the main limitation of PAYG is that it by design prohibits fine-grained billing. Summarizing,
it can be concluded that none of the solutions reviewed in this section fully satisfied all core
requirements discussed in Section 3.5.
4.3.4 Approaches Leveraging Decentralized Billing with Client Involvement
As it was discussed in Section 3.5.2, privacy-preserving approaches involving fine-grained
billing can be roughly divided into two categories: (1) centralized (performed in the back-
end) and (2) decentralized (involving client-side processing). Due to the reasons presented in
Section 3.5.2, the main focus of the dissertation is made on the approaches falling into the
first category. In case of the decentralized billing, it is commonly assumed that the necessary
statistics (e.g., time, check-in/out location, etc.) including a portion of protocol transcripts
from each check-in/out session is maintained at the user side. Based on it, the trusted user
equipment performs billing itself by carrying out all necessary calculations and preparing (cryp-
tographic) proofs of their correctness and accordance to the agreed fare policies. At the end of
each billing period (e.g., once a month) the calculated bill together with the respective proof
(possibly including signed commitments to the calculated values and pieces of detailed statis-
tics) is sent to the transport authority. The latter checks the corresponding signatures and may
challenge the user side with specific requests to prove the correctness of the calculated bill for
a certain time period. This may entail requests to open certain commitments and to provide
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respective proofs that the corresponding bill parts were calculated correctly for that specific
time period (for which the transport authority now knows the detailed pieces of statistics).
If all aforementioned checks successfully pass, the transport authority can be reasonably sure
that the bill calculated at the client side is correct. At the same time, the transport authority
does not gain enough information to invade customer privacy (since it knows only an overall
bill and a few pieces of detailed statistics).
The decentralized billing approach is often used for privacy preservation in the domain of toll
collection, see e.g., [71, 103, 104], as well as in the area of smart metering, see [105, 106]. Even
though currently there exist no similar approaches known to us which explicitly target public
transport based on e-ticketing, it should be possible to apply the aforementioned concept for
this domain as well. However, as already discussed in Section 3.5.2, the decentralized billing
generally entails a substantial additional overhead for a user compared to more traditional and
well established centralized billing.
4.4 Related Work: Summary
Each of the existing approaches reviewed above was assessed in detail in the corresponding
section. The most important ones are summarized in Table 4.19 for clarity and comparison
purpose. The core requirements which played the decisive role during the evaluation are
presented first and marked with gray in Table 4.19. As in the case of individual summaries
for each approach reviewed, check marks (X) indicate advantages (where applicable). Further
evaluation criteria are provided as well in Table 4.19 for completeness.
As it immediately follows from Table 4.19, none of the current solutions fully satisfies the
set of core requirements presented in Section 3.5. Therefore, our own approach discussed in
the next chapter addresses this issue and closes the gap.
Table 4.19: Related work: a general summary. The core criteria are highlighted with gray.
Criteria
The most relevant approaches reviewed
PAYG [9] HCDF [8] SVW [10] GR [6] ALM [97] OSK [80] RSMP [91]
Tight coupling no X yes no X no X no X yes yes
Anonymity against term. yes X yes X no no no yes X yes X
Untraceab. against term. yes X yes X no no no yes X yes X
Mutual authentication no no no no yes X no yes X
Fine-grained billing possible no no yes X yes X yes X yes X yes X
Terminals are trusted no X no X yes yes yes no X no X
The back-end is trusted no X no X yes yes yes yes yes
Explicitly considers ESPT yes X yes X yes X yes X no no no
Revocation is possible yes X yes X yes X yes X yes X yes X yes X
Dynamic extensibility yes X yes X yes X no no yes X no
Tamper resist. required not consid. not consid. partly not consid. not consid. no X no X
Involves external device no X partly yes no X no X no X no X
Crypto
primitives
Symmetric no yes yes yes yes no yes
Hash yes yes no yes no yes yes
Asymmetric yes yes yes no no no no
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Chapter Summary
In this chapter, a detailed analysis of the related work was performed. In order to provide
for a systematic review, the evaluation criteria were discussed in Section 4.1. Based on the
elaborated set of criteria, the approaches under review were generally classified into the ones
based on tight coupling between the front-end and the back-end (discussed in Section 4.2) and
the ones based on the decoupled architecture (reviewed in Section 4.3). The advantages and
shortcomings of each architecture type were discussed at the beginning of the respective sec-
tions. Finally, after the detailed review and assessment of each approach, the most important
ones were summarized in a tabular form in Section 4.4. Having reviewed the most relevant
solutions, it can be concluded that none of them fully satisfies the whole set of core evalua-
tion criteria and consequently the core requirements discussed in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.5).
Therefore, there is a need for new solutions covering this issue. This is addressed in the next




Having performed an extensive state-of-the-art analysis in the previous chapter, the conclusion
can be made that no solution developed so far satisfies all requirements for a privacy-preserving
e-ticketing system for public transport (ESPT) and addresses all core evaluation criteria at the
same time (see Section 4.1). In this chapter, a solution to this problem is presented and dis-
cussed in detail. Firstly, the main building blocks of our approach are outlined in Section 5.1.
An overview of the developed privacy-preserving framework is provided in Section 5.2. The
proposed solution is further elaborated in Section 5.3. The chapter is concluded by the dis-
cussion of approach limitations and estimation of integration costs into real-world systems in
Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 respectively.
5.1 Solution Building Blocks
Our solution is essentially comprised of three core building blocks:
1. Mutual authentication between an e-ticket and a terminal (system front-end). In this case,
the front-end of ESPT is in focus, since the backbone communication can be secured using
fully-fledged, well-established standard mechanisms (see the discussion in Section 3.5.1).
2. Local revocation of invalid e-tickets at the terminal side without the need to consult the
back-end database in a timely fashion (system front-end), supports loose-coupling.
3. Path reconstruction. Correlating different travel rides to a user pseudonym for billing
purposes (system back-end).
All of the three aforementioned building blocks (depicted in Figure 5.1) must be implemented
in a privacy-preserving way corresponding to the attacker model defined in Section 3.6 and be-
ing conform to the requirements discussed in Section 3.5. As indicated in Figure 5.1, there are
important interdependencies between the building blocks. Privacy-preserving authentication
should not prohibit local revocation at the terminal side as well as path reconstruction in the
back-end. Similarly, local revocation (with the desired privacy properties) should not prevent
path reconstruction. The aforementioned interdependencies introduce a serious challenge for
system design, since such properties as non-identifiability and untraceability on the one hand
and user revocation together with path reconstruction on the other hand are inherently con-
tradicting. Our approach outlined in Section 5.2 and elaborated in Section 5.3 demonstrates
how the aforementioned challenges can be solved. At first, however, each building block is



















Figure 5.1: Main building blocks of our solution. Privacy properties such as non-identifiability
and untraceability refer to an e-ticket (either against a terminal in the front-end or
against the back-end system).
5.1.1 Mutual Authentication
Mutual authentication between an e-ticket and a terminal (during check-in/out events) is
required for a number of reasons:
1) to ensure that an e-ticket can be queried only by a legitimate terminal (privacy);
2) a terminal should process the events triggered only by the legitimate e-tickets (correctness
and integrity);
3) man-in-the-middle attacks must be prevented (even though such kind of attack is con-
sidered to be inapplicable to NFC/RFID in practice, see [107], for example).
On each check-in/out, mutual authentication should not leak any auxiliary information about
the e-ticket which can be misused by terminals or exogenous entities for its (a) identification
(the worst case), (b) tracking, or (c) linking different communication sessions with the termi-
nal(s) together. Hereinafter, the term ”identification” with respect to an e-ticket refers to the
process carried out by some entity (being a part of a system as a terminal or an exogenous
one) outputting a parameter uniquely identifying an e-ticket within the system (such as a serial
number).
For the current e-ticketing scenario, the fundamental challenge is essentially bootstrapping
the authentication process without a terminal being able to (a) distinguish between e-tickets,
let alone (b) to identify them. Moreover, mutual authentication should not prohibit path
reconstruction in the back-end, see Section 5.1.3.
There are several advanced cryptographic tools available which provide for privacy-
preserving mutual authentication, such as the utilization of group signatures (for exam-
ple, [108, 109]), explicitly leveraging various zero-knowledge techniques [110, 111] for prov-
ing the possession of a valid authentication parameter, etc. However, the aforementioned
approaches introduce certain limitations1 for the target use case scenario of ESPT and re-
1For example, in case of anonymous credentials due to Chaum [108], they are one-show credentials. If the
same credential is presented to the same terminal more than once, the anonymity property can be defeated (by
the terminal solving a linear system of equations and extracting the secret parameter).
108
5.1 Solution Building Blocks
quire additional assumptions for their successful deployment. With this respect, the following
challenges should be mentioned:
1. Dynamic extensibility. The deployed mutual authentication scheme must support dy-
namic accommodation of new e-tickets joining the system.
2. Bootstrapping authentication. Mutual authentication should prevent tracking of e-tickets
by terminals. At the same time, many existing approaches require some kind of a boot-
strapping parameter for authentication which is often static (and therefore can serve as
a tracking attribute).
3. Efficiency. Applying advanced mutual authentication methods with decent privacy prop-
erties often has negative efficiency implications and may even be prohibitive in case of
constrained devices (used as a carrier medium for e-tickets, e.g., smartphones or smart
cards).
Under the current circumstances, we suggest that such kind of mutual authentication is
implemented using a specialized certificate-based approach. That is, a terminal provides its
unique certificate, which is in turn signed by a transport authority (TA). An e-ticket possesses
another type of certificate signed by TA and therefore can perform signing operations as well.
Unlike the terminal’s signature, the one of an e-ticket solely proves that the latter belongs to
a valid ticket group (e.g., a monthly or a yearly ticket, possibly with certain attributes like
a student or an elderly) and does not reveal any identifiable information on each particular
e-ticket. The aforementioned challenge of bootstrapping the authentication process, therefore,
can be solved by essentially checking the respective certificate chain. Unlike the conventional
certificate-based authentication, the e-ticket cannot be traced and uniquely identified due to
its group signature.
5.1.2 Local Revocation
Whereas the users possessing a valid travel permission must be granted access to public trans-
port system, the holders of the invalid e-tickets (which have been blacklisted) must be rejected
by a terminal. Therefore, terminals must be able to check if the e-ticket communicating with
them has been blacklisted or not. An important condition here is similar to the one for mutual
authentication (see Section 5.1.1): valid e-tickets must remain anonymous (to the terminal)
and untraceable. This is, however, a fairly challenging task. One of the possible solutions
would be to utilize the concept of cryptographic accumulators, see [112]. In this case, in-
stead of checking if the current e-ticket has been blacklisted, it is proved (in zero-knowledge)
that a certain committed value securely stored at the e-ticket side, has been included into the
terminal-side whitelist, or an accumulator. The process of revocation then would essentially
imply removing the specific value from the accumulator and recalculating it anew. The new
accumulator must be redistributed to all terminals in the system, similarly to the blacklist.
An important caveat is, however, that along with the terminal-side accumulators, the e-ticket
credentials must be updated as well on each revocation (for the proof of membership to func-
tion properly). This requirement renders it highly impractical to apply the cryptographic
accumulator concept to the public transport scenario where e-tickets are for the most time
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oﬄine. Even in case the updated accumulator value were dynamically delivered to a user
device during check-in/check-out, recalculating the credentials (which have to be performed
on the fly) would introduce an additional computational overhead and hence add a costly
time delay to the handling of time critical check-in/check-out events. Another solution to
the problem of privacy-preserving revocation could be the concept of ”anonymous blacklists”.
An example of this approach is an anonymous blacklisting scheme called ”Nymble” [113]. In
this system, the multi-party concept is used to protect user privacy, namely along with the
service provider and users there are two additional trusted parties: the so-called pseudonym
manager and the nymble manager. In order to obtain an anonymous credential (consisting of
”nymbles”) for using the service, a user has to (1) contact the pseudonym manager at first to
request a pseudonym which is (2) subsequently presented to the nymble manager who issues
the so-called ”nymbles” to the user. Nymbles are essentially one-time credentials empowering
the user to get the service. This approach is, however, hardly applicable to the target scenario
of public transport. Firstly, additional interaction must be carried out by each user device
(an e-ticket) on a regular basis to obtain credentials (which are the basis for blacklist check)
from the respective trusted parties. In [113], it is recommended that new credentials are ob-
tained every 24 hours. This may introduce additional nuisance for the users who would have
to carry out the update procedure on such a regular basis (especially if an additional piece of
equipment like RFID/NFC reader is required for this). Secondly, using one-time credentials
requires some kind of a global register to keep track of the already used credentials in order
to prevent double spending, etc. This is prohibitive considering a highly decentralized system
architecture employing oﬄine terminal-side validation. Thirdly, in order to get a credential,
an anonymous connection must be established from a user device to the nymble manager. The
implementation of such anonymous channel is far from straightforward especially in case of a
smart card or a smartphone as a user device. Lastly, the user device must possess the clock to
chose the right credential which is associated with the current time epoch. In case of a passive
smart cards as a user device, this could be especially difficult.
Therefore, in this thesis another solution for privacy-preserving local revocation was devel-
oped, namely based on terminal-side blacklists which are regularly updated by the back-end.
The detailed discussion on this follows in Section 5.3.3.
5.1.3 Path reconstruction
Lastly, in order to issue a bill, different rides must be correlated to each other in such a way
that the underlying identity of each user remains unknown to the transport authority (referred
to as path reconstruction in Figure 5.1). The following challenges should be considered in this
case. On the one hand, the supported fare schemes which are applied during the billing phase
need to be flexible and extensible. That is, they should not be hard-tailored to a specific fare
collection approach let alone to the privacy-preserving mechanisms in use (as it was done, for
example, in [103]). Moreover, it should be possible to combine the rides to issue discounts
(consider the example of a ”short ride” ticket up to 4 stations). On the other hand, the
process of fare calculation and subsequent billing must be carried out in a privacy-preserving
way, that is without directly identifying the customer and leaking information about his/her
travel habits. The aforementioned issues introduce a severe contradiction between fare scheme
flexibility and user privacy (in terms of individual traceability). In case of a relatively simple
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fare scheme where the price for a ride between each two stations (that is, between two successive
check-in/check-out events) can be represented in form of a fare matrix, it is already possible
to implement billing with decent privacy properties, see [16], for example. However, using
such matrix-based approach entails considerable disadvantages, namely (1) billing inefficiency
(in case of [16], cubic complexity in the number of travel records processed), and (2) billing
inflexibility, e.g., inability to combine (i.e., to link) several rides to issue a discount, etc.
Therefore, in our framework an approach based on pseudonymisation is chosen. More specif-
ically, a reasonable trade-off is considered, namely whereas check-in/out events are completely
unlinkable and untraceable in the front-end, the back-end is able to correlate different rides
to a single pseudonym and to subsequently apply the deployed fare scheme for billing. The
back-end still does not learn the underlying user identity, which is managed by the trusted
third party in our framework (see Section 5.2). Such approach goes in line with the adopted
attacker model (see Section 3.6). Our pseudonymisation scheme is elaborated in Section 5.3.2.
In what follows, our solution addressing all challenges outlined above is going to be outlined
(Section 5.2) and presented in more detail (Section 5.3).
5.2 Solution Outline
Our privacy-preserving framework follows the principles of information minimization and task
division between non-colluding entities. The solution essentially considers two distinct entities:
(1) a transport authority (TA) and (2) an external trusted third party (TTP), see Figure 5.2.
TA represents a public transport company which provides transport services. TTP acts as a
trusted mediator between a transport authority (which maintains the public transport system)
and its end users. The main idea behind this concept is the following. In order to issue a bill,
the back-end of a TA does not necessarily have to possess identifying information about a
particular user of an e-ticket. It merely needs to be able to correlate different rides performed
by a customer to a certain pseudonym which has been negotiated with a TTP in advance
and based on this information to apply the deployed pricing schemes with the subsequent
billing procedure. The resultant bill together with the corresponding pseudonym is periodically
sent to the TTP. The latter has no knowledge of travel history of a customer but is solely
aware of the overall bill and the user behind the pseudonym. Individual payments are then
forwarded to the TA by the TTP in an aggregated form. In addition, the rides history could
be stored at the user device (e.g. a smartphone) so that it can be locally viewed by a customer
later. Thus, the TA trusts the TTP that users are correctly billed (together with payment
enforcement) while customers rely on the TTP to protect their privacy and forward payments
to the TA. In essence, the approach outlined above creates a privacy overlay with respect to
the sensitive data pertaining to users. Thus, the back-end of a TA (alternatively, of several
TAs for interoperability) is operating on this abstract layer without directly processing the
identifiable information of customers. An important condition here is that the TTP does not
collude with the TA to defeat privacy protection provided by the solution.
The concept of task division between several entities has already been leveraged in practice.
As an example, a service-based architecture for fare management and interoperability specified
in the respective German e-ticketing standard (VDV-KA1) [36] can be considered. In this case,
1VDV stands for Verband Deutscher Verkehrsunternehmen, KA – for Kernapplikation (core application).
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however, the main goal was in the first place to achieve better efficiency and loose-coupling
between system components without explicitly considering the mechanisms for privacy protec-
tion. Moreover, each e-ticket is uniquely traceable in the front-end of VDV-KA system [114].
The concept of a trusted third party has been also leveraged in the Octopus e-ticketing system
rolled out in Hong Kong. Namely, the TTP in this case performs key management for the
providers of public transport services as well as for other market players which deliver various
value added services and have met the respective agreements [115]. Thus, the aforementioned
examples demonstrate that the additional effort for integrating our privacy-preserving solution
into a real-world system is considerably lower than it can be expected at the first sight. The
reason for this is that the concept of task division has been already leveraged in real systems
meaning that the respective interfaces required for integrating a TTP are already present.
What should additionally be done is rerouting the system flow via the established TTP. Fur-
ther discussion with respect to the integration of our solution into a real system (with VDV-KA




Figure 5.2: A privacy-preserving framework: an overview.
A Remark On Possible System Variations. In case the assumptions with respect to the
attacker model allow, a TTP could be represented by a trusted part of ESPT operating in the
secured area dedicated for such kind of processing with the respective enforcement of strict
access control mechanisms, etc. In this scenario, the back-end of a transport authority would
be able to perform user identification in its trusted part. In the front-end, however, all privacy
properties would preserve their nature as in the case of a system architecture with an external
TTP.
5.3 Suggested Solution: A Detailed Description
5.3.1 Basic Information Flow
5.3.1.1 Initialization
Before being able to actively use the transport system, each customer has to engage into an
initialization phase with the TTP. This can be carried out in one of the following ways: (1) via
a special issuing machine, (2) directly at the customer office of a transport authority, or (3) via
the Internet. On registering the customer, the TTP creates the respective pseudonym P Ti and
forwards it to the TA. The latter further transforms the received pseudonym into its encrypted
form PAi and operates on it (pseudonymization is explained in more detail in Section 5.3.2).
The customer in turn gets the necessary credentials from the TTP to start using the system,
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namely: a TA public key k+ta, a key pair corresponding to the subscription group (e.g. a
monthly or yearly pass) (k+gr, k
−
gr), as well as the specifically created customer pseudonym P
T
i
(together with its TA-form PAi ). Note that a public key is denoted as k
+ and a private one
as k−. A subscription group key can be constructed in accordance with the concept of group
signatures, see [108], for example. Another more straightforward and sometimes more efficient
approach is to use a conventional key pair (e.g. RSA) for each ticket group. The received key
pair is signed by the TA and can be viewed as a kind of a digital certificate.
5.3.1.2 System in Action
Front-end (time-critical). On entering the public transport system, a user performs check-
in at the entrance terminal. This involves three stages: (1) a secure session establishment,
(2) mutual authentication, and (3) blacklist check (see Figure 5.3). The aforementioned pro-
cesses must be handled in a timely fashion, since a check-in/check-out operation implies a cus-
tomer holding his/her device near the terminal waiting to begin/end or to continue the travel.
The secure session can be established either using an algorithm defined by the e-ticketing ap-
plication itself (e.g., through the application-defined Diffie-Hellman key agreement) or alterna-
tively by leveraging the standard techniques defined in ISO 7816-4 [60] or in NFC-SEC-01 [61].
Note that depending on the way the secure session has been established during the first stage,
additional binding of the exchanged keying material (e.g., DH ephemeral keys) to the cor-
responding certificates may be required to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. It has to be
mentioned, however, that due to the physical properties of communication between terminals
and e-tickets, man-in-the-middle attacks (in contrast to relay attacks) mounted on such wireless
interface are extremely unlikely in practice [107]. The subsequent communication between an
e-ticket and a terminal is, therefore, secured against an observing attacker (attacker 1, see Sec-
tion 3.6). Afterwards, mutual authentication between an e-ticket and a terminal is performed
as follows. The terminal has its unique public key k+T signed by the back-end. The e-ticket uses
its group key pair (k+gr, k
−
gr) which is signed by the TA back-end as well. Mutual authentica-
tion is then essentially performed according to the certificate-based challenge-response. Lastly,
the terminal (locally) checks if the credentials of the current e-ticket have not been revoked
by consulting the blacklist (see BL Check in Figure 5.3). This is performed in a privacy-
preserving way (in contrast to the majority of conventional systems). That is, each e-ticket
stays anonymous and untraceable against the terminal as long as it has not been included into
a terminal-side black list (similarly to the notion of conditional anonymity defined in [116]).
On successful check, the terminal creates the so-called travel record (TR) corresponding to
the current check-in/out event. It usually contains a timestamp, location, and other pieces of
information pertaining to the e-ticket (including its session pseudonym, see Section 5.3.2).
Back-end (non-real time). A set of travel records maintained by each terminal is regularly
sent to the back-end system via the backbone network where they are processed for billing
purposes (Figure 5.3, Billing). Terminal-side blacklists are regularly updated as well. The
frequency of such updates is mainly determined by the connection type between terminals
and the back-end (e.g., nightly updates as considered in [97] or more frequent updates if the
connection allows). In the back-end, different travel records are sorted with respect to the
e-ticket they pertain to. Hereinafter, this is referred to as singulation (see Figure 5.3). After
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the singulation phase, the respective billing policies are applied resulting in the overall bill for

















Figure 5.3: The suggested privacy-preserving framework. BL stands for blacklist, SC – for
secure channel.
Having described the core information flow in the system, an elaboration with respect to the
specific system constituents is provided below. As already mentioned in Section 5.1, there are
strong dependencies between certain building blocks of our solution (see Figure 5.1). Since
both, mutual authentication and local revocation must not prohibit path reconstruction in the
back-end, the latter is going to be considered in the first place within the detailed discussion
hereinafter.
5.3.2 Path Reconstruction Through Pseudonymisation
In what follows, our pseudonymisation scheme allowing for privacy-preserving path reconstruc-
tion (see Section 5.1.3) is discussed in detail.
During the initialization phase, a static pseudonym P Ti is created by a TTP for each e-ticket
ID. The mapping1 between P Ti and the respective e-ticket ID is kept secret at the TTP side.
P Ti is then sent to a transport authority (TA) to be included into the TA’s pseudonym set
P T . TA, therefore, is only operating on pseudonyms and stays unaware of the underlying
e-ticket ID. In order to further separate the processes of end user billing (performed by TTP)
and TA-internal processes including bill calculation, P Ti is transformed into a TA-specific
pseudonym: PAi
trans←−−− P Ti (the notations are summarized in Table 5.1). This transformation
is performed in such a way, that a TTP even having gained access to several records containing
1One of the ways to implement such mapping is to probabilistically encrypt the e-ticket ID (for semantic
security) with the private key of TTP and to keep the latter secret.
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TA-specific pseudonyms, would neither be able to (1) restore the underlying P Ti (2) nor to
distinguish between records pertaining to different e-tickets. Such properties are required to
further enforce the ”separation of concerns” between TTP and TA, namely to make sure that
the TTP does not gain additional information (it does not require to operate) concerning the
history of rides. The transformation can be carried out as follows: PAi = Ek+ta
(P Ti , si), where
Ek+ta
denotes encryption under the TA public key and si is a random value (salt). In order to
be able to restore P Ti , the encrypted salt value is stored together with P
A







In order to prevent terminals from tracking e-tickets (covering attacker type 2, see Sec-







where rj is nonce number generated by the e-ticket. Since a terminal is not in the possession
of a TA’s decryption key (k−ta), it is infeasible for it to tell if two session pseudonyms obtained
from different check-in/out events pertain to the same e-ticket or not. Neither can the terminal
gain any knowledge from interaction with an e-ticket about the static pseudonym (PAi ) of the
latter. Thus, for each particular e-ticket, travel records created by terminals on check-it/out
contain different session pseudonyms SPj (see Figure 5.4). In order to enable bill calculation
in the back-end part of the system, the pseudonym singulation step is required to correlate
different session pseudonyms {SPj} with the respective static one PAi using the private key of














which is regularly (e.g., monthly) sent to the TTP for end user billing.
The pseudonymisation scheme described above is depicted in Figure 5.4 for clarity.
Table 5.1: Pseudonymisation: notation used.
Notation Meaning
P Ti a static pseudonym created by TTP;
PAi a static pseudonym created by TTP from P
T
i ;
SPj a session pseudonym (randomized P
A
i ).
5.3.3 Privacy-preserving Local Revocation Based on Blacklists
5.3.3.1 Basic Scheme
In order to provide the transport service only to the legitimate customers, black list check
is performed during check-in/check-out (see Section 5.3.1.2). More specifically, we resort to
a custom and relatively simple yet privacy-preserving blacklisting scheme. It is based on
(inherently) homomorphic properties of the underlying encryption scheme in use. Namely, the

























Figure 5.4: The employed pseudonymisation scheme and privacy-preserving framework.
E(x · r) = E(x)r, (5.3)
where for clarity and conciseness x represents the TA-side pseudonym PAi (see Table 5.1), r
is a nonce value as given in Equation (5.2). Therefore, E(x · r) corresponds to the session
pseudonym SPj . The notations used in this section together with the respective associations
are summarized in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Blacklist check: notations used.
Notation Meaning/Association
x an e-ticket static pseudonym, PAi ;
y a blacklisted x;
BL : {y} a blacklist (a set of y);
r a random nonce;
Ek+ta
(x · r) a session pseudonym, SPj ;(
Ek+ta
(x · r), Ek+ta(r)
)
a session pseudonym tuple (SPT ).
The terminal-side blacklist (BL) contains a set of blacklisted static pseudonyms1,
{y : y ∈ BL} (5.4)
1That is, the subset of pseudonyms created by the TA from the TTP ones, see Equation (5.1).
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which are checked against during the e-ticket verification procedure. After mutual authenti-
cation (see Section 5.3.5), an e-ticket presents its Session Pseudonym Ek+ta
(x · r) to a terminal
along with the encrypted nonce value Ek+ta
(r) used for masking. Session pseudonym and the
encrypted nonce form the so-called Session Pseudonym Tuple (SPT):
SPT ← (Ek+ta(x · r), Ek+ta(r)). (5.5)
Having obtained this tuple, the terminal can use the homomorphic property (5.3) to perform
blacklist check:
x
?∈ BL : {y} .
For this, it creates an auxiliary temporary check set C and computes its elements as follows:
∀y ∈ BL,Ek+ta(r) ∈ SPT : c← Ek+ta(r)
y. (5.6)





(x · r) ∀c ∈ C. (5.7)
Note that for performance reasons, the comparison operation expressed in Equation (5.7)
can be performed element-wise immediately after each new element of C is calculated within
the Equation (5.6). If a match is found, the e-ticket is in the blacklist set BL and must be
rejected. The developed local revocation scheme is presented in summarized in Algorithm 1
for clarity.
Therefore, due to the randomized nature of session pseudonyms, terminals are prevented
from tracking valid e-tickets (see the terminal’s view on check-in/check-out transaction in
Figure 5.4). Should an e-ticket be on the blacklist, however, the algorithm would find a match
(see Equation (5.7)) and the user would be prohibited from entering the public transport
network. The visual representation of black list check procedure is provided in Figure 5.5.
Choosing an Appropriate Encryption Scheme
As an example of an encryption function possessing the homomorphic property (5.3), the
scheme based on the intractability of the Discrete Logarithm Problem1 (DLP) can be used.
Thus, ∀x ∈ Gq : Gq ⊆ Z∗n (with n, q classically being large primes, q|n− 1) the encryption can
be written as:
E(x) = gx (mod n). (5.8)
A session pseudonym (see Equation (5.2)), therefore, can be expressed as:
SPj ← gx·rj (mod n), (5.9)
where x is an e-ticket pseudonym, rj is a session nonce generated to mask x, and rj , x ∈ Gq.
1DLP follows from the hardness to extract x out of gx in Z∗n. See, for example, [117] for further reference.
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Algorithm 1: Terminal-side local revocation based on blacklists.
Input:






; // an SP tuple for session i
Output: accept/reject the e-ticket
1 begin
2 extract Ek+ta
(ri) from the SPTi;
3 forall the y ∈ BL do




; // the elements of a check set C
5 if SPi
?
= Cj; // test if SPi is in the blacklist
6 then
7 reject; // reject the e-ticket
8 map Cj 7→ yi; // map Cj to the respective yi ∈ BL
9 mark yi; // mark yi that caused the hit
10 accept;
The homomorphic property (5.3) can then be expressed as follows:







In order to enable efficient singulation (correlating different session pseudonyms SPj to a
single static one PAi , see Section 5.3.2), a trapdoor due to Okamoto-Uchiyama [118] can be
used. That is, if n is a large composite number which is computed as specified in [118],
then knowing the corresponding factorization of n, the discrete logarithm can be efficiently
computed. For other parties without the knowledge of the factors of n, the factorization stays
extremely difficult (see details in [118]).
Note, that the choice of the underlying encryption scheme is not limited to the one pre-
sented above. In principle, any other (deterministic1) encryption function with homomorphic
properties as expressed in Equation (5.3) can be used.
5.3.3.2 Encrypted Blacklists
In the basic setting described above, the blacklisted pseudonyms {y} are stored in clear in the
blacklist BL, see Equation 5.4. However, in certain cases it may be desirable to operate on
encrypted blacklists. An example would be to introduce a problem of terminal compromisa-
1In case of probabilistic encryption, the randomization factor must be additionally delivered to the terminal
for blacklist check.
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Figure 5.5: Local revocation check: visual representation.
tion resulting in leakage of terminal-side information to third parties. In order to provide for
encrypted blacklists, a few modifications to the original version are necessary, more specifi-
cally with respect to (1) blacklist structure and (2) session pseudonym, SP . Moreover, two
encryption functions with different exponentiation bases g and h respectively are going to be
required (see the original encryption function expressed in Equation 5.8 for comparison). The
underlying encryption functions, therefore, can be expressed as follows:
Eg (x) = g
x;
Eh (x) = h
x.
(mod n) (5.10)
Note that in Equation (5.10) above, the indices g or h represent the respective base used
for exponentiation. Hereinafter, it is already implicitly assumed that encryption is performed
under the public key of a TA.
New Blacklist Structure
Let {y} be a set of blacklisted e-ticket pseudonyms, as in the basic scheme. Then considering
the new encryption functions (Equation (5.10)) an encrypted blacklist is represented by a set
of tuples (a, b) corresponding to each blacklisted element y and can be constructed by a TA as
follows:
BL← {(a, b)} (5.11a)
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BL← {(Eg (y) , Eh (y−1))} . (5.11b)






A New Structure of the Session Pseudonym
A session pseudonym SP as initially expressed in Equation (5.2), has to be calculated in a
slightly different way, namely:
SP ← Eg (x) · Eh (r) , (5.12a)
where x represents a static pseudonym of an e-ticket that has to be checked, see Table 5.2.
Taking into account Equation (5.10), we get:
SP ← gx · hr. (5.12b)
A new form of the session pseudonym, therefore, essentially resembles the basic construct of
Pedersen commitment scheme [119].
The initial form of a Session Pseudonym Tuple (SPT), see Equation (5.5), has to be altered
accordingly:
SPT ← (Eg (x) · Eh (r) , t), where t = x · r. (5.13a)
Taking the expression for the encryption functions into account (Equation 5.10), we get:
SPT ← (gx · hr, t) (5.13b)
and substituting t with x · r:
SPT ← (gx · hr, x · r). (5.13c)
Revocation Check with Encrypted Blacklists
In the setting with encrypted blacklists (see Equations (5.11)) and the updated method for
calculation of session pseudonyms tuples (see Equations (5.12)), the procedure for blacklist
check is performed as follows. Firstly, a terminal extracts t from SPT (recall Equation (5.13b)).
Then operating on a blacklist (see Equations (5.11)), the elements {c} of an auxiliary check
set C are computed as follows:
c← bt · a; (5.14a)
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Taking into account Equations (5.11b) and (5.11c), we obtain respectively:






)x·r · gy, ∀y ∈ BL, t ∈ SPT. (5.14c)
Having performed the aforementioned operations, a terminal acts as in the basic version (see
Section 5.3.3.1). Namely, it pairwise compares the received SP with the elements of C set:
c
?
= SP ∀c ∈ C.
If a match is found, the e-ticket is blacklisted.
5.3.4 Boosting Performance
The presented approach for privacy-preserving local revocation based on blacklists (both vari-
ants) has linear complexity with respect to the number of elements in the blacklist. In order
to boost the performance, the anonymity set of each session pseudonym SP can be reduced
in a controllable way by leveraging the concept of k -anonymity initially presented in [120].
Namely, an e-ticket can additionally deliver its k -anonymous identifier (signed by a TA) to a
terminal during check-in/check-out. This would substantially lower the search time over the
respectively partitioned black list and render O(1) complexity with respect to the number of
elements in the blacklist.
5.3.5 Privacy-preserving Mutual Authentication
5.3.5.1 Bootstrapping Well-established Techniques
A core building block of our solution is mutual authentication between an e-ticket and a
terminal. It is of paramount importance to check the authenticity of communication partners
before engaging into a check-in/check-out session. Note that the majority of the existing
privacy-preserving approaches reviewed in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.19) does not provide for
mutual authentication. As discussed in Section 5.1.1, due to the specific challenges of ESPT
systems which are in focus of this dissertation, many advanced cryptographic constructions
providing for mutual authentication do not suit our purposes. For that reason, a variation
of the widely adopted certificate-base authentication (e.g., with RSA or ECC as underlying
cryptographic primitives) is suggested for the mutual authentication block of our solution. The
details follow in the next section.
5.3.5.2 Key Types
Depending on the subscription type (e.g., weekly, monthly, semester, or yearly pass), an e-
ticket is initialized with the respective group signature key pair, that is Ke ← (k+gr, k−gr). An
e-ticket, therefore, is not distinguishable within that particular group. To the contrary, each
terminal possesses a unique key pair Kt ← (k+t , k−t ). Both, Ke and Kt are signed by the
transport authority (TA) and therefore can be easily checked for authenticity (the public key
of a TA k+ta is known to all parties). Therefore, the mutual authentication step (see Figure 5.3)
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can be efficiently performed by employing simple but powerful and efficient certificate-based
authentication scheme. The employed key types are listed in Table 5.3 for clarity.
Table 5.3: The employed key types for mutual authentication
Key Type
Ke ← (k+gr, k−gr) group key pair of an e-ticket;
Kt ← (k+t , k−t ) unique key pair of a terminal;
Kta ← (k+ta, k−ta) unique key pair of a TA;
5.3.5.3 Integration Into Real-world Systems
An additional benefit of leveraging well-established techniques for mutual authentication lies in
compatibility with the ESPT systems already deployed in the real-world scenario. For exam-
ple, many public transport companies in Germany comply with the so-called core application
standard (VDV-KA), see [36]. Its security architecture relies inter alia on RSA-based cer-
tificates [121]. Therefore, the front-end devices in ESPT conform to VDV-KA are inherently
capable of handling operations required for mutual authentication considered in our solution.
That in turn substantially minimizes additional effort of integration our privacy-preserving
approach into real-world systems.
5.4 Limitations of the Proposed Solution
The proposed solution covers all requirements discussed in Section 3.5 and goes in line with
the adopted attacker model presented in Section 3.6. It has, however, certain limitations as
well. Firstly, secure key management must be supported by a user device. For example, the
corresponding private key k−gr (see Table 5.3) must be secured accordingly (never leave the
dedicated secure area of the device, ect.). Smart cards provide such a mechanism by default.
In case of NFC enabled smartphones, however, additional techniques have to be considered to
secure the private key. A possible way in the latter case would be to leverage the mechanisms
provided by secure elements (see the respective discussion in Section 2.5.2) and additional
software protection.
Secondly, the computations with respect to the creation of a session pseudonym (SP) on
check-in/check-out (see Section 5.3.2) must be carried out in the secure area of a user device.
Otherwise, an arbitrary string instead of the correct SP could be delivered to the terminal.
Relying on secure computations enforced by hardware (and additionally software) is, however,
rather typical for the majority of the deployed e-ticketing systems for which using advanced
and hence extremely resource demanding cryptographic constructs is prohibitive. Moreover,
in the architecture of New German Electronic Identity Card (nPA) [122] rolled out in 2010,
similar assumptions were made with respect to the calculation of a provider-specific revoca-
tion token by a smart card. Namely, during revocation check, service providers have to trust
that the so-called revocation token has been calculated correctly by the smart card (for details,
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see [123, 124]). Well-formedness and correctness of the revocation token itself are not explicitly
checked. It should be noted, however, that it is in theory possible to further enhance revo-
cation check mechanism of our solution by additionally employing special signature schemes
based on advanced zero-knowledge techniques as for example, CL-signatures [125]. The latter
allow to prove the possession of a valid signature for a concealed parameter (such as a static
pseudonym PAi in our case) without revealing the parameter itself. Moreover, they provide
for unlinkability of proofs across multiple sessions and allow to cryptographically bind the en-
crypted nonce value r to the corresponding randomization parameter used for the creation of
the session pseudonym, see Equation (5.5) in Section 5.3.3. Unfortunately, the application of
such advanced cryptographic methods would greatly increase the complexity of our scheme for
revocation check. That would in turn negatively affect the overall front-end performance, which
is time-critical in our case. Similarly, such complexity issues and the resultant performance
considerations were discussed in the context of the New German Identity card, see [126].
Thirdly, certain cryptographic operations required for local revocation check (e.g., discrete
exponentiation) are not directly supported by smart cards out of the box. Therefore, additional
effort may be required (depending on the smart card type) for implementing the developed
approach in the smart card area. However, in case of NFC smartphones, there are crypto-
graphic libraries and hence respective API available which allow for efficient implementation
of our solution.
Furthermore, the price for the privacy-preserving property achieved during the local revo-
cation check (see Section 5.3.3) is efficiency. The proposed solution in its basic form has linear
complexity in the number of blacklisted e-tickets. However, as discussed in Section 5.3.4, the
performance can be substantially enhanced by segmenting the set of all e-tickets and reducing
the anonymity in a controllable way by using the notion of k-anonymity originally presented
in [120]. The challenge in this case is, however, ensuring that e-tickets are equally distributed
across the k-anonymity sets and that specific travel patterns of each particular user (e.g., trav-
eling at night, etc) do not leak additional information to terminals which could be misused to
abuse user privacy.
Lastly, the implications of data mining techniques with respect to customer travel patterns
processed in the back-end have not been directly addressed within this dissertation. Further
research is required to explicitly address this issue which is out of scope of the current work. It is
assumed that in a large city, travel patterns consisting of check-in/out locations corresponding
to stops/stations (which have a rather quantized1 nature) will not leak enough information
to enable customer identification in the back-end. Moreover, the developed privacy-preserving
framework relies on the non-collusion assumption between the TA and TTP. Should that
be violated, privacy against the back-end (see Requirement 1c in Section 3.5) could not be
guaranteed any more within the adopted attacker model (see Section 3.6).
5.5 Integration Effort: Estimation
The proposed solution can be applied to the majority of real-world systems at a relatively low
cost due to the following reasons:
1Note, however, that personal travel patterns originating from much more precise GPS or cellular data are
far more privacy invasive (see [74] for instance).
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1. Loose-coupling. Unlike the majority of other privacy-preserving solutions (see Chapter 4),
ours is based on a semi-coupled architecture which is adopted almost in every large-scale
e-ticketing system for public transport (ESPT) in the world.
2. Several non-colluding entities for billing and payment transactions. As already discussed
in Section 5.2, in many real e-ticketing systems like the ones conform to the German stan-
dard VDV-KA [36], several independent entities cooperate in order to handle payment
transactions and provide for interoperability. For example, in case of VDV-KA, multiple
transport authoritys (TAs) cooperate to ensure seamless travel for customers and share
the revenue. Actual payment transactions with the end user are performed by other
dedicated entities participating in a system – the so-called KVP (Kundenvertragspart-
ner). Therefore, the proposed solution with an external trusted third party (TTP) would
solely require rerouting the system flow via another dedicated privacy-protecting party
(namely, TTP) by leveraging the existing interfaces. Note that the deployed VDV-KA
system is already using external parties primarily for payments handling. For this reason,
an additional effort of integrating a dedicated TTP into the existing infrastructure can
be substantially minimized.
3. Capabilities required from end user devices. Most of the building blocks of our solu-
tion leverage the cryptographic primitives which can be efficiently implemented on the
majority of the user devices currently available on the market. For example, mutual au-
thentication is performed using the slightly tuned version of widely used certificate-based
authentication efficiently supported by both, smart card and smartphone industry.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, our solution for constructing privacy-preserving e-ticketing systems for public
transport (ESPT) was presented. Firstly, the main building blocks comprising the suggested
approach were presented in Section 5.1. In order to provide for basic intuition behind our
solution, a respective outline was made in Section 5.2. A detailed description was presented in
Section 5.3. Lastly, the limitations of the approach together with the estimated effort for its
integration into real-world systems were discussed in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 respectively.
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In the previous chapter, our solution allowing for the development of privacy-preserving e-
ticketing systems in the public transport environment has been presented. In what follows,
the developed approach is going to be assessed in detail. First, the conceptual evaluation is
presented in Section 6.1. It is primarily targeted at formal assessment of requirements satis-
faction provided by the proposed framework as well as at the degree of achieved privacy and
security properties of the system. Second, the feasibility of the proposed solution is demon-
strated by two developed prototypes which description and performance analysis are provided
in Section 6.2. More specifically, the NFC prototype targeted at NFC-enabled smartphones
as a user device is presented in Section 6.2.1. The prototype developed for the smart card
platform is discussed in Section 6.2.2. The chapter is concluded with Section 6.3 where the
research questions introduced in Section 1.3 are discussed.
6.1 Conceptual Evaluation: Satisfying the Core Requirements
In Chapter 3, the core requirements of a privacy-preserving e-ticketing system under design
were discussed together with the adopted attacker model (see Section 3.5 and Section 3.6
respectively). In what follows, it is demonstrated that these requirements are satisfied under
the adopted attacker model and the respective discussion is performed.
First, let us recall the set of core requirements discussed in Section 3.5. For clarity, they are
presented again within this section in Table 6.1. Next, each requirement is separately analyzed
against within each dedicated section below.
6.1.1 Privacy
Protecting customer privacy in the e-ticketing scenario is the main goal of this dissertation.
The subsequent evaluation of the achieved privacy properties is performed with respect to
the capabilities of possible adversaries formally defined as an attacker model and discussed in
Section 3.6.
6.1.1.1 Privacy against external observers
There are two main aspects providing evidence that our solution is secure against external
observers.
First, due to mutual authentication between an e-ticket and a terminal (see Sections 5.1.1
and 5.3.5), the former will not engage into the full protocol without authenticating the terminal
at first. That renders querying attacks from unauthorized terminals/rogue devices essentially
ineffective as no useful information would be released from an e-ticket.
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Table 6.1: A summary of core requirements
1. Privacy
a) Privacy against external observers. An external attacker must be prevented from
deriving any PII from interaction between e-tickets and terminals in the front-end.
b) Privacy against terminals. Terminals must be prohibited from tracking and dis-
tinguishing between valid e-tickets as well as from identifying the users associated
with them.
c) Privacy against the back-end. The back-end is allowed to correlate travel records
related to a single e-ticket while being prohibited from identifying the users asso-
ciated with e-tickets.
2. Fine-grained billing support
3. Loose-coupling
4. Efficiency. Check-in/out events handling must comply with the timing requirements.
5. Multilateral security
Second, the communication between a customer device managing an e-ticket and a terminal
is secured through the respective secure session mechanisms discussed in Section 5.3 (see SC
Establishment in Figure 5.3). Therefore, an external observer tapping the communication in
the front-end of the system is essentially prevented from learning any useful information about
the e-ticket (and its owner) beyond the mere fact that the communication takes place. As a
result, privacy against external observers is guaranteed by the security of the underlying scheme
for secure session establishment. The latter in turn relies on the cryptographic strength of the
primitives used for key exchange (e.g., DH/ECDH or RSA/ECC) and subsequent channel
encryption (e.g., AES, 3DES, etc.).
As a result, under the assumption that the aforementioned cryptographic primitives (with
respective key lengths) are secure, our solution provides protection against external observers.
6.1.1.2 Privacy against terminals
According to the privacy requirement 1 b) (see Table 6.1), terminals must not be able to dis-
tinguish between different e-tickets, track them or identify a customer associated with them.
From the terminal’s perspective, several sessions with the same e-ticket appear to be compu-
tationally indistinguishable from the ones with different e-tickets (see the terminal’s view on
the front-end session in Figure 5.4). Moreover, neither mutual authentication nor revocation
check leak any additional information allowing a terminal to perform tracking or to find out
the concealed static pseudonym. More specifically, mutual authentication only reveals that an
e-ticket is authentic and belongs to a valid group (see Section 5.3.5). For local revocation check,
a terminal gets a session pseudonym tuple from an e-ticket consisting of a session pseudonym
(SP) and an encrypted nonce used to create SP, recall Equation (5.5):
SPT ← (Ek+ta(x · r), Ek+ta(r)).
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Since encryption Ek+ta
(·) is performed under the public key of a transport authority k+ta, a
terminal is essentially prevented from learning the static pseudonym of an e-ticket (represented
by x in the equation above) let alone the identity of the customer associated with it. In this case
it is assumed that the underlying encryption function is secure (see Section 5.3.3). Therefore,
a rogue terminal would have to solve a cryptographic problem which is commonly regarded to
be extremely difficult (e.g., factorizing a large prime or solving a discrete logarithm) in order to
compromise the desired privacy properties of the system. Consequently, our solution provides
protection against possible privacy invasion from the terminal’s side.
6.1.1.3 Privacy against the back-end
Achieving decent privacy properties against the back-end is fairly challenging, since at the
back-end side, certain pieces of information pertaining to user rides are required to enable
fine-grained billing. In our solution, the building block referred to as path reconstruction
(see Section 5.1) covers this issue by essentially providing a privacy overlay which on the one
hand supports fine-grained billing and on the other hand protects user identities from the
back-end. More specifically, the developed pseudonymisation scheme allows the back-end to
restore correlation between the rides pertaining to a user (see Singulation in Figure 5.4) and
extract the static user pseudonym PAi . However, due to the fact that the mapping between
the corresponding user ID and the TTP-side P Ti is kept secret by the TTP, the user ID
remains unknown to the back-end of a transport authority (TA). Since customer payments
are forwarded to the TA from a TTP in an aggregated form, the TA is essentially prevented
from performing any additional inference from payment information which may be used to
infringe on user privacy. As a limitation of our solution, it should be mentioned that the mere
possession of customer travel patterns (even without the knowledge of corresponding user
identities) may incur additional privacy concerns in certain scenarios. This has been already
discussed together with other limitations of the approach in Section 5.4. Note, however, that
the complex issue of patterns mining is out of scope of this dissertation and is not considered
in the attacker model (see additional assumptions in Section 3.6.1).
Summarizing, it can be concluded that the developed solution provides adequate privacy
protection against the back-end within the adopted attacker model.
6.1.2 Fine-grained Billing Support
As discussed in Section 3.5.2, the support for fine-grained billing is an essential functional
requirement for a modern e-ticketing system. In this dissertation, it is enabled through the
path reconstruction building block realized as a custom pseudonymisation scheme (see Sec-
tion 5.3.2 for details). The back-end maintains a set of travel records which were received from
all terminals as a result of check-in/out events in the front-end. Each travel record contains
session pseudonym tuples {SPTj} and context information such as time, station, etc. The
travel records are sorted according to each billing period (e.g. monthly billing). Then the
static customer pseudonym PAi is extracted from each SPTj using the TA’s secret key k
−
ta and
the travel records are respectively correlated to each extracted PAi , i ∈ T with T representing
the subset of all e-tickets having been used within the current billing period. This process is
collectively referred to as singulation (see Figure 5.4). After that, the travel history for each
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pseudonym has been obtained and the back-end can apply any type of billing and discount
policy which was previously negotiated. There are essentially no restrictions on the supported
policy types. End user billing is subsequently performed via the TTP as described in Sec-
tion 5.3.2. It should be mentioned that a positive side effect of fine-grained billing support
is the availability of statistics information. That is of high importance for any TA since it
enables to greatly optimize public transport network and to respond to customer demands
more effectively.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the suggested solution provides support for fine-grained
billing at the same time guaranteeing the protection of customer privacy.
6.1.3 Loose-coupling
The developed privacy-preserving framework is inherently based on the loosely-coupled ar-
chitecture. All time critical interaction in the front-end is handled locally without relying
on real-time connection to the back-end (see Figure 5.3). More specifically, the time critical
part of the framework encompasses mutual authentication and local revocation. Both of these
building blocks were designed to be locally realized in the front-end part. Regular terminal
updates from the back-end (black list updates, maintenance, etc.) are performed in an asyn-
chronous fashion and do not directly affect the handling of check-in/out sessions. Therefore,
the developed solution fully satisfies the loose-coupling requirement.
6.1.4 Efficiency
Handling of check-in/out sessions between e-tickets and terminals is the most time critical part
of the system since it directly affects customer experience. In general, timing requirements for
a single session between an e-ticket and a terminal range from 0.2 sec (London Oyster Card) to
2.0 sec (early versions of Singapore EZ-Link) [72]. It is desirable, however, that the maximum
runtime does not exceed 1 sec.
The developed framework is based on loosely-coupled architecture thus eliminating network
delays which otherwise would be an inherent part of the front-end session runtime. Moreover,
the back-end does not introduce a single point of failure for front-end sessions handling.
As previously discussed, a check-in/out session consists of three parts: (1) secure session
establishment, (2) mutual authentication, and (3) local revocation check. The latter part
(local revocation) is the most time consuming since in its default version, the complexity is
linear in the number of blacklisted e-tickets (see Section 5.3.3.1). However, the performance
can be significantly enhanced if the revocation is performed on partitioned blacklists and each
e-ticket additionally delivers its k-anonymous identifier to the terminal (see Section 5.3.4).
Mutual authentication is for the most part designed to bootstrap well-established techniques
relying on certificate-based authentication (see Section 5.3.5). Due to the wide support of
existing cryptographic libraries and hardware-based acceleration, the time required for mutual
authentication is essentially negligible with respect to local revocation check.
Depending on the exact implementation, the secure session establishment can be either
combined with mutual authentication or carried out in its own right. In the former case,
a secure session per se can be established on virtually no cost. Otherwise, the underlying
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off-the-shelf mechanisms such as the ones compliant to NFC-SEC-01 [61] may be efficiently
bootstrapped.
As a result, the efficiency of the check-in/out sessions is to a large extent defined by the most
costly operation – local revocation check. As it is going to be shown further in Section 6.2, our
practical tests have demonstrated that it is feasible to achieve acceptable performance using
blacklist partitioning and k-anonymous approach.
6.1.5 Multilateral Security
Multilateral security (MLS) is a complex notion capturing the specific security goals of each
party (which may be partly conflicting) as well as the process of negotiation to achieve common
ground for all parties in a system [73]. In the suggested framework, there are two core parties
with distinct security goals: (1) transport authority (TA) and (2) users of the system. The
trusted third party (TTP) essentially acts as an external trusted mediator and in this case
is not explicitly considered within the MLS context. From the TA’s perspective, it has to be
guaranteed that e-tickets cannot be forged (without the substantial effort rendering such forgery
worthless) and that the used transport service is adequately paid for. The users, however,
require that they are billed correctly and cannot be framed for making use of transport service
in case that had not happened in the reality.
The unforgeability of e-tickets is ensured in the first place by the utilization of digital sig-
natures during the issuance process. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the necessary credentials
for using a system cannot be created by the user herself but must be rather obtained from the
TTP in a proper way. The adequate payment for the used transport service is ensured at the
TA side by regular comparison of the overall calculated bill for all customers with the respec-
tive aggregated payment received from the TTP. Should the TA find out any inconsistencies,
it forwards the claim for investigation along with the respective evidence to the TTP. The
latter can then easily find out the culprit since it maintains the end user payment statistics




and user IDs). Moreover, before
aggregating the payments, the TTP can run internal checks to make sure that every user has
indeed paid accordingly. In case of any (repetitive) fraud/payment failures, the TTP forwards
the respective user pseudonym P Tk to the TA so that it can be included into the black list.
At the same time, depending on the exact agreements and regulation, the TTP may forward
the charge claim together with the fraud evidence to the respective law enforcement agency to
enable a fine claim and costs compensation for the unpaid transport service.
The billing correctness can be ensured by regular external audits of TA (out of scope of
this work). With this respect, the suggested framework does not differ from the majority of
deployed e-ticketing systems for public transport (ESPT) which calculate bills internally and
undergo audits. For the reasons discussed in Section 3.5.2.2, the user involvement into billing
process (beyond interaction with terminals during check-in/out sessions) is considered to be
rather impractical. Despite the fact that a user is not actively involved into billing process,
he/she is in principle able to locally compare the correctness of the bill by analyzing the history
of travels stored at his/her device. Note, however, that it requires additional software as well
as the necessary capabilities of a user device (that is, it may be prohibitive for a smart card
to store monthly statistics as a whole without, for example, regularly storing it in parts on
external persistent storage). Should a user have evidence of incorrect billing, a respective
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investigation inquiry can be issued to the TTP.
It should be mentioned that the detailed analysis of each party’s security goals together with
careful consideration of possible conflicts and negotiation processes is out of scope of this work
(which primarily focuses on privacy protection). Rather, it has been demonstrated that the
core security goals of both parties the TA and users are indeed respected by the suggested
framework and are not violated inter alia by the achieved privacy properties.
6.2 Practical Validation
The proposed solution presented in Chapter 5 describes a novel framework for developing
privacy-preserving e-ticketing systems for public transport (ESPT). Whereas during the con-
ceptual evaluation (previous section) the suggested system architecture has been assessed in its
entirety, practical validation of all system processes involved would have been barely feasible
within a single thesis. Recall that the developed framework, in large, consists of three core
processes (see also Figure 5.3): (1) front-end interaction (time critical), (2) back-end process-
ing, and lastly (3) distributed billing. The most critical set of processes from a user point
of view is the first one (front-end interaction) since it directly affects user experience. Poor
performance in the front-end is likely to be reflected in long lines being formed near terminals,
nuisance, and eventually user dissatisfaction. Moreover, front-end interaction represents the
part of a system most specific to the e-ticketing scenario in terms of hardware (user devices and
terminals) and the respective pieces of software. Therefore, to demonstrate practical relevance
and feasibility of our solution, its performance in the front-end has to be assessed in the first




















Figure 6.1: Practically evaluated part of the developed framework
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6.2.1 The Developed NFC-based Prototype
6.2.1.1 Introductory Discussion
As discussed in Section 2.5, the front-end communication between user devices managing e-
tickets and terminals is performed via a wireless interface compliant to RFID or NFC standard.
In ESPT environment, NFC can be viewed as a unification of different RFID-based e-ticketing
standards such as MIFARE, Calypso or FeliCa. Therefore, an NFC-enabled smartphone as
a user device is in principle backwards-compatible with the legacy systems based on RFID.
Providing the full support of all NFC modes as defined by the NFC forum (see Section 2.5.2)
is, however, left to each smartphone vendor. Currently, the popularity of headsets equipped
with NFC is rapidly growing. According to the report from analytics company IHS [127], the
worldwide shipments of smartphones supporting NFC have been predicted to rise by 325% from
2013 to the end of 2018. Therefore, using a smartphone as a single user device for managing
several e-tickets originating from different TAs (possibly on an international level) is no longer









Figure 6.2: NFC-enabled smartphone as a single user device hosting multiple e-tickets
Moreover, NFC-enabled smartphones based on Android OS are currently dominating the
market. It is reported that in 2013 around 93% of all smartphones supporting NFC were
running Android and such upward trend is likely to be further maintained [127]. Taking the
aforementioned issues into account, it was decided to validate the developed framework in the
first place on NFC platform using commodity user devices with Android OS.
6.2.1.2 Prototype Description
The developed front-end prototype of ESPT is essentially comprised of (1) a user device (in
the form of an NFC-capable smartphone) and (2) a terminal. The latter can be further divided
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into (a) NFC reader part and (b) main computing unit (see Figure 6.3 and Table 6.2). The
decision to modularize the NFC terminal into two parts is aimed at decoupling the process of
NFC communication (covered by the NFC reader part) and the protocol logic itself such as
control of session parameters, black list check, etc. (performed by the main computing unit).
Moreover, due to technical limitations of common USB NFC readers, the NFC reader part had
to be implemented using custom hardware, see further.
NFC-enabled	Smart	Phone
User	Side Terminal	Side
NFC	Front-end(PN532	Breakout	Board) NFC	Front-end	Controller(Raspberry	Pi	Model	B) Main	Computing	Unit(Commodity	Computer) Interface	to	the	back-endSPI
NFC	Reader	Part
NFC
Figure 6.3: The developed front-end prototype based on NFC. SPI stands for serial peripheral
interface.
Hardware part. The pieces of hardware comprising the prototype are summarized in Table 6.2
for clarity. A user device was represented by a commodity NFC smartphone Samsung Galaxy
Nexus GT-I9250. At the terminal side, the following pieces of hardware were used. First,
the NFC reader part consisted of (i) the NFC front-end represented by PN532 Breakout
Board (essentially acting as a controllable NFC antenna) and (ii) NFC controller in the form
of Raspberry Pi Model B with 256MB RAM. The control logic pertinent to the front-end
framework processes as described in Chapter 5 was handled by the main computing unit
implemented by a commodity computer Dell Vostro 3700, Intel Core i5 M 460 (2,53GHz).
Initially, in order to enable NFC communication, an attempt was made to leverage several
existing USB-based NFC readers and by this to eliminate the necessity of building a custom
NFC reader part. However, as the first practical tests have shown, the NFC library libNFC [128]
installed at the main computing unit to control terminal-side communication, turned out to
be intolerant of specific delays introduced by the interactive protocol implemented on top (see
the discussion on the encountered issues further in Section 6.2.1.5). Therefore, a decision
was made to resort to a custom built NFC Reader part which is based on PN532 Breakout
board (essentially an NFC antenna) connected via a serial peripheral interface (SPI) bus to
the Raspberry Pi Model B (depicted in Figure 6.3). Due to the SPI connection, the issues
with delay intolerance and resultant messages drop could be overcome1.
Software part. At the user side, the native Android OS was substituted by the open source
CyanogenMod version 11 (based on Android 4.4) [130] due to the lack of support for firmware
updates for the used NFC smartphone. Moreover, the utilization of CyanogenMod OS enabled
more flexibility during prototype testing and debugging. At the user device, two distinct
apps were implemented: (1) one to enable communication via the NFC interface (NFC app)
1The detailed analysis of different NFC reader types and their suitability for interactive NFC communication
as well as the eventual implementation of the underlying interface via NFC were performed at our department
by Manuel Weißbach within the dedicated student project [129]
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Table 6.2: The front-end prototype based on NFC: hardware
Part Hardware piece used
1. User side Samsung Galaxy Nexus GT-I9250
2. Terminal side:
a) NFC reader part:
(i) NFC front-end PN532 Breakout Board
(ii) NFC controller Raspberry Pi Model B, 256MB RAM
b) Main computing unit Dell Vostro 3700, Intel Core i5 M 460 (2,53GHz)













Figure 6.4: Communication stack in the developed NFC prototype.
The reason for this modularization is the following. Early tests have shown that the P2P
mode (see Section 2.5.2) provided by Android OS in fact does not allow for repetitive interac-
tive communication. It turned out that the only operation for which this mode was explicitly
considered was a one-time stateless message exchange between two NFC devices after which the
NFC connection gets automatically terminated. In order to overcome this, a decision has been
made to implement the underlying interactive NFC communication using the so-called ”inverse
reader mode” first introduced in [131] and further extended at our department in [129]. This
mode emulates a fully interactive bidirectional communication by having a smartphone acting
in a standard reader/writer mode and the NFC Reader part of a terminal in card emulation
mode. As a result, in order to send a message to the terminal, a smartphone writes it to the
tag emulated at the terminal side (write tag operation in reader/writer mode). The message
gets read out from the emulated tag by the terminal and the new message to be sent to the
smartphone is written to the tag (overwriting the old one). The smartphone then subsequently
reads the new message out (read tag operation) and is ready to respond back in the way de-
scribed above. At the smartphone side, the inverse reader mode is handled by the NFC app
(see above) running in the background and abstracting the details of the underlying NFC com-
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munication from the e-ticketing app1. The latter is responsible for the actual implementation
of the user-side protocol steps defined by the developed privacy-preserving framework.
At the terminal side, the inverse reader mode was handled by an open source C-based li-
brary for NFC communication libNFC [128] and a piece of custom code adding the necessary
functionality to enable interactive NFC communication (see Figure 6.4). The logic respon-
sible for the actual protocol prescribed by the developed privacy-preserving framework was
implemented in Java.
6.2.1.3 Setting description
As discussed in Chapter 5, a single check-in/out event in the front-end of the developed privacy-
preserving framework consists of three main steps: (1) secure session establishment, (2) mutual









Figure 6.5: Main steps performed during a single check-in/out session
In order to secure the communication session (see the first step in Figure 6.5), an application-
specific (i.e. handled by the e-ticketing app and its counterpart at the terminal side) Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key exchange was used with modulo bit length being varied from 1024 to 4096.
The exchanged DH key is used to derive a 256-bit AES key (operating in CBC2 mode) to secure
further communication. In order to provide for mutual authentication (step 2 in Figure 6.5),
RSA-based certificates were used as discussed in Section 5.3.5 with key length varied from 1024
to 4096 bit. Lastly, local revocation check consists of the e-ticketing app calculating the session
pseudonym tuple (SPT, see Section 5.3.3), sending it to the terminal side where the extracted
session pseudonym (SP) is used to perform blacklist check. The size of blacklists was varied
from 100 to 10000 elements. The implemented front-end session is summarized in Figure 6.6
for clarity with the respective notations presented in Table 6.3 for convenience.
6.2.1.4 Performance analysis
The front-end performance of the developed privacy-preserving framework was assessed by
measuring the total execution time required to serve a single check-in/check-out event (exclud-
ing the delay introduced by the underlying NFC channel). The aforementioned run time was
measured depending on the size of the blacklist at the terminal side for three different settings
with key lengths for DH secure channel establishment and RSA-based mutual authentication
of 1024, 2048, and 4096 bits. As presented in Figures 6.6, the run time consists of (1) secure
1The e-ticketing app together with the corresponding terminal part was implemented at our department by
Pavel Plakhin within the dedicated student project [132] at our department.




















1. Secure channel establishment
Generate a ∈R [1, q − 1], A← ga mod p A−−−−−−→
Check that A ∈ G = 〈g〉
Generate b ∈R [1, q − 1], B ← gb mod p
B←−−−−−−
Check that B ∈ G = 〈g〉
Compute ksh ← Ba mod p, derive kaes Compute ksh ← Ab mod p, derive kaes
2. Mutual authentication
Compute SA ← signk−gr (A)
SA−−−−−−→
Check SA, compute SB ← signk−t (B)
SB , St←−−−−−−
Check SB , St
3. Local revocation check
Generate random r
Compute SPT ← (E
k+ta
(PAi · r), Ek+ta(r)
) SPT−−−−−−→
Do revocation check (as discussed
in Section 5.3.3, see Algorithm 1)
Figure 6.6: A summary of the implemented front-end session.
channel establishment, (2) mutual authentication, and (3) local revocation check. Protocol
complexity is essentially defined by the terminal-side calculations during the last step – local
revocation. The latter in turn linearly depends on the number of blacklisted elements currently
comprising the blacklist. Therefore, the measurements were targeted at assessing the run time
performance with respect to the number of the elements in the blacklist. The dependencies
between the blacklist size and run time for key lengths 1024, 2048, as well as for 4096 bits are
presented in Figure 6.7, Figure 6.8, and Figure 6.9 respectively.
As it was discussed in Section 3.5, the run time requirements vary from 200ms to 2000ms
depending on each particular e-ticketing system. In most of the modern ESPT aiming at
enhancing user experience, much effort is targeted at keeping the run time of a single check-
in/out session below 1000ms. Therefore, in order to assess the performance of the implemented
prototype, the following run time sets are considered for analysis:
1. Acceptable performance (AP ). The set is defined by the area corresponding to the accept-
able performance which is limited by point A with the associated run time of 2000ms.
The area is marked with light yellow color in Figures 6.7, 6.8, 6.9.
2. Optimal performance (OP ). The set is defined by the area corresponding to the optimal
performance which is limited by point B associated with the run time of 1000ms. The
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OP area is marked with light green color in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8. Note that the
values corresponding to the OP area form a subset of the ones related to AP.











a unique key pair of a terminal;





a unique key pair of a TA;
(g, q, p) parameters forming a group G = 〈g〉;





a session pseudonym, SPj ;(
Ek+ta
(PAi · r), Ek+ta(r)
)
a session pseudonym tuple (SPT );
ksh a shared key agreed upon using DH;
kaes a session AES key derived from ksh;
SA a public ephemeral DH key signed by the e-ticket;
SB a public ephemeral DH key signed by the terminal.
In the cases corresponding to key sizes of 1024 and 2048 bits (Figures 6.7, 6.8), the optimal
point on the graph can be chosen from the subset of points lying in the area of optimal
performance: Popt (Kopt, Topt) ∈ OP such that Kopt = 1000. This point on the performance
curve represents the run time value corresponding to the number of elements in the blacklist
(against which the check is performed) equal to 1000. Popt can be used for boosting the
performance of front-end sessions by leveraging the k-anonymity approach and partitioning the
blacklist respectively (as discussed in Section 5.3.4). Therefore, in the implemented setting,
the k-anonymity parameter would correspond to Kopt = 1000. For privacy reasons, it would
be desired to have this parameter as large as possible. The value of Kopt, however, is limited
by the optimal performance area (OP ) defined by the run time of 1000 ms (see point B on
both graphs in Figures 6.7, 6.8).
In case of the last setting with 4096-bit keys (see Figure 6.9), no OP area can be observed,
since even with only a few elements in the blacklist, the minimum run time was measured to
be beyond 1500ms. The reason for this is the relatively long key size and consequently a much
longer processing time required for secure session establishment, mutual authentication, and
blacklist check (especially with respect to the user device part). However, even in this case
an acceptable configuration can be determined which is defined by point Pacc in Figure 6.9
with corresponding blacklist size (or alternatively a k-anonymity parameter) of Kacc = 1000
elements and run time Tacc = 1883ms.
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The optimal configuration (or alternatively the acceptable one in the last setting) achieved
with our prototype is summarized in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: NFC Prototype performance with 1000 elements in the blacklist.
Setting Key size Run time
1) 1024 bits 686ms
2) 2048 bits 907ms
3) 4096 bits 1833ms
Therefore, it can be summarized that the developed prototype has demonstrated the viability
of the front-end part of the suggested privacy-preserving framework. The observed performance
lies within the optimal area (with run time less than 1000ms and blacklist size of 1000 elements)
for key lengths of 1024 and 2048 bits currently actively used in practice. According to the recent
report from the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) [133], the key length of 2048 bits
is going to remain secure till the end of 2020 and for this reason it is explicitly advised to
be used for future applications. Hence, the achieved performance for the second setting with
2048-bit keys does not only demonstrate the real-world pertinence1 of our prototype at this



























Run time vs. the size of the blacklist, key size 1024 bits
Figure 6.7: NFC prototype. Performance of check-in/out events handling with respect to the
size of the blacklist. Key sizes used are 1024 bits.





























Run time vs. the size of the blacklist, key size 2048 bits
Figure 6.8: NFC prototype. Performance of check-in/out events handling with respect to the
size of the blacklist. Key sizes used are 2048 bits.
6.2.1.5 Encountered Issues and Collateral Findings
During the implementation work, several challenges were faced and needed to be overcome.
Firstly, the implementation of the underlying fully interactive, stateful communication via
the NFC interface turned out not to be directly supported by the available NFC-related API
of Android. That is to say, none of the three modes considered by the NFC forum (P2P,
reader/writer, and card emulation) could be directly leveraged to implement an interactive
protocol on top of NFC communication. Despite of the declared support for a P2P mode
which is the first obvious choice to leverage, it turned out that after a single round of bidirec-
tional messages exchange, the communication would be automatically terminated. In order to
perform another exchange round, NFC communication had to be initiated again by removing
the devices from mutual vicinity area and returning them there again. This has rendered the
off-the-shelf P2P mode unsuitable for the prototype. Due to this fact, a decision was made
to resort to a custom mode based on the so-called ”inverse reader mode” firstly mentioned
in [131] and further enhanced at our department in [129]. The concept is based on having a
user device acting in a conventional reader/writer mode (constantly changing between writing
and reading operations) and the terminal being run in a card emulation mode (essentially
emulating a re-writable NFC tag). Then, a user device performs a write operation to send a
message to the terminal side and a read operation to get the new message from the terminal.







Tacc Tacc = 1883ms
Kacc = 1000





















Run time vs. the size of the blacklist, key size 4096 bits
Figure 6.9: NFC prototype. Performance of check-in/out events handling with respect to the
size of the blacklist. Key sizes used are 4096 bits.
one to be transmitted to the user device. By this, a fully interactive stateful communication
over the NFC interface could be achieved.
Another issue encountered with respect to the implementation of the custom inverse reader
mode is related to commercially available NFC readers. It turned out that most of them were
unable to efficiently support card emulation mode using the libNFC library. More specifically,
card emulation was either not supported at all or it was not functioning stably due to timing-
requirements imposed by libNFC (especially in case of longer messages [129]). The reason is
likely to be the specific model of NFC chip used (with the respective low-level NFC stack)
and the connection type between the NFC chip and the rest of the circuitry. For example,
with respect to the latter issue (connection type), the USB-to-UART1 bridge turned out to
be unstable in our case compared to the connection via a serial peripheral interface (SPI)
which is widely used in industry. The possible reason may be the SPI interface is faster than
the USB-to-UART bridge. Due to these limitations, it was decided to implement an NFC
reader using the NFC chip with card emulation support (namely PN532-NFC model) and a
controlling single-board computer Raspberry Pi interconnected via a faster serial peripheral
interface (SPI), see Figure 6.3. It has to be additionally noted that during this research, it
could be concluded that to the best of our knowledge the majority of industrially deployed
NFC readers are based on SPI connection.
1UART stays for universal asynchronous receiver transmitter.
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Moreover, an attempt was made to further enhance front-end performance by leveraging
the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) with smaller key sizes instead of RSA. Contrary to
our expectations, the achieved performance (especially at the user side) was nearly one or-
der of magnitude worse (i.e. slower) than in case of RSA. The reason for this is likely to be
twofold. First, the cryptographic Java-based library used for the implementation (Spoungy-
Castle 1.5.0.0) seems to provide a rather inefficient support for ECC. Being confronted with the
similar issue, the authors of [134] further elaborate that it can be caused by the fact that the
intrinsic operations required by ECC such as point multiplication are internally implemented
on top of the underlying Java BigInteger class leading to considerable inefficiency. Second, the
user device may not be providing dedicated hardware support (e.g. hardware acceleration in
the form of a co-processor) for ECC-related operations.
6.2.2 The Developed Prototype for the Smart Card Platform
A separate prototype was developed to assess the front-end performance in case a smart card
with an RFID contactless interface is used as a customer device. A Java card platform [135]
was chosen for the implementation. Namely, an NXP J3A080 Java smart card was utilized as
a user device. The terminal side was comprised of a smart card reader represented by Reiner
SCT cyberJack RFID and a controlling machine Intel Quad Core i5, 2,4 GHz each, 8 GB RAM
with Ubuntu 12.04 (64 bit), see Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: The front-end prototype based on RFID and Java Card Platform: hardware
Part Hardware piece used
1. User side J3A080 NXP Java Card
2. Terminal side:
a) RFID reader part: Reiner SCT cyberJack RFID
b) Main computing unit Intel Quad Core i5 (2,4 GHz)
The Java card model which was available for our tests does not provide direct support
for modular multiplication and exponentiation unlike other cards based on MULTOS plat-
form [136] which have been used, for example, during IRMA (”I Reveal My Attributes”)
project [137]. It is in principle possible to overcome these limitations by leveraging the RSA
cryptographic co-processor of a Java card through delegation of modular exponentiation to
low-level implementation of RSA encryption function as it was performed in [138]. Modular
multiplication can be realized using an external library which was tested at our department
within the corresponding student project [139]. The resultant efficiency, however, remains es-
sentially prohibitive for this generation of Java cards. Therefore, it was decided to slightly
modify the initial framework by using an XOR operation instead of modular multiplication
and RSA encryption instead of custom modular exponentiation for (1) session pseudonym
creation and respectively for (2) blacklist check. More specifically, in the modified version, the



















Note that in this case, the randomization factor r is sent in clear to the terminal, which
however does not jeopardize security. At the terminal side, local revocation is performed by
extracting r from SPTi, pairwise applying XOR operation to each element in the blacklist
BL : {y}, and subsequently encrypting the result under the public key of a TA. Lastly, the
outcome is compared with the delivered SPi:
∀y ∈ BL, c← Ersa
k+ta
(r ⊕ y) , c ?= SPi. (6.3)
Thus by performing the aforementioned slight alterations to the initial front-end protocol
discussed in Chapter 5, the support for this class of Java cards could be provided. Note that
for the rest of the developed framework, it is essentially transparent how exactly the defined
front-end interaction is implemented. The general logic of a framework retains its properties
as well. It has to be mentioned, however, that in the altered version adapted to the Java
card platform, the realization of encrypted blacklists (as discussed in Section 5.3.3.2) is not
possible without further modifications and computation tricks mentioned at the beginning of
this section.
Java card platform provides an internal support for DH key agreement. Therefore, there
was not need to create an application-defined key exchange as it was done in case of the NFC
prototype (see Figure 6.6 for comparison). With respect to the rest of the protocol, mutual
authentication and local revocation steps essentially follow the pattern presented in Figure 6.6
during the discussion of the NFC prototype (with the slight modifications discussed above).
Due to performance reasons, the key lengths used during testing were limited to 1024 bits.
The evaluation results1 are presented in Figure 6.10.
6.2.2.1 Performance analysis
As the measurements have demonstrated, the performance of the smart card prototype is in
general worse compared to the NFC implementation. The area of optimal performance (OP)
as defined in Section 6.2.1.4 could not be observed at all, similarly to the third setting of NFC
prototype with 4096-bit keys. Analyzing the achieved acceptable performance (see point A
in Figure 6.10), an acceptable configuration can be determined. The latter is represented by
point Pacc with the number of blacklisted elements (or alternatively a k-anonymity parameter)
of Kacc = 1000 and run time Tacc = 1856ms (see Figure 6.10).
The achieved performance of the developed smart card prototype can be explained by the
resource constrained environment of the Java card used. The latter is reflected in the first
place in the processing time pertaining to relatively heavy cryptographic operations, such as
RSA signature generation and verification as well as decryption. It has to be mentioned that
the results of benchmarking tests performed in [141] for the model of Java card used in our
prototype back this claim. However, despite the inherent limitations of the Java card platform,
1The implementation work for the Java card prototype was performed at our department within the respec-




























Run time vs. the size of the blacklist, key size 1024 bits
Figure 6.10: RFID prototype. Performance of check-in/out events handling with respect to
the size of the blacklist. Key sizes used are 1024 bits.
the developed prototype demonstrated acceptable performance and hence the feasibility of the
developed solution in the smart card environment.
6.2.2.2 Potential for Performance Optimization
Due to the specifics of Java card application development, it can be assumed that further code
optimization can enhance prototype performance. Moreover, the smart cards based on other
operating systems (such as MULTOS [136]) provide more APIs for low-level mathematical
operations and memory management and consequently are likely to demonstrate significantly
better results including more efficient handling of RSA keys with length greater than 1024 bits.
In our case, the equipment already available at the department was used for the evaluation.
6.2.3 Evaluation Results: Summary
Summarizing the evaluation results, it can be concluded that the front-end of the developed
privacy-preserving framework was successfully evaluated for two main use cases: NFC-enabled
smartphones and smart cards. In general, the NFC prototype performed better than the smart
card one taking into account the number of blacklisted elements, run time, and key sizes.
For both proof-of-concept implementations, further code optimization is likely to provide for
performance gain and better stability. In case of smart cards, the utilization of newer hardware
(for the user device) is expected to bring significant enhancements to the overall performance.
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As presented at the beginning of the thesis in Section 1.3, the main goal of this work is the
development of a privacy-preserving framework for building loosely-coupled e-ticketing systems
for public transport allowing (1) local validation of e-tickets and (2) supporting fine-grained
billing for registered customers. Based on that, the specific research questions were derived in
Section 1.3 which now can be answered below.
Research Question 1.
How to provide for a privacy-preserving local validation at the terminal side such that:
a) valid e-tickets remain anonymous to the terminal;
b) invalid e-tickets are rejected.
As presented in Chapter 5, the developed solution essentially consists of three main building
blocks: (1) mutual authentication, (2) local revocation, and (3) path reconstruction. The
suggested mutual authentication mechanism discussed in Section 5.3.5 ensures that (a) user
devices (managing corresponding e-tickets) engage into full communication sessions only with
authorized terminals, (b) terminals can check the validity of travel permission and at the same
time learn no further information on the e-ticket itself (no tracking or identifying the asso-
ciated user is possible). Furthermore, the developed approach for local revocation presented
in Section 5.3.3 ensures that the blacklisted e-tickets (for example, the ones associated with
customers who failed to pay their bills, or in case of theft, etc.) are rejected without negatively
affecting the privacy of those users associated with the valid e-tickets. Therefore, the research
question 1 could be fully answered.
Research Question 2.
How to allow for privacy-preserving travel records processing in the back-end such that:
a) fine-grained billing for the registered tickets is possible;
b) customer identification is prevented.
The third building block of the suggested solution – path reconstruction – realized in the form
of a custom pseudonymisation scheme (see Section 5.3.2) ensures that on the one hand, the
back-end has enough information to perform fine-grained billing (possibly taking into account
different pricing schemes and discounts) and on the other hand is prohibited from identifying
customers associated with e-tickets. The employed pseudonymisation scheme essentially creates
a privacy overlay enabling travel records processing in the back-end with the desired privacy
properties. Consequently, an answer to the second research question is thereby provided.
Summarizing, it can be concluded that both research questions together with the core chal-
lenges defined at the beginning of the thesis could be answered by the developed privacy-




In this chapter, the evaluation of the developed privacy-preserving framework presented in
Chapter 5 was provided. First, in Section 6.1 the conceptual evaluation was performed with
respect to the satisfaction of the core requirements. Practical evaluation of the most critical
part of the framework – front-end interaction – was discussed in Section 6.2. More specifi-
cally, the developed NFC prototype supporting the NFC-enabled smartphone as a user device
was discussed and assessed in Section 6.2.1. The prototype for the smart card platform was
presented in Section 6.2.2. After practical validation, the answers to the research questions
defined at the beginning of the dissertation were provided in Section 6.3.
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In this thesis, the focus was made on privacy-preserving e-ticketing systems for public transport
which are based on RFID and NFC technologies. Due to dynamic technological advance and
primary focus being set on immediate functionality, the issues of privacy protection are often
not properly addressed (if at all). Moreover, despite the existing privacy awareness in the
European society, it is in the most cases still not sufficient to become a tangible factor providing
enough motivation for companies to develop and roll out systems which are privacy-preserving
from the outset. This dissertation aims at tackling the technological aspect of this issue in
public transport scenario. In order to approach the problem in a holistic way, the necessary
background on e-ticketing systems and underlying technologies (RFID and NFC) was provided
in Chapter 2 together with the respective analysis and discussion. Chapter 3 then introduced
the problem of privacy protection in the e-ticketing scenario by describing privacy from a
technical perspective, providing an overview of generic threats and countermeasures as well
as by analyzing the extent to which the notion of privacy is considered in the previously
discussed RFID and NFC standards. The aforementioned overview and analysis have shown
that additional substantial effort is required to provide for privacy protection in the domain
of e-ticketing systems for public transport. This analysis paves the way to further discussion
of core requirements posed to a privacy-preserving e-ticketing system which was presented in
Chapter 3 along with the adopted attacker model. Having introduced the privacy problem
in the target domain and discussed the requirements in Chapter 3, a detailed analysis of the
related work was performed in Chapter 4. Prior to the related work review, the evaluation
criteria were discussed which were essentially derived from the requirements and attacker
model. Based on these evaluation criteria, the related work analysis was performed. As a result,
it could be concluded that none of the reviewed approaches fully satisfies the requirements
which motivates further research in this area. Our solution presented in Chapter 5 covers
this issue. During the description of our approach, the general idea together with the main
building blocks were discussed at first. Then the elaboration on our solution was presented with
each building block being discussed in detail. Chapter 6 evaluated the suggested approach.
First, a conceptual evaluation was presented. The practical part demonstrated feasibility of
our solution by presenting two prototypes and assessing their performance. Each prototype
addressed the use-case with a user device being represented by an RFID-based smart card and
an NFC-enabled smartphone, respectively.
Main contribution of this work is, therefore, the development of a framework which allows
to design privacy-preserving e-ticketing systems in public transport domain while preserving
the core advantages of such systems, such as fine-grained billing support, flexible fare policies
and transparent use. Moreover, this thesis provides the classification of privacy-preserving
solutions developed so far together with the respective taxonomy which can be used for future
research projects in this area. Furthermore, the created overview of different types of e-ticketing
systems based on various classification parameters such as e-ticket types, the degree of user
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involvement, etc., is to the best of our knowledge currently one of the most holistic ones.
As a conclusion, it has to be mentioned that addressing privacy inevitably entails a certain
degree of trade-offs between the achieved privacy protection and system functionality as well as
between privacy and overall system cost. Moreover, the effort to achieve strong security with
optimal efficiency is often prioritized over privacy protection resulting in secure but privacy-
invasive systems. Therefore, a careful analysis together with a strong motivation for privacy
are required to tackle this issue. This thesis, therefore, presents a solution where privacy is
explicitly considered from the outset following the famous but unfortunately often overlooked
privacy-by-design paradigm.
In future, it would be desirable to extend our work with usability tests, further optimize the
developed prototypes and include more user-friendly GUIs into them. Moreover, our solution
would benefit from further research on travel patterns mining and more efficient cryptographic
primitives (and their implementations).
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